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ABSTRACT 
The management of common pool resources and policy conflicts between livestock and wildlife, 
two land-use types that take place in the same geo-spatial area has been a subject of debate 
among scholars for decades. This conflict in policies has engendered in communities which are 
beneficiaries attitudes that are either negative towards wildlife or favorable depending on the 
benefits they derive from them. This research therefore set out to understand the conflicts in the 
management of the Okavango Delta Ramsar Site (ODRS) where the OD is situated. The study 
used the grounded theory to collect and analyze the data in the ODRS from the respondent 
communities. The study finds that most members of the community had a favorable attitude 
towards CBNRM and the livestock policies. There is a difference in attitudes between 
communities that depend solely on CBNRM for livelihood and those that had alternative sources 
of livelihood such as cattle. The communities which depend only on CBNRM were strongly in 
favor of the policy and could not conceive life without CBNRM. Those which are not part of 
CBNRM and won cattle were against CBNRM as they felt it protected wild animals at the 
expense of livestock. The mixed reaction came from communities that are involved with both 
livestock and wildlife. The negative attitudes were expressed with regard to the decision making 
process concerning both livestock and wildlife polices as communities felt they were excluded 
and only informed about these policies. The study concluded that the power holders used their 
mobilization of process and bias to circumvent the communities in decision-making to avoid 
conflict.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The Okavango Delta ecosystem is threatened with degradation due to competing land 
uses between agriculture, wildlife and settlements which exist in the same spatial location. The 
Okavango Delta (OD) is the largest inland Delta in the world and was declared a Ramsar site in 
1997 after Botswana ratified the Ramsar convention the same year (Tawana Land Board, 2005). 
The convention necessitated that the Botswana government cooperate with other countries in the 
region (namely Namibia and Angola through which the Delta water flow before it enters 
Botswana)  as well as International Organizations, notably the United Nations through its organ, 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (Ramsar 
Convention Secretariat, 2011) for the Delta’s conservation.   The contracting parties to the 
convention are under obligation to conserve and ‘wise use’ of their respective wetlands (Ramsar 
Convention Secretariat, 2011). Ratifying the convention has implications for national and local 
policy making with consequences for the local communities living in proximity to the wetland.  
The implications include the need for the contracting nation to align specific policies with the 
convention or have specific policies intended for the conservation of the wetland. 
The purpose of this research therefore is to understand the conflicts in the management of 
the Okavango Delta Ramsar Site (ODRS) where the OD is situated. To develop this 
understanding I evaluate attitudes of individuals who live in communities of the ODRS towards 
natural resource conservation policies as well as agricultural policies. To achieve this task, the 
research addressed three issues that influence attitudes with respect to land use in the ODRS. 
These issues are: 1) national livestock policies, specifically the animal disease control policy, 2) 
the Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) program/policy on the 
development of the communities of the ODRS, and 3) the decision-making process and 
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interactions among the different stakeholders and government agencies Ministry of Agriculture 
(MoA) and Ministry of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism (MEWT) within the ODRS. The 
analysis consists of a comparison of attitudes towards conservation among individuals in 
communities whose primary sources of livelihood are wildlife-based tourism only and those that 
derive their livelihood from both wildlife-based tourism and agriculture. In order to conduct this 
analysis, several research tasks were undertaken. First, I provide a descriptive analysis of the 
livelihood strategies of the people living within the ODRS and on the nearby protected lands. 
Second, I describe impacts of differing livelihood strategies on the physical environment of the 
Delta and effects of the environmental and natural resources mitigation strategies that are 
practiced. These basic descriptions provide a baseline of attitudes and perceptions of 
communities towards the array of conservation and livestock policies implemented in the ODRS. 
Inherent in such an assessment of the communities’ role in the implementation of CBNRM is the 
role of non-tourist livelihood strategies such as agriculture and subsistence hunting in the ODRS. 
This line of research fits into a larger body of research that is concerned with bio-diversity loss 
and environmental degradation which threatens human livelihoods (WRI, 2005; Harper 2004) 
The purpose of this initial chapter is two-fold. First, I provide a broad-based background 
on the region under consideration. The background focuses on Botswana generally and the 
Okavango Delta Ramsar Site in particular. This section considers the size, topography and 
climate, as well as social, political and economic issues of Botswana. Second, the theoretical 
framework is discussed and focuses on the theories of the commons with specific reference to 
tragedy of the commons, the logic of collective action, game theory and the institutional analysis 
and development. The chapter concludes with the summary of dissertation organization. 
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1.1.    Background Study 
The section presents the following: the project location and a discussion of the ecosystem 
of the area. Secondly, the social, political, and economic issues are presented, followed by the 
importance of the ODRS to the Botswana economy, the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) region, and the world. The statement of the problem is presented next and 
the last topic presented under this section is the significance of the study.  
1.1.2. Project Location, Topography and Climate 
Botswana is located in the southern part of Africa sandwiched between South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, Zambia and Namibia. It is completely land locked relying on South Africa for access 
to the seaports. The country has a total area of 582,000 km2 divided into three main land tenure 
systems. These are the communal or customary land, state land, and the freehold land, which 
occupy 70 %, 25 % and 5 % of the country’s surface area respectively MFDP, 2010).  
Botswana is approximately 1,000m above sea level. It is generally flat with a few 
occasional outcrops especially in the eastern part of the country. The country is largely arid and 
semi-arid due to its position in the dry Kgalagadi ecosystem and its proximity to the sub-tropical 
high-pressure belt. 
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Figure 1: Map of Botswana 
 
Source:http://www.mapsofworld.com/botswana/botswana-political-map.html 
  
Annual rainfall averages from 250mm in the extreme southwest which is the Kgalagadi region to 
650 mm in the extreme northwest where the Ngamiland region (MFDP, 2010). 
1.1.3. Social, Political, and Economic Issues 
Botswana society is composed of several tribes most of which have agriculture as the 
dominant livelihood activities in the rural areas. There are eight principal tribes recognized by 
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the Botswana constitution: Bangwato, Bakgatla, Bangwaketse, Bakwena, Balete, Batawana, 
Barolong and Batlokwa. Other tribes such as the Bakalanga, Basarwa, Bakgalagadi, Baherero, 
Basubiya, Bambukushu, Bayeyi and Bakoba are recognized as minor tribes. With the exception 
of Basarwa, these various tribes arrived in the territory at different times in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries (Colclough and McCarthy, 1980). Almost all these tribes except the Balete 
moved into Botswana from Transvaal in South Africa. 
The Bambukushu, Bakoba, Bayeyi and Basarwa are concentrated around the Okavango 
Delta in the Ngamiland region. The Basarwa are additionally located in other parts of the country 
due to displacement after conquest during the early tribal wars of the 18th century (Colclough and 
McCarthy, 1980). The Basubiya are located in the Chobe area of the Ngamiland region. The 
Bakgalagadi are found in the Kgalagadi and Ghanzi districts in the western part of the country. 
The remaining groups are all located in the eastern and south eastern part of the country (as 
shown in figure 1) as follows: Balete in Southeast district, Bangwaketse in Southern district, 
Bakwena in Kweneng district, Bakgatla in Kgatleng district, Bangwato in Central district, and 
Batawana in the Ngamiland district while the Bakalanga are located in the Northeast district. 
The traditional Botswana economy before independence in 1966 was self-sufficient with 
families dependent on the land to satisfy their daily needs. Their diet consisted of “…sorghum 
porridge, milk, the meat of wild and domestic animals, vegetable dishes made from crops and 
wild plants and beer” (Colclough and McCarthy, 1980).  The land holding was communal and 
under the administration of the tribal chiefs. Chiefs worked with Headmen who were responsible 
for administration in their small villages and wards, including settling of disputes. The land was 
allocated for building homes, cultivation, and cattle grazing. This resulted in three types of land 
use areas: 1) the main village, 2) crop cultivation lands-normally within a 10 km radius of the 
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village and 3) the cattle post area; where cattle were grazed. This system of land tenure was 
adapted to better control land use. For instance, crop cultivation was not allowed at the cattle 
posts in order to avoid crop damage by livestock. However, a few farmers would keep cattle at 
the crop lands to provide women and children with milk as well as draft power during the 
plowing season.  
Botswana gained independence from Great Britain in 1966 after being a protectorate 
since 1885. Four political parties contested the first election at independence. This multi-party 
democracy has since been maintained with free elections held every five years. At the time of 
independence the economic prospects of the country were bleak with an annual per capita 
income of $80 (Colclough et al 1980), which made Botswana one of the poorest countries in the 
world. At independence, agriculture was the dominant economic activity contributing 96 % of 
the total exports (Colclough and McCarthy, 1980) with contribution to GDP at 43% (MFDP, 
2010). Wildlife was only used for consumptive purposes on a subsistence basis. It was a source 
of meat and skins were used for domestic purposes. 
The post-independence era has been characterized by unprecedented growth especially 
after the discovery of diamonds in the early 1980s. This led Botswana to maintain the highest 
economic growth rates in the world (CIA-World Fact Book 2012; MFDP, 2010). Consequent to 
political stability and good fiscal and financial discipline, Botswana is now a middle-income 
country with a GDP per capita of $16300 in 2011 (CIA-World Fact Book, 2012). The driving 
force of the country’s economic growth is the mining sector, especially diamonds. Despite recent 
economic diversification, agriculture still plays a crucial role in the lives of the rural population 
while tourism has become the second largest exporter after diamonds (MFDP, 2010). 
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Other post-independence changes include land administration, which moved away from 
absolute jurisdiction of the chiefs to a new form of national government institutional 
management. Customary land is now administered by the Land Boards under the Minister of 
Environment, Wildlife and Tourism in conjunction with the tribal administration, which remains 
under the leadership of tribal chiefs. About 17 % of the customary land has been designated as 
various Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) (DWNP, 2010). 
The Department of Lands administers state land. The state land consists of national parks, 
game reserves and WMAs (19.4 % of all land area in Botswana), forest reserves (1 %) and all 
urban land (4.5 %). Free hold land is comprised of a block of farms administered under the Land 
Control Act, which came into effect in 1975 (MFDP, 2003). The Land Control Act was intended 
to provide public control of certain transactions involving agricultural land such as zoning and 
leasing. The block of farms, administered under the Act, are found in Ghanzi district, Southern 
district, South East and North East districts. Their vicinity to major urban villages and towns has 
led to the current trend where the farms are being transformed into urban land to augment the 
shortage of land in urban areas for residential, commercial and industrial uses.  
According to (MFDP, 2003), about 45.8 % of the Botswana population lives in the rural 
areas engaged in both arable agriculture and livestock production. The latter represents 80 % of 
the agricultural contribution to GDP and most of the rural population depends on it as a source of 
livelihood (MFDP 2010). Livestock, mainly cattle, are also a source of social wealth and 
economic security (Fidzani, 1998). Although the livestock subsector remains important to the 
sector, its contribution has been declining. According to (BIDPA1, 2010), it declined from 74 % 
in 1993/94 financial year to 55 % in 2007/08. BIDPA (2010) also found that the livestock value-
                                                 
1 Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis 
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added fell by 35 % during the same period. Despite this decline, the Botswana government has 
since independence formulated polices intended to increase productivity of the sector because it 
is the mainstay of the rural economy (MFDP, 2010). 
The Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP) was the first major livestock policy introduced 
in 1975 aimed at increasing the livestock productivity (MFDP, 2003; Fidzani, 1998). The aim of 
TGLP was to introduce the enclosure system or fencing which was predicated on the belief that 
rangelands in Botswana were degraded due to communal system of grazing (Taylor, 2006). The 
policy encouraged all cattle owners with cattle exceeding 200 to move into the western sand-veld 
(the Kgalagadi region) which was presumably an open space where these farmers would set up 
private ranches. According to the policy, the government would assist qualifying farmers with 
start-up capital to drill boreholes and fence their 8 kilometer by 8 kilometer ranches. The erection 
of fences meant exclusion of some local communities from accessing the natural resources that 
hitherto were accessible (Taylor, 2006). The fences also meant that wildlife routes were blocked 
therefore preventing free movement of animals from the Kgalagadi region during the dry season 
to the northern waters of the Okavango Delta (Albertson, 1998).  
Animal disease control policy is one of the policies that were formulated to control the 
spread of diseases and reduce livestock mortality (MFDP, 2010). One of this policy’s objectives 
is to supply free vaccination to farmers in communal grazing areas for major animal diseases 
such as foot and mouth, anthrax and botulism (MFDP, 2010). The bulk of the budget allocated 
for this policy is allocated to the ODRS where foot and mouth disease is prevalent as well as 
tsetse fly. For example, the MoA capital expenditure for the seventeen National Development 
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Plan (NDP) 9 projects stands at P21, 009,265. The following table shows the budgetary 
allocations for the three projects related to livestock production in the NDP 9. 
Table 1: Budgetary allocation for MoA during NDP 9 
Project Name  Total Allocations in Pula 
Livestock Development 101,676 
Animal Disease Emergency Control, 97, 340, 
Improvement to Disease Control 167, 126 
Total  366,142 
                        Source: Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (2003) 
All the three projects were implemented by the Department of Animal Health and Production 
currently the Department of Veterinary Services. The budget for the three projects constituted 
36.28% of the total capital budget for the whole MoA. Improvement to disease control was 
targeted at the ODRS where foot and mouth disease (FMD) and tsetse fly (which cause nakana 
disease) are a major problem. The paradox of this is that the region has the least number of cattle 
holdings as compared to all the districts. The animal disease control polices have a positive 
impact on the small cattle owners because it provides them with vaccines that they would 
otherwise not have access to. On the negative side, the policy encouraged the erection of 
veterinary cordon fences intended to prevent the spread of diseases from wild animals to 
domestic animals especially cattle. These fences were erected in the ODRS where wildlife 
numbers are high and the outbreak of foot and mouth disease has been a serious threat. Apart 
from blocking wildlife migratory routes, these fences also limit the movement of cattle to access 
grazing areas.  
Other communities derive their livelihoods from natural resources such as wildlife. These 
communities, located mostly in the northwest and northern parts of the country, utilize wildlife 
for consumptive purposes. This use of wildlife was dominant prior to the emergence of 
                                                 
2 1USD= 7.333 Botswana Pula (3/18/2012 exchange rate) 
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commercial wildlife-based tourism, which has proven to be more profitable (Arntzen, 2003; 
MFDP, 2010). Commercial use of wildlife brought other benefits such as employment in the 
tourism industry and has given the communities an opportunity to have user rights and thereby 
profit from the resource through the CBNRM. Most of these community based activities take 
place in the ODRS which has become the heart of the tourism industry in Botswana. The 
communities participate in the tourism industry through the CBNRM policy which encourages 
communities living around the Delta to form community based organizations through which they 
can manage and conserve wildlife and other natural resources and at the same time derive 
economic benefits. Through CBNRM, there are twenty CBOs registered in the ODRS eight of 
which are wildlife-based tourism CBOs. 
The water that flows into the Delta originates from the Bie plateau in Angola, a water 
catchment area covering about 112,000 square kilometers (Mendelsohn and Obeid, 2004). 
Specifically it flows as the Cubango and Cuito rivers from Angola, passing through Namibia 
before entering the Ngamiland region in the northwest part of Botswana through a Panhandle 
that expands into an alluvian fan known as the Okavango Delta (Mendelsohn and Obeid, 2004; 
Jacobson et al, 2005).  
The Delta covers almost 60,000 square kilometers (Tawana Land Board, 2005) which is 
almost 51 % of the Ngamiland district of western Botswana. According to the 2001 population 
census, the Delta is home to 110,852 people which are 89 % of the Ngamiland district (Central 
Statistics Office, 2001, Department of Environmental Affairs, 2005).  
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   Figure 2: Map of ODRS and Settlements 
 
                 Source: ODMP, 2006 
The natural resource base of the Delta provides a variety of livelihood sources to the 
people who live in the Delta communities. Among the critical resources supplied by the Delta 
and its ecosystem are the variety of wildlife, plant resources and water and land for wildlife, 
people and their livestock (Tawana Land board, 2005; Darkoh and Mbaiwa, 2005; and Van Der 
Post, 2004). The Delta is settled by different communities on both sides of the alluvial fan due to 
its resource wealth which provides important livelihood sources to them as shown by figure 2. 
The area is also divided into several hunting areas established through the CBNRM program.  
The Moremi Game Reserve (MGR) is situated within the ODRS. The MGR is the second 
largest tourist destination in the Ngamiland region after the Chobe National Park (CNP) situated 
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in the northern part of the Okavango Delta (Mbaiwa, 2005; DEA, 2005). There are several 
communities located inside and on the boundaries of MGR whose proximity to the reserve has 
led to specific polices being applied, some of which are very unpopular among people of these 
communities. 
1.1.4. The significance of the Okavango Delta to Botswana 
 
The scenic beauty of the Delta and its wealth of wildlife and plant resources have led to 
an upsurge of international tourists visiting the region in increasing numbers annually. This has 
triggered several developments such as roads and aviation infrastructure into the region. 
According to Mbaiwa and Darkoh (2005), there are twenty three privately owned airfields in and 
around the Okavango Delta and eight privately owned air companies with about forty-four small 
engine aircraft. This is indicative of the human sprawl and demand for wildlife tourism which 
according to Van Der Post (2004) is “…a realistic threat to the delta” (p. 65) because of the 
pressure it creates on finite and unique resources. This pressure on protected lands and wildlife is 
exacerbated by the need to develop agriculture to feed the ever increasing population in the 
region (Ukpolo, 2002). On the other hand, tourism has proven to be an important economic 
driver in Botswana ranking second (9.5 % of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2009) after 
minerals in its contribution to GDP (Mbaiwa, 2006; DWNP, 2010).  
1.1.5. Statement of the Problem  
 
Although agriculture is the main land use comprising 48.8 % of the ODRS (Tawana Land 
Board, 2005), tourism has emerged as an important livelihood source providing 40 % of 
employment in the ODRS (Turpie, Barnes, Arntzen, Nherera, Lange and Buzwani, 2006). The 
contrast is that a sector that utilizes most land (agriculture) provides less employment and ranks 
lower than wildlife based tourism in its contribution to GDP. Despite this, agriculture is still very 
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important to the livelihoods of the local people in the ODRS hence  the MoA and the MEWT 
promote policies meant to achieve each ministry’s goals. The existence of agricultural 
production and wildlife, especially big game (e.g. giraffes, elephants, antelopes, lions, etc.) in the 
same geospatial environment has led to incessant conflict between man and wildlife (Darkoh and 
Mbaiwa, 2005).  
The different land uses in the area have led to conflicts involving the Botswana 
government, local people who live in the Delta communities and the private sector e.g. 
safari/tourism companies. People from the communities complain about damage caused by 
wildlife on their property including agriculture and their domesticated livestock and loss of 
human life, while safari companies on the other hand complain about the communities’ use of 
the land that has been leased to the safari companies by the communities through the CBNRM 
program (Mbaiwa, 2005).  
Before the emergence of commercial wildlife-based tourism, wildlife was used for food 
consumption purposes (Arntzen, 2003). Commercial use of wildlife brought benefits such as 
employment in the tourism industry and increased incomes for the communities as well as 
individual community members. It also promoted communities’ involvement in CBNRM which 
provides local people an opportunity to participate in the decision making process that affected 
the resources on which they depend for their livelihoods.  This situation presents a management 
problem concerning the competing land use between the MoA and MEWT. It also presents a 
problem concerning conflict between the different actors: communities, government 
departments, and the safari companies which have divergent interests (Arntzen, 2003; Mbaiwa, 
2006).  
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1.1.6. Significance of the Study 
 
The significance of this research lies in the fact that communities play a major role in 
conservation (WRI, 2005) and understanding their attitudes towards conservation will provide an 
assessment of the extent to which community involvement in conservation efforts can and will 
lead to successful implementation of conservation policies and harmonize the conflict between 
livestock and wildlife. The ODRS is not only a wetland of national importance, as a Ramsar site, 
it is also a wetland of international significance and hence attracts people from across the globe.  
The ODRS provides a variety of resources to both its human population and the wildlife 
that are found in large numbers in the area. The degradation and depletion of natural resources 
worldwide has engendered a global attention to the strategic management of these resources 
through sustainable means (WRI, 2005). Involving local communities to successfully achieve 
this goal has been seen as sine qua non for any conservation effort. The involvement of 
communities is however not without its controversies. While one school of thought holds a view 
that community conservation is the key to both conservation and poverty alleviation for 
communities living in proximity to these natural resources (WRI, 2008; Tawana Land Board, 
2005), another school of thought holds a view that there is need to critically address the concept 
of inadequate community participation in conservation (Twyman, 1998; Goldman, 2003).  
In Botswana CBNRM policy is seen as a solution to the conflict that exists between man 
and wildlife and a vehicle of rural development with potential to alleviate poverty. The 
participation in decision-making by the different stakeholders especially those in the ODRS, 
however, might be a factor to the success of CBNRM and economic development through 
CBNRM. It is also inadequate to focus on CBNRM as poverty alleviation strategy without 
addressing the major role of livestock polices in affecting/influencing the livelihoods of the 
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communities in the ODRS. As stated before, some of the livestock policies that have impact on 
the communities in the ODRS include the animal disease control policy, the fencing of 
communal grazing lands through TGLP and the fencing component of the New Policy for 
Agricultural Development. The cordon fences erected under the animal disease control policy 
have particularly had a negative impact on the communities in the ODRS. The impacts range 
from cutting off wildlife migratory routes, limiting grazing lands as well as limiting access to 
veldt products that the communities depend on (Mbaiwa, 2005; Albertson, 1998; Arntzen, 2003).  
These problems have prompted certain reactions from the communities that are investigated in 
this study. 
This study therefore addresses a gap in knowledge about (1) the attitudes of the 
community towards CBNRM; (2) critical analysis of the decision-making process and the role of 
the different players in the ODRS. The study is significant also in that it addresses the ODRS 
within the context of a property rights regime the classification of which informs the type of 
policy adopted and its efficacy. This latter issue of contextualizing the ODRS within the property 
rights regime is discussed at length in the theoretical and analytical frameworks in the following 
section. 
1.2. Theoretical and analytical frameworks  
This section presents the analytical framework used in this research. The management of 
the world’s commons and their sustainability is still a controversial issue to date with some 
popular theories/models developed in the 1960s which Ostrom (1990) calls the earlier models,  
predicting tragedy for the commons due to degradation and non-cooperation of appropriators. 
Despite these concerns about the doom of the commons, communities in different parts of the 
world the lives of which depend on Common Pool Resources (CPR) have been able to manage 
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and conserve their CPR for thousands of years. The purpose of this section is twofold: to discuss 
the theories of the commons and secondly, to discuss how groups can effectively manage and 
conserve CPR. To achieve this purpose, the first sub-section discusses the nature of CPRs and 
property rights. This section also discusses the different types of goods; private, common 
property, and public goods. The second sub-section discusses the theories/models of the 
commons that have been used to analyze the commons. These models are the tragedy of the 
commons, game theory, and logic of collective action. This sub-section also discusses the 
weaknesses of these models and the evolution of alternative framework; the Institutional 
Analysis and Development (IAD). The third sub-section focuses on the management of CPR by 
groups and the characteristics of the members or appropriators for the CPR, which enables the 
governance of the CPR. In doing so, particular attention is made on the possibility of managing 
the commons by groups within the Okavango Delta Ramsar Site (ODRS) in Botswana. The 
section will conclude with a discussion of how the common pool resources theory is relevant to 
the discussion of local peoples’ attitudes and the impact of the current institutions on the 
development of the ODRS. 
1.2.1. Common pool resources and property rights 
This section discusses the CPR and the property rights regime. The property rights 
regime will shed light on the problems that arise in the use of environmental resources. The 
section will also discuss the CPR within the context of property rights as well as private and 
public goods and how these goods differ from CPR.  
a. Common pool resources 
Common pool resources are defined as “…natural or man-made resource system that is 
sufficiently large to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from 
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obtaining benefits from its use” (Ostrom, 1990, p. 30). Tietenberg (2004) describes CPR as 
“…those that are owned in common rather than privately” (p. 63). Tietenberg further explains 
that entitlement to CPR is either formal or informal. Specified legal rules protect formal 
entitlements whereas in informal entitlements tradition or culture protects the users of the CPR. 
In both cases, the local actors in CPR play a role in the design of the rules that govern the CPR.  
Key characteristics of CPRs are difficulty of exclusion and subtractability. Exclusion 
means a situation where it is difficult to restrict other users from benefiting from the provision of 
a commonly provided good or service. High costs of exclusion through laws or other 
mechanisms at the users’ disposal are some of the issues making it difficult to exclude others 
(Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, 2003; Ostrom, 2005). The excludability problem leads to a problem of 
free riding. Free riding increases when a group with entitlements to a resource cannot easily 
exclude potential beneficiaries for failing to contribute to the provision of a good or service 
(Ostrom, 2005). 
CPR also face a problem of subtractability, which means that, as resource units are 
withdrawn less is available for the next appropriator. This is a problem for CPR when users 
cannot price a service; it results in other users attempting to maximize their use of the resource in 
anticipation of possible depletion. Although the problem of subtractability exists in private 
markets, the difference is that in CPR resource systems are jointly owned (Ostrom, 1990) and the 
rules to avoid free riding are negotiated to be in place whereas in private markets, free riding is 
not a problem as resource systems are privately owned through private property rights or 
entitlements (Tietenberg, 2004).  The costs of appropriation in CRP are shared among 
appropriators and rules to ensure that those who do not pay are excluded are invoked when free 
riding is attempted.  
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The problem of subtractability also occurs when there is a change in the user’s discount 
rates. Discount rates will increase when the resource is possibly under threat of depletion or 
when users’ anticipate that rules are going to be broken. Under these circumstances, users try to 
take advantage by grabbing more of the service or good before its depletion. To resolve this 
problem effective groups institute regulations and rules to regulate the use of the resource. The 
earlier models (tragedy of the commons, game theory, and logic of collective action) assumed 
that groups could not cooperate because their discount rates will always be high given the 
propensity for individual actors to try and maximize their benefits before the resource is 
depleted. High discount rates meant the users did not expect the resource to be around for long 
hence they would try to maximize the withdrawal of resource units leading to the tragedy and the 
decline in resource productivity. 
Ostrom and others have found that it is easy to design rules and enforce them when users 
are a small group that can meet and agree on rules governing the use of the resource. The 
effectiveness of rules depend on the size of the resource, mobility of resource units (e.g. water, 
wildlife or veldt products), the presence of storage in the systems, the amounts and distribution 
of rainfall, soils, slope, and elevation, etc. (Ostrom, 2005). In the ODRS wildlife is a mobile CPR 
and the community hunting areas (CHA) are also CPRs. The CHAs are CPRs because different 
actors can access them but their actions within the CHA will be based on their positions rules 
agreed by the community. Some of the actors that are allowed in the CHAs are the community 
members, tourists, DWNP officers, general public etc. Their activities within the CHA will be 
governed by the bundle of rights they have such as access, withdrawal, management, and 
exclusion. Each of these rights is discussed below. The same rights apply to wildlife. Once the 
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wildlife is in a particular community hunting area, they are jointly owned by the community that 
has user rights to the CHA (Moore and Rodger, 2010). 
Apart from private and common property rights, Ostrom identifies other rights associated 
with CPR which she states as follows: 
Access: the right to enter a defined physical area and enjoy nonsubtractive 
benefits (for example, hike, canoe, sit in the sun). 
Withdrawal: the right to obtain resource units or products of a resource system 
(for example, catches fish, divert water). 
Management: The right to regulate internal use patterns and transform the 
resource by making improvements. 
Exclusion: The right to determine who will have access rights and withdrawal 
rights, and how those rights may be transferred. 
Alienation: The right to sell or lease management and exclusion rights  
(Ostrom, 2000, p. 339) 
These rights help associate an actor with the position they hold in a CPR: whether owner; 
proprietor; claimant; authorized user; authorized entrant. It can also explain the rights of an 
individual at a particular point as one may be an authorized entrant such as a tourist in a national 
park, or one can have a bundle of rights such as an owner who would have all the five bundle of 
rights whereas an authorized entrant will have on the right of access. Ostrom demonstrates these 
rights in a table such as the one that follows:  
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Table 2: Bundles of Rights Associated with Positions 
  Owner     Proprietor       Claimant       Authorized User.  Authorized 
Entrant 
Access         X         X   X    X       X 
Withdrawal      X        X  X   X 
Management     X        X   X   X 
Exclusion      X        X 
Alienation      X 
           Source: Ostrom, 2000 
The vertical side of the table shows the bundle of rights while the horizontal shows the different 
positions and individual may hold.  The table shows each position has a different bundle of 
rights. 
a. Public Goods 
Public goods are very common in environmental resources. These goods are open access 
meaning that everyone can access them without exclusion. There is no excludability of other 
users from public goods. They are non-divisible which means that their availability does not 
diminish because some other user had withdrawn some units earlier hence less is available to the 
next user. The non-excludable nature of public goods and non-subtractability makes them 
different from CPR. It also means that there is no incentive to conserve them or use them 
efficiently since scarcity, which necessitate efficient allocation and use does not apply. Examples 
of public goods include air, national security, amenity goods such as scenic beauty and biological 
diversity all enjoyed by other users but pay no price. It is not possible to assign property rights to 
public goods because of their non-rivalries, non-excludability, indivisibility and non-
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subtractability. The ODRS is characterized by scenic beauty: flora and fauna which are abundant 
in the area. It is not possible to exclude individuals from consuming the scenic beauty of the 
delta since in the context of scenic beauty and amenity goods, no resource units will be drawn 
that will be unavailable to others  (Shaffer, Deller, Marcouiller, 2004). In the ODRS exclusion 
occurs when individuals are not allowed certain areas such as national parks if they had not paid. 
They lose their right to access because that can only accorded those who pay for resource use 
(Ostrom, 2000). 
b.  Private Goods 
Private property or goods are those characterized by exclusive rights by an individual. 
The individual has private property or right when they own a resource or have exclusive use of 
that resource and bear all the costs and benefits bestowed by the use of the resource. An 
individual in this case has private property rights to use and consume the specified resource. This 
form of property rights is the most preferred in the efficient allocation of goods where the 
assumption is that the consumer is rational and feels an obligation for efficient consumption of 
the good or resource (Carlson, Zilberman, & Miranowski, 1993). In the ODRS, private goods are 
dominated by the agricultural goods such as crops that are produced in small private lands, cattle 
that graze in the communal grazing lands and the individual housing units in the tribal land. 
Communal grazing lands in the ODRS can be classified as public because no distinct groups can 
lay claims to them under the current law (Tawana Land Board, 2005). 
c.  Property Rights and CPR 
Property rights refers to a bundle of “…entitlements defining the owners’ rights, 
privileges and limitations to the use of the resources” (Tietenberg, 2004, p. 56). Common 
property rights are allocated to a specific group who have entitlements to the common pool 
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resource and can exclude others who do not belong to the group from appropriating resource 
units from the resource system that is communally owned. For example, in the ODRS different 
communities are allocated a community hunting area which they manage through their 
community based organization. This arrangement is an example of common property rights 
because members of another community cannot appropriate resources such as wildlife in this 
hunting area.  CPR and public goods have been confused in some cases due to some similarities 
between them. The property rights regime helps to distinguish the difference between CPR and 
the public goods. Public goods are not exclusive to any specific group of people; no property 
rights are assigned to a resource that is a public good in nature such as the consumption of 
natural amenities. The property rights regime helps understand the natural resource allocation 
which either leads to their preservation or destruction.  
Confusion about CPR and public goods sometime arises from the fact that both CPR and 
public goods are prone to the problem of free riding. This is a situation where someone uses the 
resource without bearing any costs (Ostrom, 1990). The difference between them however, is 
that in the CPR excludability is possible based on specific rules that ensure that users share the 
costs of drawing resource units, failing which they are excluded from the use of the resource.  
Common pool resources are subtractable whereas public goods are not. Although it is difficult to 
assign property rights to public goods, common property rights govern CPRs, which are 
exclusive to a specified group. 
The models, which became popular and dominated intellectual and scholarly discourse in 
the late 1950s and 1960s, were the tragedy of the commons, logic of collective action and game 
theory. The common feature of these models is that they all doubted the efficiency and 
effectiveness of groups to cooperate and manage the commons for the benefit of all members of 
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the community or groups. The policy implication of these models is that to avoid the tragedy of 
the commons there is a choice between two alternatives: the first option is to privatize the 
commons or secondly that a public entity in the form of government should take over the 
commons for management (Ostrom, 1990). An alternative framework that developed as a 
response to these earlier three models is the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD), 
which shows that the commons are not all in jeopardy and evidence exists to show that. 
Examples include the irrigation systems in Huetta, Spain which have been managed by 
communities for hundreds of years but were never degraded (Ostrom, 1990; Tietenberg, 2004). 
A discussion of these theories/models is in the following section. 
1.2.2. Theories of the Commons 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the different theories of the commons starting 
with the tragedy of the commons, the logic of collective action and the game theory. The section 
will then present the alternative model developed as a response to the first three, i.e. IAD.  
a.  The Tragedy of the Commons 
Harding (1968) pointed out that the tendency for individuals to maximize their benefits 
from public goods (open access resources) would lead to these individuals to pursue their 
individual goals leading to degradation or resource overuse. Harding further argues that there are 
problems for which there is no technical solution such as population growth where the finite 
resources will ultimately fail to support the ever-growing population.  
The assumption in the tragedy of the commons thesis is that the commons are a large area 
with multiple actors all motivated by their own interests (Harding, 1968). Given this assumption, 
the tragedy of the common thesis is able to predict the outcome of such actions on the natural 
resources. Indifferent and continued use of the resource without concern for its preservation 
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leads to degradation. Multiple actors on a finite resource will lead to its depletion because each 
withdrawal of the resource leaves fewer units left for the next appropriator.  
The tragedy of the commons thesis also assumes that actors do not communicate with one 
another such that no one knows what the strategy of the other is (Harding, 1968). This 
assumption also means no one knows what the consequences of others are on the use of the 
resource. The model also assumes that the costs of trying to change the rules are high. Based on 
these assumptions, the tragedy of the commons proceeded to paint the future with gloom given 
that no actor would want to incur high costs to change the rules of the game. With rules difficult 
or impossible to change, self-governance by communities is not possible because there are no 
shared norms and institutions that actors build on to preserve the commons. 
b.  Game Theory 
Game theory extended the tragedy of the common to demonstrate the gravity of the 
situation by likening users of the commons as prisoners caught up in the compelling desire to 
maximize their benefits leading to their own destruction. In the prisoner’s dilemma analogy, 
someone else controls the prisoner’s actions over which the prisoner has little or no control.  The 
assumption is that the prisoners do not communicate and neither one of them knows what the 
other plans. Given this assumption, the prisoners cannot cooperate. Another assumption of 
prisoner’s dilemma is that the prisoners have complete knowledge and given that they cannot 
communicate, cooperation is not possible. According to this analogy, any agreements between 
players are non-binding and each player has a dominant strategy, which they can choose freely. 
The players do not have an incentive to change the rules freely independent of others. According 
to the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), when both prisoners’ choose their dominant strategy, they reach 
equilibrium level in their benefits, which however is not Pareto-optimal. Pareto optimality occurs 
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“when no person can be made better-off without making another person worse-off” (Freedman, 
2002, p. 463). In the game theoretical model, with the equilibrium that is not Pareto-optimal, the 
“cooperate, cooperate” strategy does not yield optimal results but inferior outcomes (Ostrom, 
1990).  The actors in a PD game adopt the “cooperate” “cooperate” strategy in a situation where 
they only use the resource to maximize their benefits without degrading it. When this decision is 
adopted, the actors avoid the defect strategy where one actor would try to maximize their 
benefits without accommodating the destructive nature of their action, whereas another actor 
keeps their resource within the limit. Ostrom (1990) gives the example of a two man game where 
they graze two animals each on a meadow. The two animals will not go beyond the upper limit 
of the meadow. In this way they adopt a cooperate strategy whereas in a defect strategy one actor 
will graze as many cattle in the meadow as he wants to maximize their gains (Ostrom, 1990) 
The conclusion based on the game theoretical model is that resource use left to groups 
with the hope that they will cooperate and yield optimal outcomes is not possible as shown by an 
equilibrium that is not Pareto optimal. A non Pareto optimal equilibrium results in inefficient use 
of resources that in the long run leads to degradation and stagnation in the production of 
outcomes. This metaphor from the game theory has reinforced the idea that different policy 
options, which advocate for outside intervention in the use of the commons, are a sine-qua-non 
for the common’s preservation and efficient use.   
c.  Logic of Collective Action 
The logic of collective action preceded the Harding’s Tragedy of the Commons (Olson, 
1965).  In the logic of collective action, Olson challenged the then common belief that people 
having common interests would work together for the common good. Olson challenged the 
premise advocated by group theory that individuals would act to maximize group cooperation. 
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His thesis rested on the notion that “he who is not excluded” from a public good has no incentive 
to preserve it.  Olson argues that the tendency for individuals who do not bear costs on utilizing 
public goods would have no incentive to preserve it but rather they opt to maximize their 
individual goals (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, 2011).  
The three models presented above assume that the commons cannot thrive if left to 
groups alone. These models assume that individuals act on their own as rational beings with 
intention to maximize their benefits. These models assume that there were no transaction costs 
that the users had complete information and the users do not communicate. According to these 
models, the individualistic nature of human actors especially when there are no costs borne by 
users of resources is the overriding factor that makes cooperation difficult and impossible. When 
cooperation is difficult to implement, actors cannot self-govern without intervention from the 
state or some public entity to enforce the rules. Free riding, which occurs when there is no 
incentive to conserve a CPR due to undefined property rights, is a thorny issue, which has made 
the three models presented more appealing as analytical frameworks in the study of the 
commons. Given the popularity of the three models (tragedy of the commons, game theory, and 
logic of collective action), many countries followed them in designing their policies (Ostrom, 
1990; Moore and Rodger, 2010). 
Mutual trust is hard to attest according to these models given the tendency of individuals 
to maximize their benefits. Lack of trust and individualism makes it difficult to devise rules that 
can ensure the sustainability and efficient use of the commons. The analysis presented using 
these models insinuate the degradation of the commons and their ultimate collapse with dire 
consequences for those who subsist on them. The policy recommendations that resulted from 
these metaphorical models led many nations to advocate for establishment of private property 
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rights or central authority in the governance of the commons. Alternative models for the analysis 
of CPR emerged in the 1980s amongst which are the IAD. 
d. Institutional Analysis and Development 
After the first seminal work by Ostrom in 1982 using the IAD as an alternative to 
managing the commons, extant literature confirms that groups are capable of designing rules and 
regulations that they use to govern the CPRs.  The multifaceted nature of the CPRs warrants the 
analyst to understand the nature of the project being studied thoroughly, the institutions in place, 
and the participants, which the earlier models overlooked (Ostrom, 2005). 
The IAD is a multi-tier framework used to study institutions (Ostrom, 2011). Institutions 
are conceived as rules and regulations that society develops and individual members are 
expected to follow (Ostrom, 1990). Ostrom and others developed the IAD framework as a 
response to the earlier theories based on experiences from different parts of the world where 
groups have been successful in governing the commons contrary to the conclusions based on the 
earlier models. The purpose of the IAD is to show that not all CPR need private property rights 
or a public entity to intervene for the commons to survive. The IAD framework demonstrates 
that there is a need to study different institutions and rules and find out how groups can regulate 
the commons without the commons gravitating towards the tragedy as insinuated by the other 
models. This strategy (IAD) believes that in circumstances where communities or local people 
are able to self-govern by adhering to the rules and regulations that are developed by these 
communities, there is no need for government takeover or some private entity. 
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Figure 3: The Institutional Analysis and Development 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
             Source: Ostrom (2011) 
Action situations refer to “…social spaces where individuals interact, exchange goods and 
services, solve problems, dominate one another, or fight (among the many things that individuals 
do in action situations)” (Ostrom, 2011, p. 11). Within the action situation are actors whose 
presence leads to interaction. The interaction of actors with each other in turn affects the action 
situation and results in outcomes. An important aspect of the interaction of actors in an action 
situation is the different institutions that results as different actors try to have control and order in 
their action situation. 
Institutions are rules and regulations made by the community members imbedded in the 
life of a community. They are part of the cultural systems that govern the behavior of individuals 
in a community. These behaviors constitute shared norms that regulate each individual in the 
community. The success of the CPR management governed by specific institutions depends on 
the unwritten code of conduct in a community that has often escaped the attention of outsiders 
interested in the study of CPR. Implied in the institutions is that the community will monitor the 
use of the commons and take action against those who break the rules. Research has shown that 
where rules are well defined and the community members are aware of them, the management of 
the commons are successful (Ostrom, 1990). This lack of understanding of institutions has earlier 
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(before the advent of IAD) led to policy solutions based on the “commons in jeopardy” thesis 
such as the tragedy of the commons and prisoner’s dilemma (Ostrom, 1990).  
The literature on the CPR points to the action situations as spaces where interactions by 
users and resources occur. Action situations are also places where institutions, defined as rules, 
govern the interaction in action arenas. According to the IAD framework, rules and regulation 
are designed to ensure compliance by users of CPR as agreed by users, failing which sanctions 
are imposed for non-compliance. The rules are designed by the community or users of the CPR. 
This is what makes for the successful management of the commons as espoused in the IAD 
literature.  
Ostrom also points out that multiple theories or models that are compatible with the IAD 
framework can be used if they help the analysts predict the likely outcomes. One such model that 
this research uses is the Human Ecosystem Model (HEM) presented below. 
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   Figure 4: Human Ecosystem Model 
 
                    Source: Machilis, Force, and Burch (1997). 
 
The model presents a broad array of variables that can influence interaction within the 
action situation. As Ostrom (2011) explains, actors bring in the action situation different 
attributes including their demographic characteristics as well as different resources; the human 
ecosystem model shows the critical resources that can influence the action situation. These 
resources are exogenous variables which impact on the human social system and in turn are 
affected by the human social system. The study uses all variables in the cultural and the socio-
economic resources categories. The study analyzes: land, flora, fauna and water from which 
resource units are drawn.   
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1.2.3. The Different Players in the ODRS 
The ODRS has different players that influence the ecological as well as the socio-
economic processes that affect the area. The major players are the communities living in and 
around the ODRS, the Botswana government through its agencies like the Department of 
Tourism, Department of Wildlife and National Parks and the Ministry of Agriculture. The 
private sector is another important player in the ODRS especially Safari companies who lease 
land and work with communities in the ODRS in the tourism industry.  
a. Communities 
The communities in the ODRS are important players in the use of the ODRS. They 
depend on the ODRS for veldt products (such as thatching grass, edible plants); the water for 
drinking and watering their livestock, fire wood, grazing areas, poles for building construction 
and medicinal plants (Mbaiwa, 2005). For centuries, some of the communities have lived around 
the ODRS dependent on it for their subsistence. They had their management systems that 
ensured that they used the resources in the area in a manner compatible with the rules in place.  
To analyze the self-organization of the communities, it is important to know what rules 
are in place that the communities established. This acts as a baseline to compare with rules in 
place that are exogenous to the communities. Further analysis of the implementation of the rules 
and the community response to them will provide insights into the effectiveness of the rules. 
Disagreements involving the community rejection or skepticism about the exogenous rules in 
place will be indicative of distrust of the motive of the rules. It will also indicate the lack of 
effective participation by local people in the design of the rules. 
The length of the community members in their respective communities is another 
variable that helps predict whether self-governance by local people with regard to their use of 
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CPR is possible. Ostrom (1990) argues that community members who have lived with each other 
for a long time develop mutual trust. They embrace the same norms and behaviors, which govern 
their community. In essence, Ostrom speaks of social capital, which makes interdependence 
possible.  
The extent to which the communities depend on the CPR (ODRS) is important to 
establish. When people depend on the resource, they want to protect it and ensure that they can 
still draw resource units from it in the future. If the communities place high value on the ODRS 
and hope it will still yield future resource units, their discount rates will be low as they believe 
that future benefits are valuable. When discount rates are low, communities have a tendency to 
self-organize for the protection of the resource. They would cooperate in designing institutions 
that will ensure that all members comply with rules.  
Communities with low discount rates tend to monitor their resources (Ostrom, 1990; 
Ostrom, 2010). The literature on successful CPR shows that when discount rates are low and 
appropriators plan to appropriate in the future, they will invest in the monitoring of rules to 
ensure that there is compliance. The irrigation systems in Huerta in Spain and Philippines have 
shown appropriators enforcing rules and applying sanctions on those who broke the rules. In 
Japan, the land commons also experienced appropriators enforcing the rules to ensure 
compliance (Ostrom, 1990).  
Communities in the ODRS are involved in wildlife-based tourism and some of them have 
formed Community Based Organization (CBO), and have Community Hunting Areas (CHA) 
allocated to them. The distance between the community and the CPR can determine the extent of 
cooperation with those communities further away having less commitment on the CPR compared 
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to those close to the CPR. This information about distances between the CPR and communities is 
important to determine if it is a factor in the self-organization of the communities.  
The Botswana government is responsible through its agencies to allocate the CHAs. One 
factor that is important to note is whether there are well defined boundaries of the CPR allocated 
to the community. The boundaries minimize disputes and tend to give the community a sense of 
ownership knowing their own boundaries. This information helps determine if the communities 
can self-govern. In situations where there are no clear boundaries, monitoring may prove 
difficult and some community members might be reluctant to participate when they do not 
understand where the boundaries are and whether they agree with them (Ostrom, 1990). The 
resource productivity is important in enhancing the cooperation between members of the 
community. If the resources are still capable of providing resource stocks in the future, it acts as 
motivation for appropriators to organize and self-govern.  
b.  Safari Companies/Joint Venture Partners 
Safari companies or joint venture partners (JVP) play a crucial role in ODRS and the 
tourism industry. They usually operate as joint venture partners with the communities in the 
tourism industry. The partnership between the Safari companies and the communities will be 
strong if both parties have a common understanding of the rules. Safari companies may have 
different goals regarding the ODRS and their partnership with communities. Information that 
may lead to the success of the self-governance between the companies and the communities is if 
the companies appreciate the local rules and other cultural beliefs that are important to 
communities.  
This study looks at the decision-making process and the discourse used to determine if 
the communities and the companies have common understanding. When users of the CPR 
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interpret rules and regulations differently, there is a danger of mutual distrust and this might 
threaten self-governance and organizing community members. Different power relations may 
disadvantage others in negotiations. To avoid this, the contracting parties must focus on mutual 
benefit. This study addresses the negotiations or consultation process and how the different 
actors are represented.   
c. Botswana Government 
The government is the general overseer of the whole economy and the ODRS. The 
different departments act on behalf of the government. The government and its operations are 
guided by the national vision 2016 which was implemented beginning 1997. Vision 2016 is a 
strategy that provides a planning framework for all different government sectors to advance 
socio-economic development (MFDP, 2010). The Vision comprises of seven pillars namely: an 
educated and informed nation; a prosperous, productive and innovative nation; a compassionate, 
just, and caring nation; a safe and secure nation; an open, democratic and accountable nation; a 
moral and tolerant nation; and lastly a united and proud nation.  The National Development Plans 
(NDPs) are designed based on vision 2016 (MFDP, 2010). The NDP 9 (2003 to 2008) was the 
first plan that was designed based on the national vision followed by the current NDP 10 which 
runs from April 2009-March 31st 2016. All the ministries design their strategic plans based on 
the NDPs which outline the national policies, programs and objectives that the government plans 
to implement and achieve in a specified period.  While there are different actors in the policies 
related to conservation of natural resources and livestock, the key ministries involved in 
implementing these policies are the MoA and the MEWT.  
The MoA is divided into eight departments as follows: The Division of Research and 
Statistics; Department of Veterinary Services; Department of Crop Production; Department of 
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Agricultural Business Promotion; Department of Agricultural Research; Department of corporate 
Services; Department of Animal Production; and the Department of Extension Services 
Coordination. Through its departments, the mandate of MoA is to develop a sustainable and 
competitive agricultural sector by ensuring that farm incomes improve, creating employment 
opportunities, generating raw materials for agricultural businesses; conserving agricultural 
natural resources by promoting and adopting appropriate technologies and management 
practices. Through the design of different polices such as the animal disease control policies 
which is the subject of this study, the ministry is able to drive the sector to greater productivity.  
The MEWT is divided into eight departments as follows: Department of Corporate 
Services, Department of Waste Management and Pollution Control; Department of Forestry and 
Range Resources; Department of Environmental Affairs; Department of Wildlife and National 
Parks; Department of Tourism; Department of Meteorological Services; and Department of 
National Museum and Monuments. The mandate of the MEWT through its departments is to 
ensure the sustainable use of environmental resources in the country. Topical departments in the 
MEWT are the DEA, DWNP, and DOT which are major players in the ODRS.  
The government thus is a major player in the ODRS hence understanding the policies, 
programs and the objectives that she plans to implement provides an understanding of how these 
plans and policies influence self-governance or lack of governance in the ODRS. Specific 
policies that are relevant to the ODRS discussed in this study are the CBNRM policy and the 
animal disease control policy. However, the discussion of these policies is limited to how they 
influence livelihoods in the ODRS and the resultant influence on attitudes of the local people 
living in the ODRS. CBNRM is the main focus because the government designed with the view 
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to encourage local communities to participate more meaningfully in the conservation of natural 
resources. 
This study investigates the consultative process between the government, communities 
and the private sector especially safari companies which operate in the ODRS. Still related to the 
role of government, this study analyzes the role of rules made by local communities in decision-
making. The study also looked at information related to indigenous knowledge and how it is 
taken on board in decisions-making affecting the target communities in the ODRS. Knowledge 
systems tend to clash in a field setting, creating uncertainty where local communities feel 
undermined (Flora, 2008).  
The discussion of the analytical framework covered the different models that have been 
used in the past to address the conservation and preservation of natural resources in different 
parts of the world. In order to do so, an understanding of how these resources are classified is 
important because that creates a basis for potential policy initiative designed to preserve such 
resources. It also creates a precursor for the stakeholder analysis and the type of property regime 
that should be in place to achieve maximum and efficient use of the resource. This research 
discusses the different models and places the ODRS in the context of a common pool resource in 
order to analyze the possibility of self-governance based on traditional institutions as well as 
addressing the current formal/modern institutions. This helps compare the different institutions 
and how they influence the stated attitudes towards the current policies designed to conserve the 
ODRS.  
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: chapter two presents the literature 
review. The chapter is divided into two sections, the theoretical literature review and the 
empirical literature review. The theoretical literature review presents a thorough discussion of 
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the power theory in the first, second and third dimension. The empirical literature review 
presents the extant literature on the empirical research that has been conducted in the area of 
attitudes towards conservation, the effectiveness of community conservation and other related 
literature on the governing of common pool resources for community economic development and 
the literature on livestock polices and their impact on communities living adjacent to protected 
areas. The third chapter presents the methodology of the study. It is divided into four sections: 
background to qualitative research, qualitative design and grounded theory, data collection, and 
data quality and analysis. The results are presented in chapter four and this is followed by 
chapter 5 which presents the discussion, limitations and recommendation.  
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
This chapter presents the literature that informs this research. It is divided into two 
sections. The first section presents the theoretical review which focuses on the theory that is used 
in this research.  The second part presents the empirical literature review which reviews extant 
research on community based conservation, livestock policies and attitudes of local people 
towards community based conservation. 
2.1. Theoretical Literature Review 
The use of theory in research plays an important role in conceptualizing issues related to 
the topic being researched as well as providing a lens through which phenomena is viewed 
((Browne-Nunez and Jonker, 2008). Theory also acts as a foundation for policy making 
(Sabatier, 2007). There are multiple theoretical perspectives that are used to analyze different 
problems such as the conflict between environment and agriculture, livestock and wildlife and 
different concerns that affect human beings. The main theory used by this research is the theory 
of power. The theories of power have been used to analyze inequality in society where those 
with power create conditions that favor them to appropriate more resources than those with less 
power (Lukes, 2005).  
Power has been a subject of debate for decades among both sociologists and political 
scientists alike. The different views on power have culminated into different dimensions, also 
known as different faces of power and these are: the first, second and third dimensions or the 
faces of power (Lukes, 2005; Gaventa, 1982).  
The first face of power or the pluralist approach was developed by Robert Dahl and 
Nelson Polsby whose views were a reaction to the elite theory of power developed by C. Wright 
Mills and Floyd Hunter (Gaventa, 1982). Wright Mills and Hunter (cited in Luke, 2005) argued 
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that power was concentrated in the hands of a small group called elites. Dahl  (1962), and the 
pluralists defined power as the situation where “A” makes “B” do something that “B” would 
otherwise not do where both are actors participating in decision-making in an open system. 
Pluralists assume that in an open system like the United States of America where no rigid class 
boundaries exist, domination of one group by another is impossible (Gaventa, 1982). Leaders are 
studied as representatives of the people and not as elites (Polsby cited in Gaventa, 1982). Polsby 
posits that non-participation is not a problem but just society’s inertia and that political inaction 
means consensus.  
Bachrach and Baratz, (1962) are the main critics of pluralists’ theory of power. They 
argue that power has two faces. The first face is that presented by the pluralists where “A” has 
power over “B”, to the extent that “A” can make “B” do something that “B” would otherwise not 
do.  Bachrach and Baratz (1970) point out that the second face of power is when “A” devotes his 
energies to manipulate dominant values and employs resources to keep some issues that are in 
the interests of “B” from the political agenda. They call this the mobilization of bias, defined as 
“…a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures (“rules of the game”)  
that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the 
expense of others” (p. 43). The mobilization of bias is used to keep controversial issues out of 
the political agenda while allowing those preferred by the power holders. The mobilization of 
bias also results in non-decision.  
Non-decision occurs in instances where an issue is deliberately ignored or marginalized. 
In turn non-decision is used to maintain the mobilization of bias. Non-decision is defined as “…a 
decision that results in suppression or thwarting of latent or manifest challenge to the values or 
interests of the decision maker” (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, p. 44). Non-decision ensures that 
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voices demanding change are suffocated before they are raised, and dissent kept out of the 
agenda to maintain the status quo in allocating the privileges and resources in a given society.  
Different forms of non-decision making are: use of force, sanctions, existing bias of 
political system, and the strengthening of the mobilization of bias to block challenges to the 
system. The use of force is considered the most extreme and may include imprisonment, beating 
and in some cases killing. The use of sanctions includes threats to deny some services, valued 
items or events that the challenger might not want to do without. Sanctions may include positive 
ones such as rewards to challengers who forgo their intended challenge. The bias of the political 
system is also used such as: rules, procedures or norms to block challenges. Labels like 
‘communism,’ ‘unpatriotic,’ ‘undemocratic,’ maybe used to make challenge unpopular hence its 
marginalization (Gaventa, 1982). 
The third dimension of power is critical of the behaviorist emphasis of the first two 
dimensions of power where the “…study of overt, ‘actual behavior’, of which ‘concrete 
decision’ in situation of conflict are seen as paradigmatic” (Luke, 2005, p.25). The third 
dimension embraces the mobilization of bias and non-decision espoused by the second 
dimension but adds that power is exercised when the actor’s perceptions and conception of issues 
are shaped by the power holders through the use of mobilization of bias, media and other 
institutions of socialization. The power holders influences, patterns, and shapes the wants and 
values of the powerless to conform to those of the power holder.  
The mobilization of bias has been instrumental in different situations where important 
issues were prevented from inclusion into the formal agenda.  Wilson (2000) shows that in 
Botswana some veterinary cordon fences in the ODRS were erected without conducting an 
environmental impact assessment (EIA). Wilson points specifically to the fences that were 
41 
 
erected after the cattle lung disease of 1995 where the policy was already in place requiring an 
EIA to be conducted before such an act could be effected. Wilson points out that the rationale for 
not conducting an EIA was that the need to curb the cattle lung disease was urgent. This was 
despite the expressed fears by communities in the ODRS and some experts that such a fence 
would have negative consequences on both wildlife and communal grazing lands. The challenge 
by the voices opposed to the erection of the fence without proper EIA was stifled because they 
did not have adequate resources and platform to adequately voice their views. The mobilization 
of bias was thus used by the power holders whose vested interests were the cattle industry in 
which most of them have invested (Wilson, 2000, Taylor, 2006).  Gaventa (1982) points out that 
the mobilization of bias was used to keep issues challenging the status quo out of the political 
agenda in the Appalachian valley thus stifling dissent from the people of the valley. 
One outcome of the mobilization of bias due to the powerlessness of the powerless is 
inertia which is itself an outcome of repeated defeat of the powerless hence the powerless 
become fatalistic and start to believe that their position of powerlessness is how things or the 
world is ordered. The resignation to fatalism of the powerless makes them vulnerable to 
manipulation and their conception of issues shaped by the power holders. In the case of the 
Appalachian Valley residents who Gaventa studied, several factors contributed to their 
quiescence in the face of oppression and unjust treatment by the power holders of the valley and 
these were:  the use of force (beating, imprisonment, killing,), information gate keeping, and the 
creation of dependency of the people on the company that dominated the economic and political 
life of the valley and its functionaries. These created conducive conditions for the company to 
the control of what issues went into the political agenda and what issues were kept out (Gaventa, 
1982). The indifference and hopelessness of the people of the valley resulted in the power-
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holders control of the response of the powerless without any visible action from the power 
holders. 
The methodology for the study of power differs for the first, second and third dimensions 
of power. In their analysis of power, the pluralists are guided by the behaviorist approach where 
they observe the behavior of participants in decision-making and conclude that the one who has 
power is the one whose ideas prevailed. The pluralist method study focus on decision-making 
procedures, instances of conflict over preferences among actors, as well as who prevail and loses 
in decision-making. Polsby (1974) points out that  the pluralist method try to study outcomes in 
decision making in order to determine who won or who lost on the basis of which the pluralist 
would conclude the one who wields power. The leadership is assumed to be diverse and fluid 
hence making the existence of elites not possible 
The proponent of this view was Robert Dahl who based his conclusions of how power 
can be studied on the results of a study he conducted in New Haven (Dahl, 1961). Based on the 
results of his study, Dahl concluded that contrary to elite theory, anyone can mobilize people and 
have their ideas accepted without being part of the elite. In his study he found that the mayor of 
the city was responsible for mobilizing the different actors in his city to decide on topical issues 
concerning the city without any veto from elites. The key to pluralist methodology is observable 
conflict in political action during decision making. According to pluralists, the one who wins in 
decision making has power and the one who loses does not have it.  
Bachrach and Baratz (1962), the proponents of the second dimension of power were 
critical of the pluralists approach and proposed a different approach to the study of power. They 
argue that the mobilization of bias used to determine what goes into political agenda or not, is 
not considered in the pluralists’ approach. They therefore propose that the study of power should 
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focus on the two faces of power: the first face is that proposed by the pluralists and the second 
face is the mobilization of bias. Bachrach and Baratz recommend that the researcher should first 
investigate the mobilization of bias in order to understand who benefits from it. Second, the 
researcher should analyze the dynamics of non-decision-making (p. 952). Bachrach and Baratz 
argue that this helps understand how the defenders of the status quo prevent change by limiting 
decision-making to safe issues. Thirdly, the researcher need to focus on “…participation in 
decision-making of concrete issues” (p. 952).  
According to the third dimension of power, a researcher should be cognizant of the non-
behaviorist aspect of power where A “…also exercises power over B by influencing, shaping or 
determining his very wants” (Luke, 1962, p. 23). Gaventa (1982) suggests a historical approach 
which has the advantage of revealing the different processes overtime used to shape the behavior 
of the powerless by the power holders. He proposes “…the study of social myths, language and 
symbols and how they are shaped or manipulated in power processes” (p. 15). Secondly, the 
study of power in the third dimension should look at communication of information, both the 
content and how the communication is carried out.  The third dimension emphasizes studying the 
means by which the powerless are led to accept the issues by the power holders as legitimate: 
false consensus.  
The methods of the second and the third dimensions of power are better at focusing on 
the agenda setting process because they address how issues arise and get into the agenda or how 
they are prevented from inclusion in the agenda. Through the mobilization of bias, Bachrach and 
Baratz (1970) have demonstrated how issues are mobilized in or out of the political agenda in the 
face of dissent by other groups.   
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The theory of power and its different faces permeate different agenda setting theories on 
how issues get into or get left out of the agenda.  Baumgartner and Jones (1993) demonstrated 
some validity of the pluralists’ claims when they pointed out that different interests groups in 
American politics use their resources to create policy monopolies which nevertheless collapse 
when other interest groups present issues and are forced into the macro-political agenda.   
In non-federalist systems where there is less dispersion of interest groups participating in 
decision making, the dominance of one group over others is more pronounced (Sen, 1999). 
Rising gaps in inequalities and economic opportunities, poverty and deprivation found in low 
income countries in Africa, Asia and Latina America with unsuccessful challenge are indicative 
of possibilities of mobilization of bias and use of sanctions to maintain the status quo. The power 
holders use resources at their disposal, information gate keeping and mobilization of bias to 
ensure that issues are kept to safe havens while dissent is suppressed (Baumgartner and Jones, 
1993; Sen, 1999). 
The phenomenon of underdevelopment of one region by another also indicates the use of 
resources by the power holders to advance their interests with less focus on the interests of the 
less powerful. This view parallels the underdevelopment theories which posit that the powerful 
nations of the world use their resources to under develop the powerless nations especially in 
North and South national relations. The use of information gate keeping, mobilization of bias and 
both negative and positive sanctions are used by the developed countries to shape conceptions of 
people in developing nations about issues of political and economic importance. Within country 
relations also show such characteristics where the dominant social groups use resources at their 
disposal to shape consensus by different means in order to determine agenda issues. The third 
dimension brings the issue of ‘power over’ in contrast to ‘power with’ two concepts used to 
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differentiate gender relation in feminist discourse (Elshtain, 1982)). “Power over” signifies 
domination of one individual or group over another or others whereas power with signifies 
partnership and working together (Elshtain, 1982). In situations of power over, years of 
capability deprivation engenders powerlessness and give grounds for false consensus which 
helps keep political agenda to safe issues. 
Botswana as a republic with democratically elected political representatives after every 
five years follows a democratic tradition in its policy formation where the public is involved in 
deliberations through different forums (Lekorwe, 1997). The most common forum for the 
citizenry to participate in policy deliberation is the Kgotla (traditional assembly) where issues of 
community and national importance are discussed (Lekorwe, 1997; MFDP, 2003). All urban 
areas, urban villages, villages, and localities have a Kgotla with tribal leadership running the day 
to day affairs of the assembly. Natural resources or environmental and agricultural policies 
therefore have a flavor of national ownership by virtue of all citizens having an opportunity to 
participate in the formation of such policies (Colclough and McCarthy, 1980). 
The major policy problem in the ODRS like in many natural resource rich countries is the 
existing policy conflict between natural resources and agricultural policies. This is exacerbated 
by the existence of agricultural production and wildlife, especially big game, in the same 
geospatial environment which makes the conflict between man and wildlife inevitable (Boyd, 
Belnch, Bourn, Drake, and Stevenson, 1999). The growing impetus to develop agriculture and to 
promote tourism at the same time in the ODRS has led the MoA and the MEWT to promote 
parallel policies meant to achieve each ministry’s goals. 
In the ODRS some MoA policies such as the animal disease control policy through 
veterinary cordon fences have proved detrimental to the wildlife sector resulting in death of wild 
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animals and restricting their movements in their seasonal migration to the Okavango Delta from 
the Kgalagadi area which is south of the delta. The animal disease control policy discussed 
earlier is responsible for the death and blocking of wildlife migratory routes through the cordon 
fences that were erected (Albertson, 1998). The National Policy on Agricultural Development 
(NPAD) of 1991 proposed the fencing of communal grazing areas for increased livestock 
productivity (MFDP, 2003). The erection of ranches in the ODRS poses a threat similar to the 
veterinary cordon fences which blocked wildlife migratory routes (Mbaiwa, 2005). The conflict 
in these policies therefore is focused on the erection of fences which negatively impact people’s 
livelihoods. 
Institutional change in the management of the Okavango Delta Ramsar Site (ODRS) 
including the different agencies both national and international bring an element of confusion 
and conflicting messages to the communities around the ODRS. At national level there are 
different agencies situated in different Ministries such as the Department of Tourism, 
Department of Wildlife and National Parks both situated in the MEWT and the Department of 
Veterinary Services, Department of Animal Production and Department of Crop Production all 
situated in the MoA implementing some aspects of their policies in the ODRS with lack of policy 
congruence (Meyer and Lucie, 2001). The institutions for the management of the ODRS are 
influenced by vertical and horizontal relationships between the agencies implementing polices in 
the ODRS based on their different mandates and powers (Tatenhove, Edelenbos, and Klok, 
2010). In fact Tatenhove et al (2010) argue that individuals exercise power but it is important to 
note that these individuals are embedded in “…historically and socially constructed 
structures…such as institutions and discourses, p. 612). 
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There are different local agencies that also actively participate in the policy 
implementation in the ODRS such as the Tawana Land Board and the Ngamiland District 
Council. Tawana Land Board is responsible for tribal land where livestock and crop production 
take place (MFDP, 2003; MFDP; 2010). The Ngamiland District Council is responsible for all 
the development initiatives in the area. The communities in the ODRS also have their own 
agencies such as village development committees, community based organizations and their 
tribal authorities. In short, there are different institutions, defined as rules and regulations 
(Ostrom, 1990) which guide how the ODRS resource system is managed and utilized and how 
people relate with each other in appropriating resource units from the resource system. The 
process of establishing some of the rules in the commons have been described as bottom-up in 
conception but top-down in practice (Twyman, 1998; Blaike, 2007).  
At the local level, community organizations participate in the development of the 
communities and implement some aspects of policies. CBNRM is part of the country’s Revised 
National Policy for Rural Development of 2002 and its aim is twofold: ecological preservation 
and social and economic development of the communities (Department of Wildlife and National 
Parks, 2010; MFDP, 2010). The efforts undertaken to conserve natural resources and the 
environment often have negative consequences on poor communities living adjacent to 
conservation areas (Infield and Namara, 2001; Darkoh and Mbaiwa, 2005). This has often led to 
conflicts between government departments implementing conservation policies and 
communities.  
The literature on CBNRM and the extent of community participation has been questioned 
on the aspect of the different power relations which disadvantage communities. Twyman (1998) 
has questioned the validity of the participative extent of the local communities given the unequal 
48 
 
power relations in the Okwa Wildlife Management in the Ghanzi District of Botswana. Twyman 
contends that the poor communities in the Okwa Wildlife Management are said to be in control 
of the resources in the area as per the CBNRM policy, but in fact, decision-making is top down 
from government to the communities. In the ODRS, the theory of power is used to understand 
what grievances are being expressed and which ones get saliency to be in the agenda. The theory 
is also used to identify whose ideas given the different stakeholders get into the agenda. 
Gaventa (1982) has shown that the power holders use the mobilization of bias and non-
decision to maintain the status quo. In the ODRS, different groups have different livelihood 
sources including agriculture and natural resources such as wildlife. The attractiveness of a 
livelihood source is also influenced by the allocation of limited resources and budgetary 
constraints from government. By the same token, the allocation of resources is influenced by 
those who have control over such resources. In Botswana, the livestock subsector has always 
received the lion’s share of the budget compared to both the crop subsector and wildlife based 
tourism (MFDP, 2010).  
The process of the decision-making has implications for the role of power and how the 
different actors given their resources would use their power to ensure that certain issues will be 
considered and others kept out. In the ODRS, Wildlife Management Areas (WMA) are used for 
both livestock and wildlife utilization. Some areas within the WMA called Community Hunting 
Areas are leased out to the Safari companies who use the areas for tourism purposes. The 
decision to lease land sometimes is reached between the Community Based Organization (CBO) 
and the safari companies. Mutual agreement and consensus is not abnormal in policy studies.  
Polsby (1980) for example, has shown that consensus can be reached where different parties 
anticipate mutual benefit.  
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Participation in decision making leads to a change in different institutions (rules and 
regulations) which govern many natural resources rich areas. In the ODRS this study focuses on 
one of the policy problems, the changing institutional landscape between the different actors 
which lead to goal conflicts of different government agencies, the private sector and the 
community. The study uses the theory of power to assess how the different actors use the 
different resources (money skills, etc.) that each actor has at their disposal to prevail in decision-
making. Within the communities the different agencies such as the village development 
committee and the CBOs reflect specific power relations that influence local decision making. 
Conflicts are reflected in the leadership of the CBOs which in some communities are in the 
hands of non-locals prompting suspicions by community members concerning their real stake in 
the management of the ODRS resource system. 
The communities in the ODRS are unique in the whole country. Most of the tribes, 
namely the Bambukushu, Bayeyi, Basarwa, and Baherero are all designated as minor tribes with 
no representation in the house of chiefs which is a legislative body responsible for articulating 
each tribe’s interests to influence policy at the national Assembly. The Batawana, also residing in 
the ODRS are part of what is designated as major tribes recognized as such by the country’s 
constitution.  
The designation of some tribes as minor is a form of marginalization and denies them full 
representation in the House of Chiefs which advises the national assembly on matters pertaining 
to cultural issues of the different tribes. Taylor (2006) further argues that this marginalization 
disadvantage the minor tribes in CBNRM matters because having no representation with equal 
status as other tribes relegates their issues and positions to the margins. Blaike (2006) notes that 
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in Botswana there is a network of institutions that is transparent in managing the CBNRM 
projects. He however notes that  
the nature of the safari, tourist, handicrafts and trophy hunting industry has not 
lent itself well to the development of skills by local people, or to the emergence of 
a substantial and widely distributed stream of income for local communities, it 
has also led to the marginalization of certain groups, especially the Koi-San3” 
(p.1954).  
The development of the two sector society has evolved where the hinterland in this case 
the communities in ODRS especially those far away in the tourist areas have become the 
suppliers of cheap labor to the metropolis or private companies where most of the tourism 
infrastructure is built. This underdevelopment of hinterlands exacerbates the flight of capital 
from the production areas such as the tourist areas leaving producers/farmers less well-off 
(Iroegbu, 2001, Irogbe, 2005). In Botswana CBNRM has been seen as a major component of the 
rural development strategy (MFDP, 2010)  but evidence shows that the development of some of 
the areas where most of the revenue is generated are still lagging behind in basic development 
infrastructure with high incidents of poverty illiteracy and poor health (MFDP, 2003, Central 
Statistics Office, 2009)). Gaventa (1982), suggests that absentee owners of the resources control 
and shape processes and conceptions in the hinterlands with resultant non challenge from those 
who are victims of exploitation being the repeated defeats of the past. Although there is no 
evidence so far that this could be the case in the ODRS, the migration of young people from the 
ODRS communities to urban villages and towns has led to decrease in populations of the 
                                                 
3 The Khoi-san are an ethnic group within the San people 
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communities in some parts of the ODRS such as Mababe, Sankuyo and Khwai (Tawana Land 
Board, 2005).  
2.2. Empirical Literature Review 
Extensive research on the interaction of agriculture, especially livestock, wildlife and 
protected areas reveal that there is incessant conflict that ultimately shapes the attitude of local 
people (WRI, 2008; Mbaiwa, 2011; Albertson, 1998; Wilson, 2000). In some instances, policies 
in place contribute to the conflict between the two sectors (Taylor, 2006). In other instances, the 
alienation of the local people from natural resource management who are also involved in 
agricultural production made them develop negativity towards wildlife (WRI, 2005, WRI, 2008) 
Of great concern relating to CBC is the attitude of local people to conservation of natural 
resources, which is seen as critical to the success of CBC (Infield and Namara, 2001; Durrant 
and Durrant 2008; Lam, 2004). They further state that to better evaluate the success or otherwise 
of CBC, it is important to assess the attitude of local people towards conservation. Receiving a 
fair outcome is seen as critical to the success of CBC (Infield and Namara, 2001; Durrant and 
Durrant 2008; Lam, 2004). Infield and Namara (2001) define CBC as being inclusive rather than 
exclusive of the communities. The key feature of CBC is the decentralization of natural resource 
management to local communities with emphasis on economic benefits to communities 
(Goldman, 2003). Goldman (2003) explains that the decentralization of some aspect of CBC is 
the reason why it is often referred to as CBNRM. Infield and Namara (2001) further assert that to 
better evaluate the success of CBC it is important to assess the attitudes of local people towards 
conservation. 
Shretha and Alavapati (2005) however, argue that communities living in proximity to 
protected areas are often left to bear the social costs of conservation whereas the benefits of 
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conservation escape out of the region and are not equitably shared. Shretha and Alavapati further 
argue that the benefits of conservation are felt more at the global level followed by national and 
regional levels while the communities benefit less. Research in the ODRS has also suggested the 
same trend where the local communities are left out of the benefits of CBNRM because the bulk 
of the revenues leak out of the local economy (Darkoh and Mbaiwa, 2005).  
Gaventa’s study of  the coal mines of the Appalachian Valley revealed that they were 
very rich in coal and contributed a high percentage of the US energy (62%) and yet the majority 
of the people of Appalachia remained poor (Gaventa,1980).  Gaventa explained and showed that 
despite this economic injustice, the people of the valley remained silent. In the ODRS and other 
areas rich in natural resources and yet with poverty being rampant could also be explained using 
the power theory to understand why inequalities remain unchallenged. 
Studies on attitudes in Africa have largely been influenced by the methods and theories 
developed in the western world. The interest in attitude research is mostly influenced by the 
increasing conflict between man and wildlife (Browne-Nunez and Jonker, 2008). In their review 
of the different research projects that have been undertaken on attitude research, Browne-Nunez 
and Jonker point out that most research in Africa has been influenced by theories and methods 
developed in the western world such as Marshlow’s hierarchy of needs.  
The purpose for their review was to assess the applicability of the methods and theories 
in African survey research as well as the challenges faced by Africa survey research. They found 
that the common theme that influences research on attitudes is the human-wildlife conflict which 
has plagued both the western world and the developing world alike. They point out that the 
importance of research on attitude is predicated upon human-wildlife conflict which engenders 
certain responses from the afflicted communities. They point out that the attitudes of the 
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communities affected by wildlife conflict are important in policy response. Policy responses may 
include ‘…increasing the benefits to communities and using locally recruited game guards…” 
(Browne-Nunez and Jonker, 2008, p.47). 
Browne-Nunez and Jonker (2008) state the importance of methodological approaches in 
previous research which influenced research in Africa and raise “…questions regarding the basic 
cannons of empirical research such as measurement, testing of theories, reliability and validity’ 
(p. 48). The emphasis on methodology is that rigor of the methodology will lead to “successful 
application of survey data” (p. 48). Definition of concepts, what is being measured and theory 
are important aspects of attitudinal research.  Browne-Nunez and Jonker (2008) add the 
importance of reliability and validity in the process of doing this type of research. They define 
conceptualization as the process that clarifies meaning of terms used in the research process so 
that the reader can have an understanding of their contextual meaning. They explain that the 
‘…definition of the concept being measured and the indicators being used in measurement are 
often determined by theory” (p. 57).  
Given the importance of conceptualization and theory, Browne-Nunez and Jonker (2008) 
propose a definition of attitude as perception or how one feels about an attitude object. This 
definition is by no means the only one but has been deduced from the different definitions that 
were found in the literature. The authors have found in the literature reviewed on attitudinal 
research in Africa that most of the researchers did not define the term attitude while many also 
did not apply any theory to their research. The lack of definition poses a problem of validity in 
terms of knowing whether the instrument chosen is measuring that which one set out to measure.  
Browne-Nunez and Jonker (2008) also point out that applying no theory to the research 
adds to the disadvantage already stated by denying the research a guide to frame issues which 
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would help contextualize definitions upheld by the adopted theory in the event it becomes 
necessary to re-define the terms/concepts being measured. They further state that a few 
researchers have however used theories such as the Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs and Roger’s 
Diffusion of Innovation. Survey research in Africa on attitude has been rippled with many 
challenges especially concerning data collection.  
An evaluation of CBNRM on the basis of the benefits experienced at macro level using 
macro indicators often mask the negative consequences at the local level. Benefits of wildlife 
based tourism of which CBNRM is a driving force are often measured by macro-economic 
indicators such as the gross domestic product (GDP) with less attention made on the impacts at 
local level (Goldman, 2003). The distribution of benefits is a major concern with many CBC 
programs. Mbaiwa (2006) for example notes that joint venture partners benefit in 
disproportionate manner from tourism in the ODRS compared to the local people. He notes that 
the community sells the trophy animal for a very low price compared to the amount that the 
company gains when it sells the animal leaving the communities feeling cheated. Other 
discrepancy exists in the accrual of benefits related to environmental incomes. These include 
skills level and the resources needed to benefit from environmental income. The communities are 
usually disadvantaged in this regard (WRI, 2008). 
Policy conflicts are usually exacerbated by the unclear property rights. Where these 
property rights are well defined, they are based on a model that was adopted without critical 
analysis of alternative theories (Blake, 2006, Ostrom, 1990). Harding’s tragedy of the commons 
model (Harding, 1968) has been dominant in influencing conservation policies in many countries 
(Quinn, Hubby, Kiwasila, and Lovett, 2007). Due to its premise that individuals using the 
commons attempt to maximize their gains at the expense of the environment, the model proposed 
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privatization of the commons where some private entity or the government would take over the 
management of the resource Quinn et al (2007) however state that there is evidence that in Africa 
common property regimes have been used successfully to manage common pool resources 
(CPR) 
CPRs are better managed when common property rights are recognized as applicable in 
an area under consideration (Clement, 2009; Quinn et al, 2007; Ostrom, 1990). Recognition of 
common property rights would signal an acknowledgement that local people are capable of 
collectively owning and managing the CPR from which they appropriate resources using their 
own institutions and rules. This leads to an alternative policy framework that embraces full 
participation of local people and hence minimizes potential conflict while also creating an 
environment where conflict also is resolved amicably using agreed institutions. On the other 
hand policies guided by the tragedy of the commons advocate privatization of the CPR with the 
understanding that local people cannot manage their own resources (Ostrom, 1990). This world 
view has the tendency to exclude local people from decision making triggering conflicts between 
the different agencies implementing the policy with local people (Blake, 2006).  
Failure to conceptualize a resource based on the correct property rights theory has the 
potential to undermine conservation efforts. The history of conservation in Africa and elsewhere 
in the world, based on the tragedy of the commons had led to conflicts between implementing 
agencies and local communities (Quinn et al, 2007, DWNP, 2010). Communities often left out of 
the decision-making process concerning the natural resource on which they depend, develop 
hostile attitudes towards some natural resources especially wildlife (Mbaiwa, 2006; Goldman, 
2003; Quinn et al, 2007) 
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The evolution of community conservation was a transition from solutions based on the 
tragedy of the common, culminating in emphasis on conservation and community economic 
development (WRI, 2005). The hypothesis of CBC was that with economic benefits from natural 
resource, communities would change their unfavorable attitude towards wildlife and participate 
more effectively toward wildlife and natural resource conservation. The spread of CBC in 
Southern Africa was rapid. The 1990s saw several countries adopt community based 
conservation with different names: CampFire in Zimbabwe, Living in a Finite Environment 
(LIFE) in Namibia, and Administration Management Design (AMADE) in Zambia. Most 
communities have embraced the idea of CBC after realizing the benefits of participation such as 
employment and revenue for their communities. 
Despite the success of CBC in many countries that adopted it, CBC is not without its 
limitations. Although the philosophy behind the community based conservation is for 
communities to play an important role in a bottom-up decision-making in conservation, top-
down approaches are still common (Mbaiwa and Darkoh, 2006; WRI, 2005). Some community 
members still view wildlife and natural resources as government property beyond their control. 
In some cases the language used is intended to coerce communities into agreement while greater 
power remains with government (Twyman 1998, Blaike 2006). This results in continued 
dissatisfaction by local communities with community based conservation. 
There has been extensive research on the interaction of agriculture especially livestock 
and wildlife and protected areas. The interaction has mostly been characterized by conflict 
(Mbaiwa, 2005; Albertson, 1998). The conflict mainly involves wildlife destroying crops or 
predation on livestock (Arntzen, 2003; Mbaiwa and Darkoh, 2006; Albertson, 1998). Part of the 
problem of conflicts between wildlife and livestock lies in the policies intended to promote 
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livestock production and agriculture in general. In the ODRS for example, Albertson (1998) 
pointed out that the cordon fences that were erected in the 1980s that intended to prevent the 
spread of diseases from wildlife to domestic animals, ended up blocking wildlife migratory 
routes. The Kuke fence which separates the Ghanzi Tribal Grazing Land Policy farms, has 
actually resulted in thousands of wild animals trapped on the dryer southern side of the ODRS 
where there was little to no water during the dry season (Albertson, 1998).  It is estimated that 
between 20 000 and 30 000 zebras and wildebeest died during the 1980s drought because they 
could not access the Okavango Delta waters due to the blockage of their routes by the Kuke 
veterinary cordon fence (Boggs, 1999). On the other hand these fences restricted livestock from 
accessing other parts of the grazing areas (Mbaiwa, 1995).  
It has been argued that the modern land management policies in Botswana such as the 
Tribal Land Grazing Policy (TGLP) which advocated privatizing the commons disregarded the 
traditional systems which were efficient (Magole, 2009). TGLP was informed by the tragedy of 
the commons theory which in the 1970s was popular and influenced many policies concerning 
common pool resources. Magole (2009) argue that disregard of the common property regime 
which hitherto regulated land management in Botswana was a mistake as the performance of 
TGLP was dismal. In the Lake Ngami region, land was managed as common property by 
kinsmen under the authority of the chief. There were mechanisms in place that ensured that land 
was not overgrazed but TGLP provided exclusive rights to a few individuals who were expected 
to care for the land better (Magole, 2009). Evidence exists that TGLP has not been produced the 
expected results (Magole, 2009; MFDP, 2003). Instead most of the farms were overgrazed and 
mismanaged.   
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DeMotts, Haller, Hoom and Saum (2010), studied the dynamics of CPR in the Okavango 
Delta in Botswana. The purpose of the study was to make a comparative analysis of the historical 
changes in the use of common pool resources using two villages (Ikoga and Seronga) in 
Botswana.  
They drew their data from a combination of field work conducted and studies published 
by authors on livelihoods in the Delta. Ethnographic field work was conducted by Roland Saum 
in Ikoga (2003 and 2004) mostly using participatory observation. Interviews with community 
members, oral history, biographies, archival search and secondary literature searches were used 
to access data. They found that institutions in the two villages had been undergoing changes from 
pre-colonial period through colonial period and after independence. The major changes were the 
institutions responsible for communal resources management. In the pre-colonial period, local 
institutions were responsible for land and its resources but these were dismantled during the 
colonial period where Chiefs became the custodians of the land and by extension the natural 
resources. These changes were maintained and further strengthened by the post-independence 
government.  
Notable changes after independence were the formation of land boards to be custodians 
of the land and its resources. In the two villages, there are no territorial boundaries governing the 
use of resources especially fishing, access to common pool resources is open.  The study 
concludes that despite the open resource nature of the resource there is no evidence that the 
common pool resource are under stress. This is attributed to other sources of livelihoods the 
communities have access to such as government assistance.   
In Botswana some communities had predicated their existence on the common pool 
resources such as wildlife and veldt products. Magole (2009) conducted a study in which she 
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examined the shift in common pool resources management in Botswana and how it affects the 
different groups with differing socio-economic status with specific reference to the San or 
Basarwa ethnic group who are the earliest inhabitants and are now the most marginalized in the 
country. 
The study relied on the use of secondary data and past reports which mainly focused on 
the San people. The study found that common pool resource management in Botswana shifted 
from being community led to a State led system where all conditions are set by the state through 
numerous laws governing the use of common pool resources. Specific results on the San people 
revealed that the advent of agricultural production and other modern production systems 
including mining exploration pushed the San further into marginal lands where they had to 
contend with fewer and fewer wildlife on which they depended. The passing of modern Acts like 
the Wildlife Act and Tourism Act meant further marginalization of the San from their livelihood 
source. Community Based Natural Resource Management Program was designed to bring back 
the participation of communities in the management of common pool resources. The policy was 
able to establish the boundaries which helped to some extent with the problem of excludability 
through the creation of community hunting areas.  
Magole (2009) thus concludes that the marginalization of the San and the encroachment 
of the elites in the areas hitherto inhabited by the San have brought resource conflicts that has an 
ethnic dimension. The author further argues that access to common pool resources by the elites 
and other people from outside the areas presents institutional problems that are critical if the 
management if the Common Pool Resources is to be successful. 
Moore and Rodger (2010) looked at wildlife as a common pool resource in Western 
Australia. The paper aimed at achieving three objectives: first, to explore the possibility of 
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wildlife tourism being a common pool resource; second, to derive a list of enabling conditions 
required for the sustainability of such resources and third, to determine the applicability of the 
conditions through a case study 
The study used thirty enabling conditions grouped into four conditions that are required 
for sustainability of wildlife tourism to answer the second objective and applied the conditions 
using a case study to test applicability. The four categories are as follows: first, characteristics of 
the resource; second, nature of the groups depending on the resource; third, features of the 
institutional regimes, and fourth, which resources are managed. The case study was a desk-based 
study of whale shark tourism in Ningaloo Marine Park off northern Australia. Data sources 
included government, industry and unpublished reports, research thesis, journal papers, 
discussions with officers from Western Australia Department of Environment. 
The results showed that wildlife can be considered a common pool resource because of 
its inability in some settings to exclude tourists and thus inability to capture the true investments 
and benefits of the tourism industry due to the free rider problem. Institutional arrangement such 
as licensing makes exclusion of free riders possible. These arrangements are supported by the 
state. Rulemaking and monitoring are agreed upon after local consultations. The problem 
encountered is the mobile nature of the sharks that make their use cross boundaries and 
jurisdictional borders. This is problematic in ensuring the preservation of resource stock. The 
study concludes that this is a problem irrespective of property right regime employed. 
Given the successes of common property regimes in many parts of the world, it is 
important to consider characterizing the ODRS and its ecosystem, where the existence of 
agriculture and wildlife coexist, as a common pool resource. This consideration to characterize 
the ODRS as a CPR is based on the knowledge that communities that currently live in and 
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around the ODRS have lived there for thousands of years dependent on the delta for their 
survival (Magole, 2009). If the ODRS is considered as a CPR, it will offer alternative perspective 
from the dominant one where private property has been center stage in informing policy 
regarding land management in Botswana.  Failure to characterize the ODRS as CPR limits the 
possibility of considering an alternative policy approach where common property would be an 
option. Inherent in this alternative view of common property rights is the increased participation 
of local people in the management of the commons.  
The literature reviewed demonstrates that there are different views about the commons 
and what property rights would be suitable to manage them. This conclusion is based on the 
literature and experiences from other places where the use of the IAD has been applied. Some of 
the studies indicate strong government support for the local rules and institutions in the research 
areas which contributed to the successful management of the common pool resources.  
There is a need for the assessment of the local peoples’ attitudes towards conservation 
and the extent to which they participate in the decision making and benefit from CBC. Such 
information will provide insights into the contribution of local people in natural resource 
conservation especially in the fragile Okavango Delta ecosystem. This study therefore intends to 
assess the attitudes of local people towards conservation and land use in the Okavango Delta. It 
will specifically try to answer the following hypotheses: 
1. The Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) and livestock polices 
have been successful in the development of the ODRS? 
2. The local people of the Delta communities effectively participate in decision-making 
concerning the development of the ODRS. 
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CHAPTER 3. Methods 
This chapter presents the methods used in this research. This research adopts a qualitative 
design and used grounded theory as a technique for data analysis. This chapter is divided into 
four sections: background to qualitative research, followed by the explanation of qualitative 
research and grounded theory; data collection; and lastly the section on data quality is presented. 
3.1. Background to Qualitative Research 
Research has been dominated by two distinct and often competing research designs: 
quantitative and qualitative designs (Babbie, 2004). The quantitative method often associated 
with the positivist approach has been the dominant of the two however in some cases the 
qualitative research is used to explain the social phenomena that are beyond the efficacy of 
quantitative research (Babbie, 2004).  Although there are numerous qualitative designs, such as 
ethnography, ethnomethodology, phenomenology, etc. grounded theory has emerged as a 
powerful challenger to the otherwise dominant quantitative paradigm. As a process, grounded 
theory is a rigorous approach to data that includes a dialectical conversation between researcher 
and data.  Grounded theory has the capacity to be especially strong in content validity (Charmaz, 
2006) and holds the potential of being complementary and informative of quantitative research.  
A study of the ODRS should therefore be cognizant of the diverse actors and their 
different characteristics in order to generate data that will truly reflect different discourses 
concerning the ODRS. Given the diversity of the actors and their different experiences, grounded 
theory provides a more relevant technique to understand the different perspectives of the actors. 
This can generate rich data that will provide in-depth understanding of the interactions between 
the actors and their meanings based on their stories and narratives.  
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3.2. Qualitative Design and Grounded Theory 
I chose a qualitative design because the purpose of the study is to understand the conflicts 
in the management of ODRS by evaluating attitudes of local people towards conservation of the 
environment and natural resources. The respondents were selected from communities of the 
ODRS.  Understanding the conflicts in the management of ODRS necessitates selecting a 
methodology that helps one understand meanings attached to the issues under study such as 
attitudes, conflict, etc. Qualitative design provides the tools that can achieve this task (Creswell, 
2009).  
Grounded theory came into existence in the late 1960s when researchers, concerned with 
the issues of dying and death and their impact on both the patients and the staff in hospitals, 
embarked on a journey to study the hitherto marginalized areas such as the one stated above: 
dying and death (Glaser and Strauss as cited in Charmaz, 2006). Grounded theory provided an 
avenue for qualitative research that cuts across disciplines and is able to “…develop and 
inductive theories that are grounded in systematically gathered and analyzed data” (Bitsch, 2005, 
p. 77). Simply put, using grounded theory as a technique results in a very close reading of the 
transcribed words of participants and/or observations.  It involves a series of approaches to the 
data, from initial coding to focused codes and finally to a theoretical conceptual design 
(Charmaz, 2006).  
In conducting data collection, I directed discussions in the interviews and the focus group 
discussions. This means that I have played a role in influencing the interaction between 
respondents. My role however was that of a facilitator to ensure that issues were explored more 
through probing. Having experience with the government bureaucracy made me interpret the 
results using my own intuition about how the bureaucracy works and the consultative process.  
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The methods chosen to collect data in the ODRS was that which focused on participation 
of the respondents especially the local communities who might be deemed to be voiceless by 
virtue of their location in the power relations system. In giving the respondents an opportunity to 
engage in dialogue about their concerns, I achieved what de Souza Briggs (2003) calls ‘People 
Power produces Proper Planning” (p. 16). The tendency in bureaucratic discourse is to divide 
actors into givers and receivers where the government and its bureaucracy are givers and the 
local communities are receivers. This is the top down approach which has dominated planning 
for decades. Participatory methods have themselves been symbolic in most instances (Twyman, 
1998). This results in conflict between the givers and the receiver since often times the receivers 
are given what does not add value to their lives.  
An emancipator method is the one that creates dialogue to ensure richness of data 
(Charmaz, 2006).  It helps the involved actors to deconstruct meanings of hitherto misunderstood 
conversations. By interviewing community leaders and conducting focus group discussions with 
local community members of diverse demographics, I was able to create dialogue amongst the 
community members and help them present their views on topical issues affecting their 
communities’ development effort. On the other hand, I interviewed the officials on similar issues 
and was able to discern in a reflexive manner the points of convergence and differences.  
Mason (2002), advises that a researcher should ask themselves questions concerning how 
they want to read their data and present their arguments. She points out that these could be in a 
literal, interpretive, or reflexive sense. To read data in a literal sense is to look at the aspects of 
the reading for their literal substance. In the interpretive reading the researcher reads the data for 
what they think it means. The last one is the reflexive which requires the researcher to 
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interrogate themselves about their role in the reading. That is, how they see themselves in the 
data or the role they play in the interaction. 
The ODRS as a major tourist attraction and housing a wetland of international 
importance (Okavango Delta) has invited different stakeholders with diverse interests. The 
diversity of interests implies contested views at the policy level with different discourses 
presenting their views. In the case of the ODRS with its diverse participants, the dominant views 
representing the interests of the power holders often prevail and find their way into the policy 
agenda while others do not. It is not uncommon in Botswana to find the dominant discourse to be 
the official one while the receiver discourse, usually the ordinary citizenry are being swayed to 
the margins (Twyman, 1998) 
To study official discourse, different techniques were employed to decipher information 
from the government policy documents, ODRS management plans and the consultations as well 
as the presentations in the workshops leading to the plan by the bureaucracy. To achieve this I 
asked myself some questions as suggested by Charmaz (2006) including: who produced the text, 
for what purpose? What other purposes does the text serve? (p. 39). The second strategy I used is 
coding. I used initial coding to note emerging issues as a strategy which is helpful when working 
with documents (Charmaz, 2006) 
As Twyman (1998) notes, practiced discourse might have hidden meanings that are 
intended to coax the receiver to accept what is being proposed only for the receiver to realize that 
communication did not mean what it said it meant. In studying the practice discourse I was 
aware of the fact that the bureaucracy in Botswana is the implementer of government policy 
which is the dominant discourse. I was also aware that the government or the policy makers use 
consultative process to convey their policy messages or images to the general public. Given this 
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understanding and cognizant of unequal power relations in the policy process and the typical use 
of language, text and talk to exercise power over (Alexander and Mohanty, 1997; Mohanty, 
2006; Gaventa, 1982; and Dijk, 1993), I analyzed how the practitioner of this official discourse 
participated in its formation.  
The receiver discourse is rooted in the indigenous knowledge which has been relegated to 
the margins in the modern policy discourse. The traditional way of life in most of the ODRS 
communities can be described by what de Souza Briggs call ‘raising barns” (2003, p. 10) 
meaning the interdependence based on social capital (Shaffer et al, 2004). This way of living is 
characterized by the community dialogue on all issues that concern it in a manner that is 
reflective of patriotism. The interaction of the official discourse with receiver discourse is often 
conflict ridden where interests clash. de Souza Briggs (2003) argues that “…tackling problems 
well together usually begins with some honest inquiry into which conditions may qualify as 
problems to be solved, which as opportunities to be pursued, and which merely as concerns to be 
tracked and revisited” (p.11). A community in the ODRS pursuing such a strategy might find 
itself at loggerheads with the official and practitioner discourse which have priorities set at the 
national level.  In cases where this occurs, the receiver discourse indicates acrimony which I 
identify by looking at the consultative records such as minutes from Community Based 
Organizations (CBO) minutes, reports and the government reports. Text analysis (Charmaz, 
2006; Dijk, 1993) is a useful tool to link the three discourses and see the hegemonic tendencies if 
they exist. 
3.3. Data Collection  
As with any study, the nature of the research question should drive the method used.  
Here, I wish to better understand the meanings associated with stakeholders in Botswana, both 
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local and governmental, in order to assess how they understand the policies implemented in the 
ODRS region. 
The data collection took place in three periods in the ODRS in Botswana: July/August 
2008, July and August, 2009 and September 2011. Data collection methods include interviews 
with stakeholders in order to access the discourse of local stake holders related to issues of 
tourism and agriculture. I also conducted observations in Mababe, Khwai, Sankuyo and 
Nokaneng. I conducted observations in Mababe on three occasions in 2008, 2009, and 2011 and 
the same with Sankuyo but in Khwai I conducted observations in 2009 and 2011 only. I visited 
Nokaneng to conduct observations and interviews in 2011.  
I also used secondary data in this research.  Secondary data sources included Botswana 
government policy documents specifically national development plans (NDP), official statistics 
from central statistics office (CSO), relevant reports from different ministries especially the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, Ministry of 
Environment, Wildlife and Tourism. I obtained some of the data from the Okavango Research 
Institute (ORI), which is part of the University of Botswana focusing their research on the 
Okavango Delta Ramsar Site. The data was in the form of scholarly reports on the Okavango 
Delta and the different aspects of the Delta.    
Three types of communities were visited: one community that does not have a CBO and 
does not participate in CBNRM activities but keep livestock and two communities that do not 
keep livestock but participate in CBNRM as the only source of livelihood. One community 
where interviews were conducted owns a few livestock and heavily depends on CBNRM as a 
livelihood source.  These communities were purposefully selected for their uniqueness in the 
ODRS as described above. Mababe, Khwai and Sankuyo were selected because they derive their 
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livelihoods from wildlife based tourism through CBNRM and are not allowed to keep livestock. 
Nokaneng was selected because it does not participate in CBNRM. Their attempt to form a 
community based organization was refused by the Department of Wildlife and National Parks 
(DNWP) and as such the people in that community depend largely on agriculture as a source of 
livelihood.  
Within these communities, I interviewed key informants such as traditional leaders, 
leaders of community based organization. The selection was also purposeful and I also used the 
snowball technique to identify respondents. These techniques are very common in qualitative 
research where respondent selection can be based on their resourcefulness given the issue to be 
studied (Creswell, 2009; Babbie. 2004). The key informants that I interviewed were the chiefs of 
Mababe, Sankuyo, and Nokaneng. The other respondent I interviewed in Mababe was identified 
through the snowball technique because of their wealth of experience in CBNRM issues and his 
credentials as the former chairperson of the Trust who had travelled overseas presenting on 
CBNRM issues in Botswana. I interviewed managers of CBOs/Trusts for Mababe, Sankuyo and 
Khwai as they all fall under the category of key informants. In total the key informants I 
interviewed were four chiefs for the four villages, a former chairperson of Mababe Trust and 
three mangers of the Trusts for the three villages. In Nokaneng I interviewed the secretary of the 
Tribal Administration and the administrative Assistant at the Kgotla who is also a resident of the 
village, as part of the purposefully selected key informants. In total my key informants from the 
communities were eight. I held discussions with two faculty members from the Department of 
Environmental Science at the University of Botswana in 2008, director of Division of 
Agricultural Planning and Statistics in 2008 and 2011, Deputy Director, Veterinary Services in 
2011, Chief Crop Production Officer all in the Ministry of Agriculture in 2011. I also 
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interviewed Senior Tourism officer at the Department of Tourism in Gaborone in 2009 and one 
tourism officer in for the Ngamiland District Council in 2011. I interviewed one Wildlife Officer 
in charge of CBNRM in 2011. I could not record the interviews as the respondents were not 
comfortable with that idea. 
3.3.1 Observations 
The use of observation as a data collection technique is common in qualitative research. 
It is usually used to capture data that include non-verbal communication and related environment 
in which research is taking place. Mason (2002) posits that it is 
a method of generating data which entails a researcher immersing himself or 
herself in a research ‘setting’ so that they can experience and observe first hand a 
range of dimensions in and of that setting…including social actions, behavior, 
interactions, relationships, events, as well as spatial, locational and temporal 
dimensions  (p.84).  
In the qualitative tradition observations take place in the naturalistic environment instead of 
controlled one characteristic of quantitative design. 
In the summer of 2009 and September 2011, I conducted observations in three local 
communities of Mababe, Khwai, Nokaneng and Sankuyo. The purpose was to familiarize myself 
with the setting, the environment, and different location of different infrastructure in the 
communities, business, and type of dwelling places, government resources and community based 
resources and structures. To ensure increased richness of data, I ‘immersed’ myself in the setting, 
the purpose being to experience and observe first hand all dimensions of the setting. This also 
helped me to observe the interaction of community members in a more relaxed setting and later 
in a more ‘formal’ one during focus group discussions (Mason, 2002). 
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In the summer of 2009, I spent three hours of observation in the Mababe village doing 
observations. I first introduced myself to the village chief and explained what my research was 
about and also to seek permission to move around the village making the observations. I noted 
the village infrastructure: schools, health facilities, government offices and other infrastructure 
that help people run their day to day activities. I also looked at the type of housing units in the 
village, water sources and retail stores, farms, and other forms of infrastructure that was 
observed. I also noted the people in their relaxed moments for example at a drinking spot where 
several young men were loitering. I listened and engaged in conversations about their everyday 
life in the village without making the conversation translate into an interview.  
In Mababe I also had an opportunity to observe the community deliberations in a meeting 
in a traditional assembly on issues related to the community Trust. At the meeting I was sitting 
down taking notes on the content of the meeting as well as noting the characteristics of those in 
attendance. I made observation on how the issues were deliberated and how resolutions were 
taken. For example, one contentious issue that arose concerned the effectiveness of the Board of 
Trustees. Some members of the community were concerned about the type of training courses 
the Board and its management decided to send their children to be trained on which they argued 
were not what the community agreed upon. The members also questioned the biasness of 
allocating the training slots which they contended favored specific families.  After some heated 
debates, a motion of no confidence was passed on the Board and they were subsequently 
unelected after majority favored the motion. The new board was elected in the same meeting. 
I took note of the participation of the different attendees on the bases of gender and age. 
These attributes of the respondents help the researcher understand the factors that may influence 
the attitudes towards conservation of the environment and natural resources. I also took note of 
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the sitting arrangement and who set where, whether people of same gender sat together or 
whether they were just mixed as well as observing sitting arrangement by age. I felt the need to 
make this observation because I would learn something about the culture in a traditional 
assembly meeting and how that influences decision-making. 
3.3.2 Interviews 
I conducted interviews with key stakeholders from the Central Government, Local 
Government and community based organizations as well as the University of Botswana (UB), 
Department of Environmental Science at the Okavango Research Institute in 2009. The 
discussion with UB faculty centered more on research planning where my questions were 
directed at general issues about the ODRS, different stakeholders and different sources of 
information concerning the ODRS. In our discussions issues related to policies arose and how 
the different stakeholders interact in the ODRS which formed part of my data.  
In September 2011, I interviewed the Mababe chief, the chairperson of the Mababe Trust, 
the chairperson of Sankuyo Trust and the chairperson of the Khwai Trust. The Chief of 
Nokaneng and the tribal administration secretary were also interviewed. From the local 
government, I interviewed the Deputy Secretary of the Ngamiland Land Board on different 
subjects including the land use plan for the ODRS, land allocations and community involvement 
in the development of the area. I interviewed the Head of Department of Environmental Affairs 
in Maun on issues relating to policy and the ODMP and the different stakeholders involved in the 
ODRS. The chairpersons of the Khwai, Sankuyo and Mababe CBO/Trusts were interviewed 
separately concerning their respective CBOs. 
I used an interview guide with open-ended questions (Creswell, 2009; Hennink et al, 
2011) to direct and generate discussions.  By asking open ended questions, the respondents were 
72 
 
given an opportunity to provide as much information as possible with follow-up questions. I 
chose the interview method because it would help me get involved in the discussion and also 
make observations on non-verbal communication. I asked specific questions including what the 
people perceived as the benefits of CBNRM, what was the role of the community in the design 
and implementation of CBNRM, how the community leadership participated in CBNRM, the 
views of the respondents to wildlife presence in their area, and the role of community 
organizations in the management of wildlife resources. Other questions that I asked were: what 
were the views of the community with respect to the government in the management of 
CBNRM, the role of different government departments and how the community felt about their 
working relationship? I asked questions concerning other livelihood sources, mostly about the 
role of agriculture. Community members in focus groups were asked to rank the importance of 
wildlife, agriculture and other livelihood sources in their lives. A participatory rural appraisal 
technique of livelihood ranking was used to help understand the answer to this question.  The 
technique involves the use of visual material such as grain for respondents to cut the portion 
from the pile that represents the percentage a livelihood plays in their lives. 
In September 2011, I collected more data focused on the attitudes of members of 
communities in the ODRS towards CBNRM. I also asked questions about livestock keeping. I 
asked questions similar to the ones I asked about wildlife. In addition I asked about the views of 
respondents on the relationship between wildlife and livestock as well as the government policy 
towards compensation of wildlife damage on crops and on the predation of domestic animals by 
wildlife. 
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3.3.3 Focus Group Discussion 
In the summer of 2009, I conducted focus group discussions in the three communities of 
Mababe, Sankuyo, and Khwai. The participants were purposefully chosen based on availability 
and their resourcefulness on the issues relating to conservation and community development. 
The Chiefs in the three communities were instrumental in facilitating my meetings with the 
respondents. In Mababe, the respondents included seven males who were all in their twenties and 
six females three of whom were in their late twenties and one old woman who was in her late 
sixties or early seventies. The males were mostly articulate on issues concerning developments in 
their community. To encourage the flow of ideas, I prompted everyone to feel free to make 
comments especially those who were more reserved and not partaking in the discussion 
sufficiently. I did so by asking them what their thoughts were on the topic under discussion. In 
Sankuyo, only a few men were present and two women who most of the times were more 
reticent. There were five men in their late thirties or early forties and four women: three were in 
their twenties while one was in her thirties. In Khwai, the participants were mostly young men 
(six men and two women) all in their twenties and were active in their CBO and were well 
informed about issues concerning the developments in the area.  
3.4. Data Quality and Analysis 
To ensure the quality of data, Lincoln and Guba (1984), addresses different criteria that 
the researcher or naturalistic inquirer needs to be cognizant of for their data to be accepted. They 
posit that the issue to be tackled first is that of trustworthiness. To do so, they suggest that the 
researcher addresses questions of truth value, applicability, consistency and neutrality (Lincoln 
and Guba, 1984). They contend that these four issues help address the issue of reliability which 
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is a precondition for validity. Triangulation which means replication is used to affirm the 
reliability. 
In data collection, my role was that of a facilitator for the discussion to be focused on 
issues related to conservation and development in their respective communities and other issues 
stated before. The quality of this data is predicated upon the assessment of similar studies which 
could be compared for consistency. The instruments used should be able to yield similar findings 
if they are reliable. For this particular data collection, prolonged engagement in the setting 
ensured that the data collected reflects the situation on the ground not tainted with the 
misconceptions of the researcher, and secondly, the information was discussed with researchers 
at the Okavango Research Center specifically Dr. J. Mbaiwa who has been involved in several 
research projects in the area and thus familiar with the social environment of the communities. 
The discussions with the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) also provided 
verification of the validity of the information. The purpose was to triangulate using multiple 
sources as suggested by Denzin (cited in Lincoln and Guba, 1985).   
Several steps were taken to analyze data. The most recent data that I collected in 2011 
was in the form of recorded interviews. The first step I took was to translate the interviews from 
Setswana to English and at the same time transcribed the interviews. I then developed codes 
starting with initial coding of the data. A code is defined as “…an issues, topic, idea opinion etc. 
that is evident in the data (Hennink, Hutter, and Bailey, 2011, p. 216). Initial coding involves 
reading the data and identifying an issue that is repeated in several other transcripts (Hennink et 
al, 2011). After the initial coding, I developed a code book containing most of the initial codes 
already developed. A codebook explains the meaning of the codes and gives examples from the 
interview in order to ensure the meaning is correct given the context. The next step was focused 
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coding. This step involved selecting codes that are similar and describe broad segments of data.
 From the focused codes I developed memos which are explanations of the implications of 
the issue and the analysis of what they mean in the context of respondents. Most of the secondary 
data involved the numbers of wildlife, livestock, revenues and demographic data. The data is 
presented in the form of frequency tables to show the development tend in the ODRS and how its 
impact on the lives of the community members. This information from the quantitative data 
helps make sense of the impact of the livestock and wildlife based tourism polices on the 
communities of the ODRS. This baseline information is used to evaluate the responses from the 
community members given that the literature shows positive contribution of livestock and 
wildlife based tourism polices on development and yet there is continued conflict in the ODRS 
between the different actors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76 
 
Chapter 4. Results 
This chapter presents the results of this study. It is divided into three broad sections. The 
first section of this chapter presents livestock production. It focuses specifically on and wildlife 
based tourism 1), economic benefits of livestock production 2), policy incentive to livestock 
production 3), wildlife based tourism data and 4), policy incentives to wildlife based tourism. 
Information on economic benefits includes total cattle sales, holdings selling, total revenue. The 
second section presents results on wildlife-based tourism. It focuses on the economic and social 
benefits of wildlife based tourism. The economic benefits are discussed based on the revenue and 
employment created by community based organizations through which local people of different 
communities in the ODRS participate in tourism. The third section presents results on the 
attitude of the local people of the ODRS communities towards livestock policies, with specific 
reference to livestock disease control policy and the CBNRM. This section addresses the 
attitudes of local people in communities whose main source of livelihood is CBNRM and do not 
keep livestock; communities who participate in CBNRM and keep livestock, and communities 
who do not participate in CBNRM and are engaged in livestock production.  
4.1. Livestock Production 
After the cattle cull of 1996, following the Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia (CBPP) 
outbreak in the ODRS, the government restocked cattle to farmers who were affected by the cull. 
The government adopted the stamping-out policy (Marobela-Raborokgwe, 2011) where all cattle 
(320,000) in the affected zone were killed. The decision to kill all cattle in the ODRS during the 
CBPP outbreak was seen as the best strategy to eradicate the disease since the other options such 
as vaccination had failed and were also expensive. Cognizant of the potential hardship that the 
farmers in the ODRS would endure after the cattle cull, the government offered farmers three 
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options: the first option was for farmers to be given all their compensation money and get no 
cattle in compensation and the second option was for farmers to claim 75 % of the money and 
have 25 % compensation as cattle. The third option was for farmers to receive 75 % 
compensation as cattle and 25 % as money. The restocking exercise was aimed at helping 
farmers in the area to re-start their herds. 
In 1997, a total of 70,000 cattle were re-stocked in the ODRS and other parts of 
Ngamiland district.  Since then, the cattle population has been fluctuating but generally 
increasing from 1998 to 2006 as shown in figure 5. The cattle population was 92,154; 115,273; 
173, 474; 156,845; 139,196; 154,196; and 133,148 for the years 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 
2004 and 2006 respectively.  
Figure 5: ODRS Cattle Population by Year 
 
Source: Data compiled from CSO agricultural surveys for 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003.2004 
and 2006 
 
An agricultural holding is defined as an economic unit which manages agricultural 
production on a specified land area (CSO, 2004). Agricultural production can be any type of 
livestock production or crop cultivation in a farm unit. In the ODRS, the number of cattle 
holdings was also increasing for the same years. These are shown in Figure 6 below. 
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Figure 6: ODRS Cattle Holding by Year 
 
Source: Data compiled from CSO agricultural surveys for 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 
2006 
 
The benefits from cattle can be classified as social and economic. Emerton (1999) further 
classifies these into use values and non-use values (see also Barnes 1998; and Arntzen 2003). 
The use values include direct uses such as meat, milk, hides and draft power. The use of cattle 
for the provision of these uses has both economic and social components. These uses are 
addressed in the following sections starting with the economic benefits. 
4.1.1. Economic Benefits of Livestock 
The economic benefits of livestock discussed here include the revenues from cattle sales 
that individual holders earn, employment and the marketing infrastructure related to cattle such 
as roads and abattoirs. 
With the advent of the modern cash economy in Botswana, the sale of cattle for cash 
became one of the major benefits of livestock. This propensity to exchange cattle for cash was 
encouraged by the availability of the marketing infrastructure, such as the Botswana Meat 
Commission (BMC), local abattoirs, and numerous other marketing outlets that emerged with the 
modern economy (especially after independence) (MFDP, 2003; MFDP, 2010). This marketing 
network, which constitutes build or physical capital, became more visible after the discovery of 
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diamonds, which helped government to generate enough revenue to embark in such 
developments to achieve such built capital. The improved road network infrastructure, which 
connects production areas with marketing places, was also a catalyst to increased livestock 
production and hence increased sales. The overriding factor that led to the fast growth of the 
built capital for livestock production was the livestock policies that the Botswana government 
adopted including Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP), fencing component of the National 
Policy for Agricultural Development (NPAD) and animal disease control policy which were 
aimed at increasing livestock productivity. 
As a result of the cattle cull of 1995 due to the CBPP outbreak, the cattle population in 
Ngamiland has not reached its pre-CBPP levels. For example, Wilson (2000) found that an 
average number of cattle herd per household was fewer than five in the Ngamiland West region 
after the cull. The cull led to alternative sources of livelihood and cattle as a livelihood source 
lost its prominence (Wilson, 2000). Fidzani (in Flyman 2003) found that the eradication of cattle 
in the Okavango led to economic hardships that hitherto were unheard of in the region. From 
their surveys, the number of households that ranked cattle as their number one source of 
livelihood dwindled from 52% of the people interviewed in 1996 to only 7.2% in 1999. Despite 
this, cattle are still important to the people of the ODRS as will be shown later in this section. 
Revenues from cattle sales have been increasing largely due to the increase in sales since 
1998. The results of the trends in total revenues, cattle holdings, average revenue per holding and 
price received are shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Total sales and holdings selling, total revenue and average price in BWP by district and 
year 
    Source: Data compiled from CSO annual agricultural surveys for 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 
2004, and 2006 
 
Table 3 shows that there has been a fluctuation in holdings selling, total sales, total 
revenue received, average revenue per holdings and average price received. Average revenue per 
holding from livestock sales rose steadily from 1998 to 2004 and declined in 2006. These would 
be very low annual revenues for households where cattle are the only source of household 
income, which is sometimes the case.  
Figure 7 is a pictorial presentation of the holdings selling, total sales, average revenue per 
holding and average price trends over the seven year period. As figure 7 shows there is much 
fluctuation on total sales and average revenue per holding. The holdings selling and price and the 
average price have remained stable for the period.  
Figure 7: Holding selling, total sales, average price per holding and average price by year 
 
Source: Data compiled from CSO agricultural surveys for 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 
and 2006 
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A slight drop in average revenue is observed in 1999, which is consistent with the drop in cattle 
sales and revenues for that year. 
4.1.2. Policy Incentives to Livestock Production 
The agricultural policies in Botswana have mostly favored the livestock subsector 
compared to the crop subsector. The subsector has enjoyed favorable budgetary allocation and 
increased and improved built capital (roads, artificial insemination centers, marketing 
infrastructure etc.) There are also several institutional arrangements that the livestock sub sector 
enjoys. These include support from the government, parastatals4 and the private sector in terms 
of provision of subsidies, market and livestock feeds and vaccines.  
In terms of budgetary allocations, the livestock sub sector enjoys a bigger share of the 
MoA financial resources. This is with the blessing of parliament where budgetary allocations are 
debated and approved. For example, the MoA capital expenditure for the seventeen National 
Development Plan (NDP) 9 projects, which was implemented over a five year period starting 
2003/2004 financial year to 2008/2009 financial year stands at P1, 009, 265 as shown by table 1 
on page 9. 
The three projects were implemented by the then Department of Animal Health and 
Production now Department of Veterinary Services, constitute 36.28% of the total capital budget 
for the whole MoA. The animal disease emergency control and improvement to disease control 
are designed to control the major diseases such as foot and mouth disease, nakana, and cattle 
lung disease all of which are prevalent in the ODRS. The paradox of this is that no cattle or cattle 
products are allowed to leave the ODRS as part of the improvement to disease control. The 
imposition of trade restrictions on cattle from FMD zones has resulted in the banning of cattle 
                                                 
4 These are organizations that are jointly owned by the government and the private sector 
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from the ODRS to be exported to the lucrative European markets as part of the sanitary and 
phyto sanitary agreements between Botswana and the European Union. This means that these 
policies are more regional in nature and are invested in an area whose livestock has little benefit 
to the whole nation. 
Apart from budgetary allocations, the livestock sub sector has several other institutions 
that support it. The marketing outlets include the Botswana Meat Commission, municipal 
abattoirs, local abattoirs, cooperatives, watering facilities, kraals, and crushes. The road 
networks, which link production sites with the marketing outlets, constitute the marketing 
infrastructure that is supported by government policy. As Ghatak and Ingersent (1984) state; 
“producers must be convinced that a remunerative market exists for their products …before they 
can be induced to produce commercially” (p. 85). Although Ghatak and Ingersent were writing 
in the context of commercial production, the same logic holds for traditional production in 
Botswana. This is evidenced by the use of the marketing outlets by traditional producers in the 
ODRS where sales have been increasing (see table 3 above). To further illustrate the logic of the 
market outlets’ importance in production inducement, MFDP (2003) shows that the construction 
of several marketing facilities during NDP 8 “…in strategic production locations throughout the 
country and the distribution of these facilities has led to increased cattle off-take from the 
communal areas” (p.180). The availability, variety and proximity of market outlets therefore act 
as stimulus to more production.  
Despite huge investment in the livestock subsector especially in the ODRS as shown by 
the budgetary allocations, most cattle holders in the ODRS depend on other sources of livelihood 
than cattle  
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Figure 8: Number of holdings by main source of income
 
 Source: Data compiled from CSO agricultural survey for 2004 
 
Figure 8, shows that while livestock sale plays an important economic role in the lives of the 
farmers in the ODRS, they depend more on income from paid employment, income from 
remittances and income from pensions. In figure 9, which shows holding by main source of 
income for 2006, livestock ranks number four after, paid employment, pensions, remittances and 
income from other business.  
Figure 9: Number of holdings by main source of income 
 
Source: Data compiled from CSO agricultural survey for 2006 
 
4.2. Wildlife Based Tourism  
This section presents the advantages and disadvantages of wildlife-based tourism in the 
ODRS. The section is divided as follows: first the economic benefits of wildlife-based tourism 
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will be discussed. The discussion is centered on the revenue generated by the sector in the ODRS 
and on employment with specific reference to CBOs. Next the social benefits are discussed. 
Other benefits of wildlife are considered in a third subsection, followed by a summary of all 
benefits. This is followed by a discussion of the disadvantages and disincentives to wildlife 
based tourism. The section will conclude with a summary of the disadvantages. 
4.2.1. Economic Benefits of Tourism 
This subsection presents the economic benefits of wildlife based tourism in the ODRS. It 
starts with the discussion of tourism in the ODRS in general and then it addresses individual 
CBOs that are engaged in wildlife-based tourism in the ODRS. 
The tourism industry has been growing consistently over the past decades both in terms 
of international arrivals and revenue (Mbaiwa, 2005). For example in 2000, international arrivals 
were 689 million and in 2008 this number has increased to 928 million (Mbaiwa, 2005). This 
increase in international arrivals has been consistent all the years in between with a slight drop in 
2001. Revenues from tourism have also increased over the years from US$ 569 billion to US$ 
901 billion. A slight drop was also noted in 2001 with all the other years registering increases for 
the period. The increases in both arrivals and revenues were however skewed towards the HIC 
whereas the LIC countries had fewer arrivals and lower revenues. The challenges that the LIC 
face that limits them from earning higher revenues and more numbers of arrivals is low 
infrastructural development, skills and marketing infrastructure (World Bank, 2010). 
In Botswana tourism has also been on the increase with total arrivals increasing over the 
years from around 1 400 000 in 1998 to around 2 600 000 in 2008 (CSO, 2010). This increase is 
coupled with increased employment and revenue for the country. 
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                      Figure 10:  Total arrivals 1998-2008 
 
                      Source: CSO, 2010 
Tourism has also benefited the LIC by creating employment where formal jobs are non-
existent in many remote areas of these nations (WRI, 2008). Many LIC have realized increases 
in employment due to the expansion of the tourism industry as well as net revenue accruals to 
their state coffers. Despite these benefits, Mbaiwa (2005) warns of unequal distribution of 
tourism revenues due to the more common enclave tourism in most LIC countries. According to 
this type of tourism, ownership of tourism resources is mostly in the hands of foreigners while 
locals have a few non-profitable enterprises. The result is that most of the revenue leaks out of 
the tourist areas and leaves the local economies no better off than they would be if they owned 
more of these tourism enterprises.  
Employment in the tourism industry is also skewed with high paying jobs held by 
foreigners this being the result of the low skills level of local people in the tourism industry. 
Policies in place in some of the LIC are not effective in advancing tourism development. This 
usually is a result of pressing issues that force public policy to focus on other sectors such as 
education, health and food production (Sachs, 2005). 
While the HIC countries have diversified their tourism industry from being just extractive 
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use of their natural capital year ago, this phenomenon is recent in most LIC. The reason behind 
this is the desperate need of the people in LIC to meet their daily needs to escape poverty and 
other major challenges such as diseases, poor sanitation and meeting immediate educational 
needs. In doing so they draw more from the ecosystem services through extractive means such as 
direct use values of wildlife, forests and veldt products to meet practical needs in most cases at 
the expense of the strategic needs (WRI 2005, 2008). Developed built capital in HIC which 
become amenities attracting people from metropolis around the world are absent in LIC (Green, 
Deller and Marcoullier, 2005). This offers limited options for tourists in LIC hence LIC lag 
behind in terms of arrivals and revenues.  
The pull factors for most tourist destinations are their richness of natural resources such 
as flora and fauna and the scenic beauty of their landscapes. Research has shown however that 
while these attract a lot of revenue and in the process increased investments in further 
infrastructural projects, the local communities are often left with less benefits compared to the 
revenue generated (Twyman, 1998, Darkoh and Mbaiwa, 2005). Such needs as improved 
nutrition, access to medical facilities, good sanitation, and general wellbeing of local 
communities are often not part of the development agenda. This is usually the result of unequal 
power relations between the stakeholders involved in the policy process. Woolcock and Gibson 
(2008) for example, using a mixed methods approach studied the role of marginalized groups in 
local development found that these groups were usually excluded by the local elites in decision 
making. The only way the marginalized groups could participate was in the presence of 
facilitators who ensured that some form of dialogue was established and that the views of the 
minority were heard. It is however clear that despite these limitations, governments in LIC are 
investing their efforts in developing tourism and ensuring that local communities are involved 
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through community based conservation endeavors. In Botswana a large portion of land is set 
aside for tourism related activities as stated earlier even though the dominating economic activity 
in the ODRS is agriculture. 
It is worth noting that the different land use types such as tourism and livestock grazing 
yield different use values and the allocation of land is influenced by how much each land use 
type will benefit the local and national economies. Arntzen (2003) made an analysis of the 
different land uses using the model developed by Barnes (1998). The following table shows the 
different land use types under different economic analysis. 
Table 4: Economic analysis of land use types 
 Small-scale 
traditional 
livestock 
production 
Large-scale 
cattle post 
livestock 
production 
CBNRM 
in low 
wildlife 
quality 
areas 
CBNRM 
in high 
wildlife 
quality 
areas 
Commerci
al tourism 
I. Financial 
analysis 
     
IRR 11.5% 6.8% 8.0% 8.1% 9.6% 
NPV (Pula) 381 -52 846  3 466 20 302 229 517 
NPV/ha (P/ha) 52 -8 0.00 0.25 15.94 
II Economic 
analysis 
     
IRR 10.1% 2.0% 24.8% 54.1% 64.0% 
NPV (Pula) 4 679 -235 621 1.8 
million 
2.9 
million 
6.6 
million 
NPV (P/ha) 26 -37 3.00 36 457 
Source: Arntzen (2003). 
The table show analysis of different land use given specific internal rate of return. The results 
shows that small scale traditional livestock production is the most economic. This is followed by 
commercial tourism. It is worth noting however that these are economically viable under 
different scenarios. For example, wildlife based tourism will thrive in areas low human density 
and far from major human activity, areas whereas livestock production is the reverse. 
Commercial livestock production is shown not to be viable in the ODRS where commercial 
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tourism is most viable. Although this analysis has been done years back, experience in the 
Okavango Delta prove its veracity as the benefits shown in this section shows.  
The Okavango Delta is the number one destination for most tourists in the country 
because of its richness in both flora and fauna (Mbaiwa and Darkoh, 2005). Mbaiwa (2003), 
notes that the tourist arrival has been on the increase in Botswana from 540 000 in 1995 to 740 
000 in 1998. This number has been increasing over the years bringing more revenue to the 
country and specifically to the local communities in the Okavango Delta.  This increase will be 
viewed as good news as the expectation is that the communities will benefit through the 
CBNRM. 
Tourism brings benefits through increased employment where most of the local people 
participate. For example, the ODMP (2007) shows the proportion of locals employed compared 
to non-citizens. 
  Figure 11: Employment in the tourism industry 
   
  Source: ODMP, 2007 
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Figure 11 shows that 90.6% of the people employed are citizens and share only 58.3 % of the 
wage bill while the remaining percentage (9.4 %) is that of non-citizens and they share almost 
the same amount of the wage bill (41.7 %).  The skewed nature of the wage bill could be 
attributed to the low income jobs taken up by locals while the non-citizens occupy the jobs 
requiring high education. 
There are different types of business in the tourism industry. These include hotels, lodges, 
restaurants and safari lodges which are high quality compared to other accommodation types and 
business in the ODRS. Most people employed in the tourism industry are absorbed by these 
businesses. Figure 12 show the distribution of business ownership by types is presented. 
Figure 12: Number of businesses in ODRS by type of ownership 
 
           Source: ODMP 2007 
As shown in figure 12, the number of businesses in which citizens had ownership has increased 
between 2000 and 2005. Figure 12 however shows that ownership of business is mostly skewed 
towards non-citizens. As Mbaiwa (2005) argues this concentration of ownership in the hands of 
non-citizens works against citizen economic empowerment and will make it difficult for the 
Botswana government to alleviate poverty of which tourism is one of the main vehicles. Citizens 
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face difficulties in competing effectively with their counterparts from outside the country 
because of a lack of startup capital, as well as low skill levels in the tourism industry. 
At community level, tourism has been instrumental in ensuring the participation of local 
communities in the industry. This has been achieved through the CBNRM program which was 
designed to ensure community participation in conservation and at the same time accruing 
economic returns.  
Historically, Batswana utilized wildlife for consumptive purposes. Until recently, this 
form of wildlife has been dominant until the advent of commercial wildlife based tourism, which 
is deemed to be more profitable (Arntzen, 2003). Commercial use of wildlife brought other 
benefits, such as employment in the tourism industry and communities’ opportunity to have user 
rights over the resource through CBRNM. For these communities to benefit, they establish CBOs 
with the help of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the DWNP. The CBO must 
register a constitution with the government of Botswana in order for its existence to be 
recognized (DWNP, 2010; Boggs 2000). 
The analysis of the benefits of CBOs focuses on the revenue generated by the ODRS 
communities through the CBNRM projects, and the employment generated by the Community 
Based Organization (CBO). The economic benefits are investigated for each CBO sometimes 
called Trust. The trusts investigated in this study are all involved in wildlife conservation and 
utilization. The study focuses on the following six trusts that operate in the Okavango district: 1) 
Cgaecgae Tlhabologo Trust (CTT); 2) Khwai Development Trust (KDT); 3) Okavango 
Community Trust (OCT); 4) Okavango Kopano Mokoro Community Trust (OKMCT); and 5) 
Sankuyo Tshwaragano Management Trust (STMT) and 6) Mababe Zokotshana Community 
Development Trust (MZCDT). 
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The CBOs discussed in this study are all engaged in various aspects of wildlife-based 
tourism. These aspects of wildlife utilization include the selling of concessions by CBOs to safari 
operators, trophy hunting, marketing hunts, and rentals of Community Hunting Areas (CHA). 
4.2.1 a). Cgaecgae Tlhabologo Trust (CTT) 
CTT was registered in 1997 and covers the village of Xaixai only. It has been allocated a 
CHA, NG 4 which the trust uses for multiple purposes. It developed its management plan in 
1998 and has the following major activities in the CHA: photographic tourism, management of 
cultural tourism operation, and management of village shop and making and selling crafts.  
CTT has on average experienced growth in revenue from 1997 to 2009. The growth is 
shown in figure 13 below. 
 Figure 13: Total revenue by year in BWP for CTT 
  
 Source: Compiled from CBNRM reports Botswana 
 
Revenues for this particular trust were derived from the sale of part of the quota in 2001 to a 
safari operator, Michelleti Bates, while most of the revenue came from the Land rental which 
since 1998 has been steadily generating income for the CTT. Employment creation in rural areas 
is one of the objectives that the government of Botswana intends to pursue in all national 
development plans. One of the objectives of CBNRM policy is to create employment for the 
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communities which qualify to register a community based organization. Data on employment for 
CBOs is very sparse, making it difficult to analyze the true dimensions of the employment in the 
area. For the CTT, employment generated through the trust is for the years shown in figure 14 
Figure 14: Employment by year for CTT  
 
Source: Compiled from CBNRM reports Botswana 
 
As figure 14 shows, employment has been fluctuating over the years but rising over the first 
three years. It then declined in 2001 possibly due to the effects of the September 11, 2001. 
Although there was a pick in employment in 2002, there was a decline in the years 2007, 2010, 
and 2011 but due to limited data, this research could not establish the reason for the decline. The 
payment of employees differed depending on whether the employer is the Joint Venture Partner 
or the community Trust. The employment wage for the Trust ranges from P450 to P850 and the 
employees by the JVP are paid between P650 to P1500. It is however unclear how many 
employed people are members of the trust and how many are not members. It can be assumed 
though that most people employed in the trust are community members since the objective of the 
trusts is to employ people from the communities represented by the trusts (MFDP, 2010). It is 
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known that most of the employment created in this trust includes guides and other seasonal jobs 
(CBNRM, 2007).  
Projects undertaken for the development of the community includes the operation of a 
tuck-shop which is intended to help local people have access to commodities that they would 
otherwise travel a long distance to buy. The Trust has also built Trust offices in the village. The 
challenges faced by this Trust include misappropriation and mismanagement of funds from the 
CBNRM projects. Lack of proper record keeping is another problem that exacerbates the 
continued mismanagement of the funds. Inadequate involvement of community members in 
decision making obscures transparency and has resulted in mistrust of the Board by the general 
members. Lack of business and financial management skills is a noted handicap for the success 
of the Trust as well as accountability. This Trust has taken some steps such as opening accounts 
for each business that the Trust ventures into in order to monitor the performance of the projects.   
4.2.1 (b) Khwai Development Trust (KDT) 
KDT covers Khwai village, which is located in the ODRS on the fringes of the Moremi 
Game Reserve. The trust was registered with the DWNP in 2000. It had a membership of 395 
people in 2001(CSO, 2001). It controls the controlled hunting area NG 18 and also operates a 
lodge (Dinaka Lodge) situated in NG 19. The activities of this trust involve marketing hunts, 
grass and crafts marketing, subsistence hunting of part of the quota, and managing camps 
(DWNP, 2007). 
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Figure 15: Total revenue by year in BWP for KDT  
 
 Source: Compiled from CBNRM reports Botswana 
   
The revenues generated show an increase from 2000 to 2008 an unexplained drop in 2009 which 
could be associated with the international economic decline for that year. All income was 
received from selling hunting packages except in 2003 when additional revenue was received 
from campsites and the selling of the quota by public auction. Land rental and quota revenue 
increased over the years from 2003 to 2008. Employment in KDT varied for each year as figure 
16 below shows.  
Figure 16: KDT employment by year 
 
 Source: Compiled from CBNRM reports Botswana 
 
The employment figures are a total employed by the Trust and the Joint Venture 
Company (JVC). In 2000, their safari company employed three people per hunting package. This 
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means that total employment for that year was dependent on the total hunting packages obtained. 
The safari company employed the same number of people per hunting package in 2001. In the 
same year, the trust employed 22 people to work in camps. In 2003, employment fell to 20 and 
went up in 2010 and 2011. Due to lack of data it is not clear what has been happening in the 
years in between. As was the case with the CTT, the employment figures are not well explained 
in terms of the origin of those employed in the trusts. The objective of the trust, however, is the 
same as that of the CTT, to employ the community members where the trust is established. 
Hence it is likely that the trust employed only community members. 
The projects undertaken for the development of the community since the registration of 
the Trust include the building of an-eight bed hunting camp which is leased out to the JVC at 
P134000 per year with annual rental increment of 10%. The Trust also bought three vehicles (a 
Land cruiser, a truck a small truck) which are used by the Trust and the general membership. 
They have a speed boat used to patrol the river channel. They have invested in a burial fund for 
members with individual benefit of P3000. The community has also built a lodge (Dinaka lodge) 
which is to also be leased out to the JVC. Water reticulation is one of the projects that have been 
undertaken to provide water to individual households.  
Despite the above achievements the Trust faces some challenges. One of the major 
problems is the misappropriation of funds which are however difficult to prove because of poor 
or absent records such as audit reports and financial receipts. The lack of proper record keeping 
is due to the low skill levels of the local people who are in most cases forced to employ people 
from outside the community to run the management of their Trust. Intra-community conflicts 
have been witnessed in this Trust where the outgoing board refused to hand over the assets of the 
Trust making accountability and progress by the incoming board difficult.  
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4.2.1 (c) Okavango Community Trust (OCT) 
The OCT was registered in 1995. It covers five villages: Beetsha, Eretsha, Gudigwa, 
Seronga and Gunitsoga. The trust generates revenue from photographic tourism and the selling 
of concessions to safari operators.  Apart from the management plan that was prepared for the 
trust by the Okavango Community Consultants for the allocation of the CHA in 1991, the trust 
has prepared its own management plan for the CHAs NG22/23 through the Ecotourism Services.  
Since the trust started its operations, it has experienced steady growth in revenues over 
the years as shown in figure 17 below.  
Figure 17: Total revenue by year in BWP for OCT 
 
 Source: Compiled from CBNRM reports Botswana 
 
During the same period, employment fluctuated from a high of 155 people in 1997; dropping to 
150 in 1998 and 29 in 1999. Employment then rose in 2007 and 2010 and slightly fell in 2011. 
The fluctuation in employment is explained by the seasonal nature of CBNRM activities like 
hunting and photographic tourism, which are dependent on the arrivals of tourists. The 
employment created by the OCT is shown in figure 18 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
0
500000
1000000
1500000
2000000
2500000
3000000
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
97 
 
Figure 18: Total employment by year for OCT 
 
Source: Compiled from CBNRM reports Botswana 
Employment wages ranged from P650 to P10800 for both Trust and the JVC. 
Apart from the revenue generated and employment, the Trust has invested in the different 
income generating assets mostly shops and kiosks. The Trust also bought a motor boat that is 
used to transport between villages at a specific charge. The vehicles include three land cruisers, a 
truck and a tractor.  
The Trust has encountered problems similar to problems experienced by the other Trusts 
discussed above. The most pressing problem concerned the constitution that gives the Board of 
Trustees all decision-making powers. This has resulted in most decisions made without the 
participation of the general membership. For example, setting high allowances for the Board of 
Trustees which was not beneficial to the community. The constitution also requires only 10 
members in attendance to hold annual general meetings, which is not representative of the 
general members from the five member villages. Another complaint is lack of transparency of 
the Trust in its operations by not involving the majority of its members. This results in lack of 
information which might assist in the proper running of the Trust. 
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4.2.1 (d) Okavango Kopano Mokoro Community Trust (OKMCT) 
The OKMCT was registered with government of Botswana in 1997. The communities 
covered by this CBO are Ditshiping, Quxau, Daonara, Boro and associated settlements. The 
CBO is involved in the selling of concessions to the safari company, management of campsites, 
mokoro (canoe) packages, grass reeds, and fish marketing. This CBO does not have a 
management plan for optimal use of the allocated CHA NG 17. The only plan that is in existence 
is the one prepared by the Okavango Community Consultants, which was used to seek approval 
for the allocation of a CHA NG 17. 
Like other CBOs discussed in this study, OKMCT realized increased revenues over the 
years 1997 to 2009. The data are shown in figure 19. 
Figure 19: Total revenue by year in BWP for OKMCT 
 
Source: Compiled from CBNRM reports Botswana. 
Like revenue, employment has been increasing over the years for the community where 
the local population was the beneficiary. The employment trend is shown in figure 20. 
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Figure 20: Employment by year for OKMCT 
 
 Source: compiled from CBNRM reports Botswana. 
The Trust has also engaged in development activities including the drilling of water boreholes in 
four villages which participate in the Trust. The Trust bought twelve vehicles, used for the 
different activities in the participating communities.  
The problems encountered include the misappropriation and mismanagement of funds by 
the Board of Trustees. The board has apparently failed to account for money from other revenue 
sources such as buffalo fence gate fees and mokoro poling, raising suspicions that the Board is 
enriching itself through the Trust’s funds. This has stalled developments in the communities that 
are members of the Trust. The Board has also not been abiding by the constitution, which has led 
to poor management of the Trust. Inadequate involvement of the general membership in the 
Trust affairs has led to poor decision making process. Lack of business, accounting and 
management skills make the accountability of Trust funds very difficult as well as the general 
management of the Trust to make it more profitable.  
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4.2.1 (e) Sankuyo Tshwaragano Management Trust (STMT)  
STMT was registered in 1995 and is engaged in the selling of concessions to the safari 
operator, thatching grass, and subsistence hunting of part of the quota. The revenues generated 
through the trust are shown in the figure 21. 
Figure 21: Total revenue by year in BWP for STMT 
 
 Source: compiled from CBNRM reports Botswana 
 
Although there was a decline in revenues in 2001, there has been an overall increase in 
the following years up to 2009. More revenue for the STMT came from the hunting during the 
years when the Trust was allocated a quota. Other funds came from non-consumptive tourism 
such as photographic tourism and other projects owned by the Trusts including lodges and 
campsites. Since its inception, the STMT has initiated development projects including a 
campsite, cultural village, and water reticulation for members, water system toilets as well as 
helping the elderly with old age pensions on monthly basis. The Trust also administers 
scholarships for young people in the community to further their studies at tertiary level mainly 
doing tourism related courses.  
Employment in the trust fluctuated from 1997 to 2011 but generally increasing as shown 
in figure 22. 
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Figure 22: Employment by year for STMT 
 
 Source: compiled from CBNRM reports Botswana 
 
As with other Trusts, employment is dependent on the availability of the tourists who need 
guides, trackers, and temporary labor in the camps. The JVP employs most people compared to 
the Trust itself.  
The Trust has undertaken several developments in the village such as the construction of 
water system toilets. The Trust has also constructed a Community Social Center with a television 
and DSTV decoder for the general membership. The construction of Trust offices in Sankuyo is 
another project that was undertaken and completed. The Trust has also refurbished the Santawani 
Lodge which it operates and constructed six chalets with the assistance of African Wildlife 
foundation. The Trust also operates the Kaziikini Camp site with traditional houses, a central 
kitchen and ablutions. The Trust made a donation of P25 000 to National Aids Coordinating 
Agency and P25 000 to Masiela Trust Fund during the 2004 financial year. The Trust is in the 
process of reticulating water to households. By 2007, sixty-five stand pipes had been installed 
but the target was to have every household in the village to have a stand pipe. The Trust also 
built seven one-roomed houses for destitute children and the elderly in the community. Since 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2007 2010 2011
102 
 
1997, the Trust has been giving out P500.00 as household dividends to date. It also has a burial 
fund for members at a tune of P3000 per adult and P1000 per child (up to 16 years). A tune of 
P110 000 from Community Benefits Fund had been divided among elderly and disabled people 
of Sankuyo during 2005 and 2006 operation years.  
4.2.1 (f) Mababe Zokotsama Community Development Trust (MZCDT)  
MZCDT was registered in 1997 and operates Controlled Hunting Area NG 41. The focus 
of the Trust is hunting and photographic tourism with only Mababe village involved. The lease 
for the CHA runs from 2002 to 2017 after which the community needs to negotiate a new lease 
or an extension. The JVP is the African Filed Sports who started with the Trust in 2002 to date.  
The MZCDT has been having increasing revenue over the years from 2000 to 2009. Most of the 
income came from the quota and land rentals.  Figure 23 shows the revenue generated by the 
MZCDT over the years. 
Figure 23: Total revenue in BWP by year for MZCDT 
 
Source: compiled from CBNRM reports Botswana 
The MZCDT has engaged in several development projects intended to benefit the 
community. Some of the projects include the campsite, building of the Trust offices in Mababe 
and renovating some old offices. The direct benefits to the community include some destitute 
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allowance, scholarships which sponsor children from the community to attend schools in Maun. 
The courses are related to duties that need to be undertaken by the Trust such as accounting, 
secretarial courses and management courses. The idea is to invest in the community’s human 
capital so that they can run their own Trust and not have “outsiders” take up the managerial 
positions of the Trust. The Trust also has a burial fund that helps with funeral expenses for 
community members.  
Like many other CBOs in the ODRS, the MZCDT has challenges that include lack of 
managerial skills and financial mismanagement. And generally lack of trust of the Trust 
management which in most cases is manned by people from outside the communities is another 
problem that brings tension in the dealings of the community and its management. Low 
educational levels limit the capacity of communities to negotiate successfully for issues that are 
pertinent to their lives such as recognition of their knowledge system which has hitherto 
sustained wildlife and natural resource management. 
In conclusion this section has shown that the revenues from wildlife utilization increased 
for all different CBOs investigated in this study, although fluctuating in certain years. This was 
mostly due to revenues in CBNRM being dependent on the arrival of tourists. The same trend 
was observed with employment, which also fluctuated because of its dependence on the demand 
for tourist activities. Most of the revenues came from joint venture agreements as opposed to 
other sources of revenues in CBNRM. While economic benefits play an important role in 
CBNRM, there are other benefits from CBNRM that are mostly social. These benefits are 
discussed in the following section. 
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4.2.2. Social Benefits of Wildlife-Based Tourism 
 
This section presents the social benefits of wildlife in the ODRS. In this sub section the 
social benefits are divided into two components: 1) direct benefits and 2) indirect benefits. The 
direct benefits that are analyzed include access to subsistence products such as wildlife as 
sources of meat. To better understand the social benefit of wildlife, two entry points used by the 
World Bank in its ex ante analysis of development projects are used and they are: 1) Institutions, 
Rules and Behavior and 2) Participation. They are used to analyze the indirect benefits, such as 
ownership and decision-making, new alliances and social capital, social mobility and status 
attainment, technical and managerial capacity, and social empowerment. 
The tangible house-hold level benefits of wildlife, such as meat, are very important to 
realizing food security and nutritional objectives. Since the suspension of subsistence hunting in 
Wildlife Management Areas, communities’ access to wildlife meat through the kills made by the 
Joint Venture Partners (JVP). The communities, through their Trust, negotiate a quota with the 
DWNP.  The hunting takes place outside the parks and protected places (Arntzen 2003) in the 
wildlife management areas designated as community hunting areas or controlled hunting areas. 
All the CBOs discussed in this study can enter into an agreement with their JVP to auction their 
quota to the JVP. The JVP do the hunting and share the meat with the community. 
In Mababe, the community has an agreement with the JVP to make joint negotiations for 
the quota with the DWNP. Once the quota is awarded the JVP hunts the animals awarded and in 
the case of elephant kill, the parties agree that the whole meat is given to the community. 
According to the interviews, the JVP brings the carcass from wherever the elephant is killed 
close to the village where the whole community can harvest the meat. The JVP gets the tusks and 
the bones and any other parts they deem valuable to them. These portions on the elephant that the 
105 
 
JVP harvests are sold abroad at a huge profit. This fact has also been confirmed by Mbaiwa 
(2006) who found that the JVPs earn large sums of money and what they spend on paying the 
community for the quota is very low. In the event other animals are killed like buffalo or 
antelope, the JVP takes half of the carcass and the community gets the other half. This practice is 
common with most of the CBO in the ODRS  
The involvement of community members in CBNRM has other tangible results such as 
social mobility. Beeghley (2000) refers to mobility as “…changes in peoples occupation, either 
intra or intergenerationally” (p 43). In the context of CBNRM, the social mobility is looked at in 
terms of the movement of trust members from one social class to another. Although it is a 
difficult task to classify people into social classes, especially in rather homogeneous 
communities such as the ones found in the ODRS, Sorensen (2003) came up with the 
classifications as mentioned before. The indicators of these categories were as follows; housing, 
cattle, agriculture, fishing, employment, education, children’s education, temporary job etc. Each 
indicator was matched with the wealth category to describe their situation. Housing for the very 
poor was found to be a house in a poor condition, if any existed, but mostly none existed. For the 
poor, the house was a traditional hut with thatched roof and no compound. For the middle-
income group, the house was a brick house or possibly a traditional one with compound. For the 
rich and the very rich, the houses were brick with a fence surrounding them and had up to four 
rooms respectively.  
Using this classification scheme, Sorensen was able to evaluate the social class of the 
OPT members after a short period of time in the trust. She found that all the Polers who were 
regarded as very poor were now perceived as poor while some of the poor Polers had moved into 
the middle income group (Sorensen 2003). When the same scale is applied to the other CBOs, a 
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similar pattern emerges whereby the members are socially mobile within their own communities 
due to the earnings they receive from CBNRM. This trend is demonstrated by the increasing per 
capita revenues from CBNRM activities. The increasing income enables the members to afford 
social amenities that they could not afford before CBNRM, such as improved housing and 
education for their children. This makes it possible for community members to move up socially. 
All the CBOs studied here have been experiencing increased revenues. They have been able to 
invest their money in other developments, such as the building of lodges by the KDT, which in 
turn generates more employment (Potts, 2003). In this way community members are able to 
climb the social ladder as they earn more income through their CBOs and they have more 
opportunities for gainful employment. 
Status attainment is associated with social mobility. The data used in this study indicate 
that community members are able to move up the social ladder due to incomes they receive from 
CBNRM projects. Movement from lower status to a higher status through the productive 
application of one’s labor is associated with rationalization. Weber explained this as the process 
where social life becomes more methodical based on scientific knowledge (Beeghley, 2000). 
This rationalization process is also associated with efficiency and control. In the case of the 
community members involved in CBNRM, the status attainment process is contingent upon the 
community member’s achievement and not ascription (Beeghley, 2000). 
The technical and managerial training provided by CBNRM and the government, as well 
as the private sector, has introduced community members to the world of business where they 
have attained some skills in general as well as in project management. The empowering effect of 
this is demonstrated by participation in the political and social life of communities where 
members are more influential compared to before CBNRM (Sorenson, 2003). It is a requirement 
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that the private sector embark on training community members once joint venture agreements 
have been entered into (Boggs, 2000). This capacity building initiative for the CBOs has focused 
on four areas: 1) project planning, 2) land use and management planning, 3) negotiating joint 
venture agreements, and 4) basic project and financial administration (CBNRM, 2003). The 
training is supposed to enable improved management of the projects by the communities. The 
devolution of rights to the wildlife resources can only be effective if the communities themselves 
are more involved and participate meaningfully in the decision making process. Shackleton, 
Campbel, Wollernberg and Edmunds (2002) note that, “where local people are well organized 
and had alliances with NGOs or other influential groups, they managed to secure greater 
benefits” (p 5). It is the provision of such skills as mentioned above that provides empowerment 
to CBO members 
Another advantage of CBNRM and wildlife is that new alliances are formed between 
villages. For example, the OCT covers five villages that must work together in the management 
and conservation of wildlife for their own benefit. These new alliances create conditions 
conducive to rural development projects implemented in the district. Additionally, the social 
capital that results from these alliances would be broadly based compared to if only a few people 
are involved from a single village or community. Another form of social capital that can 
influence area development is political empowerment resulting in different villages speaking 
with one voice to influence political decision making in the district via district or village 
development committees.  
This form of social capital is indicative of the new rules and behavior that develop among 
people involved in the production of goods and services, such as those of CBNRM. Such rules 
require members to contribute to the CBOs by attending meetings and taking up tasks that are 
108 
 
assigned to them. Failure to observe the new rules may result in a loss of membership from the 
CBO and hence loss of income. The involvement in the production process engenders new social 
relations that bring people together to meet common goals. As a result of the participation in 
CBNRM projects in their respective communities, members of these communities show active 
participation in CBNRM conferences by voicing their concerns about conservation and the 
benefits of CBNRM. This active participation is a result of interaction among people of different 
communities and different educational levels where cross-fertilization of ideas exposes 
community members to different ideas. This occurs during the consultative process of CBNRM 
and in particular when communities initially form CBOs. During this consultative process 
government officials and members of the private sector and the NGOs are present. They present 
different ideas from which members of the community may benefit. This buildup of community 
empowerment is visible in conferences where community members are active and able to 
articulate their position in relation to pertinent development issues. For example, in the CBNRM 
conference of 2003, communities challenged the lack of youth participation in CBNRM. Their 
concern was that many youths instead roam the streets in urban areas unemployed. The 
communities blamed this on insufficient marketing of CBNRM and hence it was resolved that 
the newly established tourism board would take up the task of vigorously marketing CBNRM 
(CBNRM, 2003).  
CBNRM has not only brought monetary benefits to the Okavango district but also 
cultural benefits. For example, Mbaiwa (2004) has found that the use of mekoro (dug in canoes) 
have been used for many years in the Okavango district as a mode of transport and for hunting in 
the delta. The advent of tourism and CBNRM has brought new opportunities for this otherwise 
outdated mode of transportation to be rejuvenated for tourism purposes.  There is now a trust, the 
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OPT, which operates mekoro and has now been able to re-invest their financial benefits in less 
than ten years establishing a lodge and a camp site along the Okavango river (Mbaiwa, 2004).  
Another aspect of cultural rejuvenation is observed in the formation of traditional villages 
with traditionally constructed huts. These provide accommodations for tourists and generate 
revenue for the trusts. In the Okavango district the traditional villages have been constructed in 
Sankuyo, Seronga, and Gudigwa. Apart from the provision of accommodation, traditional dishes 
are also provided in the villages promoting the traditional culture. Traditional music and dances 
are an additional component of this endeavor to promote tourism through culture. In the process 
it is not only the tourists who enjoy the richness of culture but also the young who had lost touch 
with their own culture due to modernity.  
In summary, this section discussed the various social benefits and incentives associated 
with wildlife based tourism in the Okavango district. These include bush meat consumption, 
ownership and decision-making, new alliances and social capital, social mobility and status 
attainment, new skills acquisition, political and social empowerment. Through subsistence 
hunting communities are able to access bush meat. New alliances are formed as different 
communities work together to achieve their objectives in CBNRM.  Coupled with the new social 
capital that emerges from CBNRM activity, communities improve as they work together towards 
community development in general. Community members involved in CBNRM have been able 
to move up the ladder of social classes and attain new statuses, which lead to political 
empowerment. Despite the social benefits associated with CBNRM and wildlife utilization, there 
are some disadvantages as well. These are discussed under section 4.3. 
The actors in the ODRS are agreed in the promotion of conservation in the ODRS and the 
economic benefits that could be derived by utilizing natural capital and other resources in the 
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area. However, the different actors have different views on the effectiveness of consultation and 
implementation of the ODRS policies and strategies. It is useful to point out that in a situation of 
unequal power relations, the powerless, or those who wield less power such as local communities 
are often disadvantaged with the elites playing possum on issues raised (Dijk, 1993). The power 
of the elites is often organized and institutionalized and codified in different laws enacted with 
symbolic participation of the local communities (Mbaiwa, 2005). To help the local communities 
to have a voice is to assist in reining in the divergent views that are detrimental to the goals and 
objectives of the ODRS. It is also to help strengthen the organizational capacity of the local 
communities (de Souza Briggs, 2003).  
4.3. Attitudes of local people towards CBNRM and Livestock Policies 
This section presents the attitudes of the communities towards CBNRM and livestock 
polices in the ODRS. The section looks at different issues that affect the community emanating 
from CBNRM and livestock policies. It also looks at the decision-making process and the 
participation of different stakeholders. It specifically addresses the different discourses: official 
discourse, receiver discourse and practitioner discourse which provide insights into how the 
community members feel about the policies in the ODRS. In looking at the different discourses, 
the section particularly addresses attitudes by looking at the three different types of communities: 
communities that participate in CBNRM only; communities that participate in CBNRM and also 
keep livestock; and lastly communities that do not participate in CBNRM but keep livestock. 
The positive and negative attitudes are addressed for each type of communities as stated above.  
To better evaluate attitudes, questions such as: ‘what are your feelings about CBNRM’ 
“What are your feelings about animal disease control policy’ were asked and the answer was 
used to assess whether the attitude is negative or positive. Where the respondents expressed 
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dissatisfaction about the policy using such statements as: ‘that policy is for the DWNP and not 
for us’, ‘I do not benefit anything from the policy’, ‘I do not like the policy” etc., were used as 
proxies for negative attitude towards the policy. Positive attitudes were evaluated by such 
statements as: ‘this is a good policy’, ‘I don’t know what we would do without this policy’, ‘we 
depend on cattle and the policies that support us’ etc. Such statements were evaluated as 
indicating favorable attitude or perception of the policy. Such measures are consistent with what 
is suggested in the literature and what other researchers have used to measure attitudes (Browne-
Nunez and Jonker, 2008). In this study one technique that was not used but is commonly used in 
attitude research is the Likert scale where ordinal measures are used such as “Strongly agree”, 
“agree”, “no answer” “disagree”, and “strongly disagree” to measure the intensity of the attitude 
or perception (Babbie, 2004; Browne-Nunez and Jonker, 2008; Miller and Salkind, 2002). The 
Likert scale is more suited in interviews using structured questionnaires ‘…administered to a 
group of subjects representative of those with whom the questionnaire is used…” (Miller and 
Salkind, 2002, p. 330).  
The interviews conducted in the different communities of the ODRS and the 
conversations between the government and the communities on the consultative process leading 
to the ODMP revealed that communities appreciate CBNRM policy based on the tangible results 
that the communities enjoy as discussed in the previous section. The communities also expressed 
their desire to conserve wildlife and natural resources in the ODRS because of the benefits they 
derive from CBNRM. For example, KK, Mababe chief, put it this way “Life without the Trust 
would be very difficult (shakes his head, head bowed down). It brought employment, it has 
reticulated water into households and takes care of destitute and orphans. It has built houses for 
the elderly.” Code book, page 7. JR in Gudigwa, a community that keeps livestock and is also 
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involved in arable agriculture and participates in CBNRM said the following during the second 
round of ODMP consultative meeting held on 01/31/2005 
I learned that the DWNP will do some detailed studies about specific animal 
species. Before you implement any solutions, please come back with your 
recommendations to the communities. We would not like to see wild animals 
displaced from here as we make a living from them. In Gudigwa we have a 
community trust and get an income from wildlife through tourism activities. We 
have two trust vehicles in Gudigwa that assist people with transport. (P. 4.) 
These comments indicate the appreciation the local people have for tourism and 
CBNRM. These comments came from two communities: Gudigwa, involved in agricultural 
production and CBNRM and Mababe which is involved in CBNRM only. An interview with the 
court clerk in Nokaneng in October, 2011 revealed that the local people in that local people in 
that community do not appreciate CBNRM because they do not benefit from it. They do however 
acknowledge the benefits that they can get from the program but since their bid to register a 
Trust was unsuccessful, they depend only on agriculture for their livelihoods and other livelihood 
sources. They understand the benefits of the CBNRM program because they see developments in 
other communities that are part of the program and hence they argue that they should be allowed 
to register their Trusts so that at least they can benefit from the wild animals that kill their 
livestock and destroy their crops.  
There is a difference of attitude between communities that do not participate in CBNRM 
and those who participate. The other difference is the responses of communities who own 
livestock and also participate in CBNRM. Communities who depend on CBNRM for their 
livelihoods such as Mababe, Khwai and Sankuyo have strong attitudes towards the conservation 
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of wildlife and natural resources as well as the policy issues concerning the wildlife and other 
natural resources. Communities that depend on both livestock and CBNRM were more 
concerned with the conflict between wildlife and livestock while feeling that the government was 
not doing enough to help them keep their livestock safe from wildlife. These communities were 
also more affected by the policy conflicts between wildlife and livestock as well as the negative 
impact some livestock policies had on their livestock when compared to communities who 
depend on CBNRM as the main source of livelihood. The third category of the communities in 
the ODRS is those which are affected by wildlife but are not part of CBNRM and hence derive 
no benefits from the policy. This latter group of communities had a negative attitude towards 
wildlife and a strong negative attitude towards the DWNP.  
These local people in the ODRS communities however share many similarities on how 
policy decisions are made and other negative impacts that these polices have on them. The 
majority of the local people in these communities feel excluded and left out in the policy 
decisions that affect them. Four major categories are addressed that show different types of 
attitudes concerning livestock policies and CBNRM policy. These are: 
a. Feeling excluded from decision making 
Feeling left out of decision making is a category from the data that embraces several 
focused codes such as feeling marginalized, community being excluded and lack of transparency. 
This category denotes negative attitudes from the receiver discourse which were expressed 
during my interviews and the ODMP consultative meetings of 2003 and 2005. Feeling excluded 
from decision making means the feeling that the community is being left out when the 
government makes decisions concerning the ODRS. It means that communities’ participation in 
decision making is limited and in most cases symbolic. Symbolic participation means the 
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involvement of communities without commitment to embracing their concerns or ideas (Sen, 
1999; Twyman, 1998). Green and Haines (2008) address participation in terms of citizen 
participation or public participation which they differentiate from public involvement or citizen 
involvement. Public or citizen participation is conceived as a situation where citizens or the 
public are purposefully involved in activities in partnership with government or other agencies. 
This is also referred to as community action where the activities are initiated by the community 
through their community based organizations and are directed at changing a specific program or 
policy. The other form of participation, public involvement, is where the action is initiated and 
controlled by the government or outside agencies. 
b. Disregarding indigenous knowledge 
Indigenous knowledge here refers to the norms and values in a community that informs 
rules and institutions in the community that reflects the communities’ knowledge systems. The 
rules and institutions in turn reflect shared values of that community. These norms and values are 
transmitted from one generation to another and constitute social capital (World Bank, 2003; 
Gorjestani, 2000). Indigenous knowledge is part of social capital which Shaffer et al (2004) 
states as a “…important element in community decision making” (p. 203). Social capita is 
defined as the community networks, mutual trusts within the community, norms and values that 
are shared by community members for their common good (Shaffer et al, 2004; Green and 
Haines, 2008). Indigenous knowledge is an important element of social capital and is a very 
important issue in the ODRS because local people in the ODRS have their own norms and values 
as well as a set of skills that for thousands of years formed part of the human capital that 
sustained them in the ODRS. The local people’s set of skills that hitherto have been used for the 
preservation of the ODRS’ environment and its natural capital are an asset that needs 
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consideration in any program or policy that pertains to the conservation and or development of 
the ODRS. More discussion of this category is made under the different communities that are 
located in the ODRS. 
c. Expressing skepticism about government policy 
Expression of skepticism about government policy cropped up in all the interviews I 
conducted in the communities of the ODRS and they were also expressed in all the consultative 
meetings of the ODMP that took place in 2003 and 2005. Skepticism about government policy 
refers to the mistrust and lack of confidence in the policy promises by government and its 
agencies. The skepticism also refers to the perceived preference with which the government and 
its agencies treat the foreigners or non-locals compared to the local communities. The third 
aspect of skepticism comes from inconsistencies and mixed messages that come from different 
come departments which implement different policies in the ODRS.  
d. Conflicting Policies 
Conflicting policies are a common feature in many organizations where different 
agencies compete for the same resources, the same client but have incongruent goals (Meyers 
and Lurie, 2001). The agricultural and wildlife policies implemented in the ODRS are a thorny 
issue to the communities residing within the ODRS or in proximity to it. Of particular concern to 
the communities regarding the policies implemented in the ODRS are the animal disease control 
policy, land use policy and CBNRM policy. Apart from vaccination, the major policy instrument 
of the animal disease control policy is the veterinary cordon fences which crisscross the ODRS 
hampering both the wildlife migration routes as well limiting local people’s access to resources 
(Wilson, 2000).  
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The objective of the cordon fences is to separate livestock from wild animals in order to 
control the spread of diseases such as FMD and CBPP. Two fences, the northern buffalo fence 
and the southern buffalo fence are of particular interest in the conflict. Apart from blocking 
wildlife track routes these fences also limit access to grazing by livestock. The northern buffalo 
fence situated in the northern part of Maun (the capital of the Ngamiland district) cut through 
what had been the grazing areas for Shorobe farmers thus reducing grazing availability to the 
farmers. The northern side of the fence is the Moremi Game Reserve (MGR) which is declared a 
livestock free zone. Communities along the southern buffalo fence have also experienced the 
same disadvantage of the fence as those living adjacent to the northern buffalo fence (Mbaiwa, 
2006). The above categories are discussed in details below based on the different types of 
communities.  
4.3.1 Communities dependent on CBNRM only 
In this study, three communities who depend only on CBNRM as a source of livelihood 
were studied and are all situated in the livestock free zone where the MGR is also located. They 
are Sankuyo, Mababe, and Khwai all on the fringes of the MGR. 
a. Feeling excluded from decision making  
The interviews I conducted reflect feeling exclusion from decision-making. For example, 
one of the respondents from Mababe G.M who I interviewed in 2011 said: 
ODMP, I was there, there was a lady called PS today she’s assistant secretary 
somewhere in the ministries. When it started, we were just told, it was like here 
say, somebody just coming into the kgotla, then they say ‘there’s some club that is 
coming that is going to look at the river and how you can live properly along it 
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without polluting it and so that the river can also not trouble your lives’. As easy 
as that (p.3) 
G.M also expressed during the same interview the idea that the government develops ideas and 
bring them to the communities as finished products to be buttressed by the local people. He 
referred to the ODMP as an imposed plan on the local people, a “pre-cooked idea” idea as he put 
it. 
This comment concerned the ODMP and the consultative process that supposedly took 
place between the ODMP committee and the communities in the ODRS. According to the 
interview the issue was framed and decided by the government and its bureaucracy and presented 
to the communities as a semi-finished product  
In Sankuyo village, G. N commented in the second round of ODMP consultation held on 
3/7/2005 as follows 
In the past God blessed everybody. From the presentation it appears that our 
suggestions and requests have not been included by any department. Government 
comes up with policies and plans and they are implemented without listening to 
the communities. I have not been to school but I know the problems in our area. 
(p. 143). 
This comment is an indication of how issues are raised but are not included into agenda that 
leads to implementation. This non-decision by government is consistent with the second and 
third dimension of power where the power holders keep issues to safe havens for reasons which 
ensure that their agenda is pursued. Another respondent S.M of Mababe at the ODMP 
consultative meeting held on 3/7/2005 pointed out that they have had some recommendations as 
to how to solve their problems. S.M pointed out that “During the meeting in 2002, we made 
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recommendations on how to solve our conflicts with wildlife, but none of our suggestions have 
been implemented so far” (p.150).   
In Khwai, during the ODMP consultative meeting held on 3/8/2005, T.S commented as 
follows:  
In 2002 we were called to a workshop and made some suggestions how to solve 
conflicts that we have with wildlife. We suggested that the number of wild 
animals that are killed along the veterinary fences should be monitored, but we 
never got feedback as to whether that proposal has been implemented (p.153). 
These comments indicate that communities are requested to bring forth suggestions on topical 
issues concerning their lives but the problem lies in implementing these suggestions or the 
authorities providing feedback on progress made on these suggestions. This trend of non-
implementation or addressing of concerns by the government was common in all the 
communities in the livestock free zone where CBNRM is the main source of livelihood. These 
comments represent the receiver discourse where communities express their views on policies or 
government intervention aimed at improving the livelihoods of local people. The ODMP 
committee comprised mainly of government agency representatives (ODMP, 2005). Their 
responses reflected efforts the government has undertaken to help the communities and in some 
instances such comments seemed to blame the local people for the problems they experience. For 
example, a response to the issue of land allocations in Khwai raised in the meeting held on 
3/8/2005 was as follows: 
Up to now government did everything for communities. The idea of CBNRM is 
that communities should benefit from managing their own resources. Government 
is still  providing guidance to communities through the TA C. The Khwai 
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community did not take the advice of the TAC. The Khwai trust has a campsite, 
which is not utilized. Why do you want more campsites before you have 
developed the one you have already got? (p.153) 
The above comment was a response to a comment by K.S, a local resident of Khwai during the 
ODMP consultative meeting of 3/8/12: 
The tourism activities in our area are not benefiting us enough. The joint venture 
partner makes much more money than the community. We have applied a long 
time ago for more communal camping sites in order to make more money from 
tourism, but we have still not been allocated these sites (p.153). 
The two comments shows the conflict in receiver discourse and practitioner discourse where the 
latter is defensive of government policy and seem to suggest that the government is doing all the 
best in its power but the local people contribution is below expectation. It is clear from the 
comments that the government official did not address the thorny issue of unequal benefit from 
tourism between the non-resident actors which benefit more than the local people whose benefit 
less. It also shows how being excluded from decision-making leads to misunderstanding and 
potential conflict between actors representing different discourses.  
e. Disregarding indigenous knowledge 
The interviews and other data collected show that indigenous knowledge has been 
relegated to the margins of policy debates in the country. There is an acute dominance of official 
discourse with the expectation that the communities would and should follow the prescribed 
solution to their problems (Twyman, 1998). According to one key informant, K.K, the Technical 
Advisory Committee (TAC), which is composed of government departments and the private 
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sector, has a big brother mentality. The following is the comment from the interview with 
Mababe chief conducted in 2011: 
Now what happens usually is that the TAC has the mentality of big brother…but 
you know I don’t know but you know these people are not like the most educated 
like some people in specific areas but at times them being misled, they sometimes 
prevent the trust to make certain decisions at other times they disturb the trust in 
different ways. (p.7) 
The chief stated that the TAC comes up with prescriptive formulations which the community has 
to follow. He asserts that in most instances the TAC overrules and overturns the decisions that 
the community through their Trust makes. In some instances, he explains, the TAC insists on 
their position even if it contravenes the constitution of the Trust. These assertions are echoed by 
other respondents who also feel they are being instructed around ‘like kids’ as one respondent 
put it. Twyman (1998) found similar notions of the dominance of official discourse in her study 
of Okwa Development Trust. The words used are couched in palatable statements such as 
“ownership of resources”, ‘communities are in charge” and yet the communities end up being 
given an end product that does not reflect their views and in other ways not what they expected. 
The communities in the ODRS blame the decline of wildlife on the people who come 
from outside the ODRS and bribe the locals to use their licenses to hunt. One key informant, 
G.M from Mababe stated that the outsiders bring cars and guns and promise to share the meat 
with the local who fronts them in the hunting expedition. G.M claimed that some locals are paid 
money to do so. This therefore undermines the traditional methods that the community used in 
the past which allowed the hunters to appropriate only what they needed. The hunting tools were 
themselves limiting factors in the hunting process ensuring that there was no mass killing. The 
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presence of guns and cars as alluded to by G.M makes it possible for hunters to kill more, 
especially if they come from outside and do not follow the local rules of appropriation.  
c. Expressing skepticism about government policy 
The different respondents in the livestock free zone expressed frustration with 
government policy. Interviews with Khwai chief in 2011 revealed that the government makes 
promises they don’t keep. He argued that there have been so many consultations on how to run 
their tourism business but more often than not the TAC instructs them what to do and what not to 
do. In other instances they bring forth ideas such as waste management and they are told the 
issue will be addressed and it is never addressed. This has made local people to lose trust in 
government promises. 
An elderly lady, participating in the focus group discussion of 2009 conducted in 
Mababe, questioned if government knew if they as a community still existed. She wondered why 
they were poor and suffering whereas they were told they own the wild animals which would be 
bring revenue from tourism. Local people are aware of the income that is generated through 
tourism and they wonder why the benefits do not trickle down to them as promised by the 
government.  
f. Conflicting Policies 
Conflicting policies in communities that depend on CBNRM and do not keep livestock 
were mostly centered on how the DWNP treats local people vis-à-vis wildlife. There is a feeling 
among these communities that the DWNP favors wild animals over people. For example, G.M, a 
resident of Mababe during an interview I conducted in October 2011 made the following remark 
on the occasion of a lion that was killed because it was at a health facility “the DWNP was so 
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worried because a lion was killed despite the fact that it was preventing people from entering the 
clinic. These people don’t care about us they care only about animals”. (p. 11). 
Concerning agency goal conflicts, G.M (2011) from Mababe and the deputy chief of 
Mababe interviewed in 2009 revealed that an arable field was supposedly allocated by staff from 
the ministry of agriculture. The field was fenced and the community members were concerned 
that elephants would destroy the fence. The DWNP in an interview conducted in 2009 expressed 
ignorance about the field and were concerned that the allocation of the field was an act of 
promoting agriculture where the DWNP discouraged it. Another instance of conflict in policies 
and possibly also a reflection of inadequate communication between government agencies was 
demonstrated by a confusion that arose when goats were to be transported to Mababe for 
distribution among local people as a way of alleviating poverty. In an interview with G.M of 
Mababe, he informed me that some few years back, the government agreed to buy goats for 
Mababe community as a poverty alleviation strategy. The Ministry of Agriculture personnel 
bought the goats from Maun and other neighboring villages. On their way to Mababe, the DWNP 
officers stopped the goats from going through the buffalo fence gate because they would be 
entering a livestock free zone Another respondent, K.K the chief  of Mababe, stated that no one 
is prohibited from rearing animals (livestock) people are just discouraged because of predation. It 
is evident from these accounts that government policy is not clear about the different types of 
livestock. The feelings of despondency and frustration about different aspects of government 
policy were also expressed by local people in communities that participate in CBNRM and also 
keep livestock. 
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4.3.2 Communities participating in CBNRM and also keep livestock 
The communities that keep livestock and participate in the CBNRM are all located 
outside the livestock free zone mostly in the western and northwestern part of the ODRS. Unlike 
the Mababe, Sankuyo, and Khwai, each of which have its own CBO, most communities which 
participate in CBNRM and keep livestock share a single CBO mainly due to their being close to 
each. 
a. Feeling excluded from decision making 
The communities who participate in CBNRM and also keep livestock also expressed 
concerns of exclusion from decision making like those who depend on CBNRM for their 
livelihoods. Feeling excluded results in lack of trust on the governement and its institutions. In 
Eretsha during the first consultative meeting of 11/5/2003, resident comment number two said  
you say we should look after the Delta and its natural resources but we live by  
the Delta resources, so what should we do? We are suspicious that when you 
leave here you will sign away our resources and claim that the people of Eretsha 
have agreed to this. (ODMP, 2005). 
 In another village, Etsha 6 the following comment was made by M.T during the first 
round of the ODMP consultative meeting which was held on 11/13/2003  
 I do not believe these people came to serioulsy consider our opinion and help us. 
They are just doing their job because they get paid for it. We have often 
complained about wildlife but nothing ever happened. The government is mainly 
interested in the protection of the Delta, but not in our livelihoods (ODMP, 2005). 
Boro community is one of the settlements that were visted by the ODMP team. The 
community is situated in the southern fringes of the delta and is engaged in both livestock and 
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CBNRM. Several comments indicated that they feel excluded from decision making and many 
complaints were also raised concerning conflicts between livestock and wildlife.  
b. Disregarding indigenous knowledge 
In the words of respondent comment 7 in Gunotsoga during the ODMP consultative 
meeting held on 11/06/2003: 
 we are conservationists, we have selected trees from which to create our mekoro’ 
yet another one said ‘the reason we see wildlife today is because our forefathers 
have conserved them over the years and now tourists are enjoying them 
Communities also think the laws are changed so that they favor foreigners. In Gudigwa during 
the ODMP consultative meeting held on 11/5/2003 respondent’s comment 2 expressed 
frustration at the discriminatory system concerning game licenses where foreigners are favored 
because they are given licenses faster after application as compared to locals whose licenses are 
given out after a long time. The same responded went on to point out that they used to eat meat 
from lion left overs to avoid having to go hunting. When government encouraged them to settle 
down and leave their nomadic lives, the government put them on a food ration policy. The local 
people feel that they were better off with their old system where they lived off the land and still 
were able to rationally use the natural resources. The instruments used in harvesting natural 
resources have an impact on the depletion rates. The local people argue that the instruments they 
used to appropriate resource units were simple and did not allow for appropriation of more than 
they needed (Mbaiwa, 2006). For example, spear fishing is a traditional method that local people 
use to appropriate fish and they (local people) argue that this method cannot deplete fish. Instead 
they point to modern methods such as fish nets and used by JVP as depleting the fish resource. 
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g. Expressing skepticism about government policy 
Residents in communities that participate in CBNRM and keep livestock also expressed 
skepticism about government policy. Resident comment number eight in Beetsha for example, 
commented during the ODMP consultations held on 11/6/2003, ‘I think that government has a 
plan to kill all our livestock. I think that government doesn’t want us to live here and that this 
management plan is just a pretext to these things. Just come out straight and tell us the truth.” 
(ODMP, 2005). This concern expresses fear that government might want to kill their livestock 
possibly reminiscent of the 1996 cattle cull where all cattle were killed in the area due to the 
cattle lung disease. 
The delay in land allocations especially for agricultural and tourism purposes was a 
thorny issues in these communities. The Tawana land board was accused by most members of 
the communities as delaying developments and also of favoritism. For example, SX of Jao, 
commented during the ODMP consultative meetings held on 2/2/2005 that it was difficult for 
them to get land allocated in the delta because the TLB would not allocate them land whereas 
foreigners were given land by TLB. Many other local people from different communities that 
keep livestock and participate in CBNRM echoed similar concerns about the TLB and other 
government agencies. 
d. Conflicting Policies 
This problem is more pronounced in communities where livestock and wildlife are in 
close proximity to each other. In Etsha 6, a community located on the western side of the 
Okavango Delta but south of the pan-handle, K.C made the following comment indicating the 
different demands from government in an environment where there are several conflicting 
situations: 
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You are telling us to take care of our water resources, but the water has 
diminished. What is causing the low flood levels?  
You suggest we should not raise cattle. Elephants are breaking the buffalo fence, 
the fence is not repaired, and our cattle are crossing into the Delta. When cattle 
are found inside the cattle free zone, they are shot by the government. The owners 
are compensated with BWP 400 only. That is why livestock farming has gone 
back. 
Beetsha is a settlement that lies in the north eastern side of the pan-handle. Residents here 
depend on both CBNRM and livestock rearing for their livelihoods. Their responses to the 
interaction between livestock and wildlife indicate the intensity of this problem and their 
frustration that it is not being solved. As S.B commented during the ODMP consultative meeting 
held on 01/31/2005: 
In historical times cattle and wildlife mixed without getting Foot and Mouth 
Disease. It is difficult for us to see our cattle being killed when they cross the gaps 
in the buffalo fence. Fire has an important effect on eliminating livestock diseases 
in the floodplain grazing areas. Furthermore livestock benefit from the fresh 
sprouting grass after a fire. Normally we can coexist with elephants. They eat the 
vegetation but do not necessarily destroy it. However, when open water sources 
are diminishing, people and elephants are congested in the same areas. We used to 
kill and eat elephants to keep their numbers at an acceptable level (p. 8). 
This comment suggests the desire for local people in livestock keeping communities for a 
resolution to the policy conflicts. It also shows that local people reminisce of the past where 
livestock and wildlife co-existed. It may be assumed that communities had institutions that 
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enabled that environment to exist where livestock and wildlife conflicts were kept to the 
minimum. 
The conflicting messages and actions by the government agencies is another issue that 
was expressed by many respondents in the four villages (Mababe, Sankuyo, Khwai and 
Nokaneng) where I conducted interviews. The same sentiments were expressed by different 
speakers during the ODMP consultative meetings in all the categories of villages (see sec. In 
some instances such as in Ikoga village, the DWNP encouraged the community to form a 
TRUST, but according to A.K during the ODMP consultative meeting held on 11/09/2003, the 
Tawana Land Board refused to allocate them even though the WMA (NG24) was available for 
use. A.K claims that the Technical committee refused to sign the lease. Kauxwi community also 
experienced the same problem with the TLB after they formed their trust. During the ODMP 
consultative meeting, one community members stated that “we started our TRUST in 1999 and 
nothing has happened so far. The problem is the TLB; they send us back and forth between 
Seronga and Maun. The TLB even ignores local institutions when they come to deal with 
agricultural issues like farmers committees.” This non-decision on the part of governments 
brings confusion and uncertainty among community members 
One of the issues that worries local people concern compensation of livestock or crops 
that are killed or damaged by wild animals. The MoA encourages increased production of 
agricultural goods and the MEWT promotes the conservation of wild animals which destroys 
agricultural produce. When livestock is killed or crops damaged by wild animals, it becomes the 
responsibility of the DWNP which in most cases does not offices in the villages, to assess the 
damage whereas in most cases the agricultural extension officers are resident in these 
communities. One resident in Ikoga J.M remarked that “our fields are damaged by elephants 
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even when they are fenced. Wildlife department is not even coming to assess the damage and 
compensate us”. The compensation issue is more intense in the communities that own livestock 
because they experience a net loss every time their livestock is killed by wild animals or their 
crops damaged due to inadequate compensation. Compensation is dependent on the DWNP 
coming to assess the damage. There are instances that the DWNP does not show up for the 
assessment mainly due to logistical reasons that apply to the department such as lack of transport 
to go to the site, or inadequate staffing which results in the farmer not being compensated. In 
Ikoga for example one resident (J.K) remarked that the elephants are a serious problem and they 
damage their crops but wildlife does not even come to assess the damage and compensate them.  
The issues that are raised by these communities seem to have been raised before and 
there has been no solution to their problems. It would seem that the communities that keep 
livestock and participate in CBNRM were more concerned with livestock related issues 
especially as it pertains to the conflict between livestock and wildlife. Such comments as DWNP 
prefers wildlife over people suggest that they need assistance with livestock related issues more 
than conservation of natural resources as advocated by the DWNP.  
4.2.3. Communities that do not participate in CBNRM 
There are very few communities that do not participate in CBNRM except those that are 
located far from the ODRS even if they are still in Ngamiland district. Nokaneng is one of the 
few communities located in the ODRS south of the pan-handle on the western fringes of the 
Delta. Local people in this community depend on livestock as compared to CBNRM.  
a. Feeling excluded from decision-making: 
Local people in these communities expressed concerns that they were excluded from 
decision making. One respondent, respondent A interviewed in Nokaneng contrasted the current 
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situation of elected officials with the advent of chieftainship and said the following: “in the past 
our chiefs cared about us and knew how to work with us to control animals but the government 
and the wildlife people want the wild animals to kill us all so that they take our land”. This 
skepticism of government policy emanates from lack of consultations which in the past was 
strong within the community as indicated by the comment. The major issue raised in these 
communities however relate to wildlife and livestock conflict.  
b. Disregarding indigenous knowledge 
Residents of Nokaneng raised concerns about the invasion of modern institutions in their 
area which eroded the traditional rules and norms and hence affected the natural order of things 
such as availability of rain. In the words of S.K commenting during the ODMP consultative 
meeting held on 11/14/2003 “In the past when we had rain makers there used to be good rains 
that fed the rivers. There were always elephants in our area, but they came to drink water and 
walked away without harassing us.” (ODMP, 2005)  
In another settlement of Habu, situated south of Nokaneng in the western fringes of the 
OD, people expressed S. M 
I want to know which groups qualify for the community development fund. 
Perhaps the fund could assist us to drill boreholes away from the river. I am 
prepared to kill predators that destroy my livestock. I blame the DAHP officers 
working in our areas for suggesting such low compensation rates. 
This comment is similar to others that were expressed in the discussions of the ODMP. The 
comments were more concerned with the protection of their livestock and such expressions as ‘I 
am prepared to kill predators that destroy my livestock’ indicate preference for a source of 
livelihood on which the respondents depend. This community like others that do not participate 
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in CBNRM, are more concerned with protecting their livestock and agricultural production and 
do not dwell much on wildlife conservation which they see as a problem to them.  
The preceding discussion focussed on four categories that were constructed from the 
focussed codes. The categories discussed are: a. feeling excluded from decsion-making; 
disregarding indegenous knowledge; expressing skepticism about government policy; and policy 
conflicts. The discussion about these categories centered on how different communities 
responded to each of the categories. In the following discussion I focuss on each category and 
draw comparisons between communities, based on their responses. I also discuss practitioner 
discourse which in the case of the ODMP consultative meetings was a response to the reciever 
discourse.  
Feeling excluded engenders in the benficiaries of a specific policy negative emotions and 
attitudes towards the agencies that are responsible for its implementation. In the ODRS, the 
DWNP is responsible for implementing CBNRM and have thus receieved the brunt of the 
negative attitudes emanating from communities. The DWNP is the representative of government 
in the implementation of CBNRM and thus aims to ensure that the communities take part in the 
policy. Many community members believe that the DWNP favors animals over people and such 
comments were expressed multiple times during the interviews and the ODMP consultative 
meetings. These sentimenst are stronger in communities which do not particpate in CBNRM. In 
those communities that particpate in CBNRM, the sentiments show more negativity when there 
is conflcit in terms of livestock killed or crops damaged by wild animals and also where human 
life is threatened. In every village during the ODMP consultations, wildlife as a problem was 
mentioned more than 60% of the time and the DWNP was accused of doing nothing about this 
other than to prevent people from killing these problem animals.  
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Instances of exclusion in policy making by the Ministry of Agriculture concerning such 
policies as the veterinary disease control were also mentioned as shown in the sections 4.3.1, 
4.3.2 and 4.3.3. Communities who depend on livestock production for their livelihood 
complained about the veterinary control fence as cutting out some part of their grazing land 
hence leaving limited grazing for their livestock as discussed under sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3. 
They local people argue that this increases competition between livestock and wildlife for the 
now limited grazing resource. Mbaiwa & Mbaiwa (2006) also found that in Shorobe, local 
people complained about the buffalo fence cutting on their grazing land hence limiting access to 
other parts of the grazing area they use to have which is on the other side of the buffalo fence. 
Villages of Eretsha, Beetsha, Gudigwa, Maun and Shorobe all complained about the buffalo 
fence and its negative impact on their livestock during the ODMP consultative meetings as 
shown under section 4.22. The fence cuts them off from accessing other parts of the ODRS 
which before the buffalo fence they could access with ease and appropriate resources important 
to their livelihoods. 
In contrast, the communities that depend on CBNRM as their main source of livelihood 
did not express many complaints about the veterinary cordon fences or express any complaints 
about the MoA. The only comment that could be a measure of attitude towards the MoA in these 
communities was whether they get any help from the MoA or not. Their response was that there 
is very little help they get but did not express major concern about this scarcity of service From 
the official discourse, it is possible that this lack of support from the MoA to the communities is 
in line with the declaration of the northern side of the buffalo fence, where Sankuyo, Mababe and 
Khwai villages are located, as a livestock free zone. As it pertains to arable production, 
destruction of crops by wild animals is certain to occur, sparking compensation claims from the 
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DWNP by farmers. Since compensation for killed livestock and/or crop damage by wildlife is a 
thorny issue in the ODRS, the DWNP would not be inclined to encourage any policy that 
promotes agricultural production in the area especially in the fringes of the wildlife rich Moremi 
game reserve where the Sankuyo, Mababe, and Khwai villages are located. 
The intensity of the negative attitudes expressed also differs between the communities 
that own livestock and participate in CBNRM and those who keep livestock only but do not 
participate in CBNRM. The latter communities express skepticism about anything related to 
wildlife and CBNRM as well as frustration at the DWNP as regard the way the department treats 
wildlife favorably compared to local people. In these communities as shown by responses in 
Nokaneng and Habu, some local people express strong feelings about possible action towards 
wildlife if the wild animals kill their livestock as discussed under section 4.2.3.  
It becomes clear that these complaints emanate from the exclusion of communities in the 
initial policy ideas that resulted in the formulation of the policy. The communities get involved at 
the end of the process when the policy is nearing completion. Their involvement takes place 
during the consultative meetings through the kgotla where the draft policy is presented to the 
community so that they can present their views. Usually this happens when the issue has already 
been discussed by the legislature who now ensures it gets community ‘support’. Molomo (as 
cited in Edge and Lekorwe, 1998) points out that the bureaucracy in Botswana dominates the 
legislature in policy making more often by-passing the consultative process that needs to take 
place with the citizenry before the issue is placed on the official policy agenda. In the process the 
issue lacks the input of communities whose knowledge system has sustained them for 
generations. The disregard for indigenous knowledge emerged as one of the thorny issues during 
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the interviews and it is also mentioned in most of the villages during the ODMP consultative 
process. 
Specific to indigenous knowledge, the communities believe they are better 
conservationists than the government. They question the government’s proclamation that the 
government wants to help them conserve the natural resources which they (communities) have 
lived among and off them for generations. They argue that the reason why government is able to 
talk about the resources especially wildlife is because the communities have conserved them. 
The communities’ conservation strategies has for years been to kill only those animals that are 
old, or seem sick and mostly to kill male animals selectively. The idea was to ensure that there 
was breeding stock. Where a certain species was seen to be in decline, they would stop hunting 
that breed and its killing was made a taboo until the species recovered. These stories from the 
local people have been confirmed in the literature by other researchers. Mbaiwa (2006) for 
example also found that the people of Khwai hunted only certain species and usually they 
selected old males.  
The communities also blame current polices which they argue do not allow for animal 
population control. They give an example of elephant population which has increased to 
uncontrollable proportions. The communities believe conservation of natural resources should 
also consider the carrying capacity of the land. In this consideration, the communities argue, 
focus should not only be on cattle but also on wild animals such as elephants whose population 
growth has led to more destruction of vegetation hitherto not seen. The communities have in the 
past employed culling of elephants as a way of controlling their numbers. They would eat the 
meat and use other parts of the animal for different uses. The current arrangement now is that 
DWNP has control of who hunts and what to hunt and when. This then replaces the indigenous 
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knowledge conservation practices of the past. It also limits the right to access because the final 
decision as to who can access the resources in the ODRS rests with the DWNP. For example, 
accessing the national parks is in the control of the DWNP and communities do not participate in 
apportioning that right.  According to the five bundles of rights discussed earlier, the 
communities are given the right to access, manage and appropriate but the appropriation rules are 
designed by the DWNP. Thus the rules and institutions that hitherto sustained the commons 
according to the communities are replaced with new rules and institutions that are alien to them. 
This disregard for indigenous knowledge results in feelings of despondency and skepticism about 
government policy. 
Expression of skepticism about government policy cropped up in all the interviews I 
conducted in the communities of the ODRS and they were also expressed in all the consultative 
meetings of the ODMP that took place in 2003 and 2005. Skepticism about government policy 
refers to the mistrust and lack of confidence in the policy promises by government and its 
agencies. The skepticism also refers to the perceived preference with which the government and 
its agencies treat the foreigners or non-locals compared to the local communities. The third 
aspect of skepticism comes from inconsistencies and mixed messages that come from different 
come departments which implement different policies in the ODRS.  
The interviews that I conducted revealed lack of trust in the promises that the government 
and its departments make. A thorny issue that emerged in all the discussions both in focused 
groups discussion, key informant interviews and the ODMP consultative meetings is the conflict 
between wildlife and agriculture. This conflict involves crop damage by wild animals and 
predation of livestock by wild animals. 
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The proximity of livestock to wildlife areas due to settlement expansion has increased the 
interaction of wildlife and livestock escalating the conflict between the two (Van De Post, 2004). 
The increasing elephant population has also been a major contributing factor to this conflict as 
well as no clear policy to control such growth of settlements, elephant population and inadequate 
consultation of the local people concerning the management of the ODRS and its natural 
resources (Mbaiwa, 2006; Wilson, 2000). Figure 24 shows the distribution of elephants and 
livestock and elephants in the ODRS. As the figure 24 shows, there is more concentration of 
elephants in the northern part of the ODRS while most cattle population is concentrated in the 
southern part. The figure also shows that the cattle and elephants intersect in areas where the 
buffalo fence is not connected. The figure also shows that elephants are wide spread from the 
north into the central part of the ODRS and since they are difficult to control, elephants are able 
to go through some weak part of the buffalo fence and go into cattle grazing areas which increase 
the conflict between the two species. 
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Figure 24: Cattle and elephant distribution within ODRS  
 
 
        Source: MoA and ODMP, 2005 
Another major concern about the animal disease control policy is that cattle that 
accidentally enter the cattle free zone where elephants cut the fence are killed and the carcasses 
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burnt (ODMP, 2005; Mbaiwa, 2006). The community members question why can’t they be given 
the meat for consumption? On the reverse side, when wildlife crosses in the livestock zone, they 
are chased back into the livestock free zone often using helicopters. These issues were also found 
by Mbaiwa (2006).The community members wonder why the wild animals that cross into the 
livestock zone are not killed just like their livestock. The use of government helicopters creates 
an image about the government attitudes towards wildlife that is very disturbing to the 
communities. It gives an impression that the animals are much respected because helicopters are 
associated with dignitaries. This clear contradiction about government action on straying 
livestock and wild life animals fuels skepticism of the communities about government policies. 
Several community members have remarked “government loves wild animals over people”. 
Similar remarks were observed in most of the villages during ODMP consultative meetings as 
different members from the concerned villages expressed their despondency about the 
government preference for animals over people as will be shown under the discussion of local 
people of the different communities.  
A mitigation strategy taken by the government is to compensate the affected farmers after 
the DWNP assesses the damage. This appears a fair approach, but two issues arise that are a 
persistent displeasure to the local communities. First, the DWNP offices are located far from the 
site where crop damage or killed livestock occurred. This makes it difficult for communities to 
reach the offices within a reasonable time that allows the DWNP to find evidence of the damage 
or killed livestock. Added to this is the non-response by the DWNP due to their logistical 
problems (transport problems or inadequate staffing). If the DWNP fails to undertake the 
assessment of the damage caused or if they get to the site after the evidence has disappeared that 
links the damage to the wild animals, the farmer would not be compensated.  
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Table 6: Rank of animal problem by type and district 
 
  Source: MoA and ODMP, 2005 
The above table shows the animals that are a problem in the ODRS ranked by the problem status. 
As the table shows elephants are the main problem animals in the area followed by lion and 
thirdly the hyena.  
The second aspect of the mistrust results from the length of time that it takes for the 
compensation to be awarded. In most of the interviews the respondents expressed frustration that 
the compensation for their livestock killed by wildlife and their crops destroyed by wildlife takes 
too long if it ever comes. One of the reasons compensation never comes is due to the length of 
time it takes between the time the farmer submits a report to the DWNP and the actual 
assessment by the DWNP. In many cases the DWNP takes too long to go for assessment due to 
logistical factors stated earlier (transport shortage and low staffing) and when they arrive, the 
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evidence such as animal tracks, connecting the crop damage to wildlife would have disappeared. 
The same applies to livestock predation; the evidence such as tracks and the carcass would no 
longer be available for evidence (Mbaiwa, 2006). 
One of the uncertainties about government policy concerns the allocation of benefits in 
the ODRS. Most of the respondents pointed out that government agencies treat them differently 
from those outside the ODRS especially non-locals. They claim that non-locals especially white 
people are preferentially treated and are accorded easy access to resources such as land and 
licenses to start businesses whereas locals are not. They specifically complain about the Tawana 
Land Board (TLB) which they claim is “useless” in the words of one respondent. The TLB is 
responsible for allocating land to individual community members for residential, business and 
agricultural purposes. It also allocates CHAs once the trust is formed by a specified community. 
The TLB seems to have failed to efficiently and effectively execute these tasks for many 
community members in the ODRS. The complaints against the TLB were on average 40% of all 
the complaints during the ODMP consultative meetings of 2003 and 2005.  
Unmet promises from the government have contributed to the communities’ skepticism 
about the government. The interviews that I conducted revealed that there have been many 
consultations concerning the needs of the communities and the feedback the communities 
provided was never put into action. The local people, as tax payers, begin to wonder why 
government officials keep visiting the communities to solicit ideas about the best ways to 
improve the livelihoods of the local people and yet the officials never give feedback or 
implement the suggestions. As demonstrated in the discussion on the category ‘skeptical about 
government policy’, the local people become suspicious that government officers visit the Delta 
so that they can claim subsistence allowance. 
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4.3.4 Official and practitioner discourse 
 
The last sections (4.3.1, 4.3.2, and 4.3.3) focused on the receiver discourse. In this 
section, the discussion focuses on the official and practitioner discourse. Discussing the official 
and practitioner discourses entails looking at the responses that the policy makers and the 
bureaucracy make to issues raised by the receiver discourse as well as looking at the policy 
positions of government. In this study, official or practitioner discourse was limited by the 
reluctance of respondents to be interviewed as well as refusal to be electronically recorded which 
limited optimal use of the data and increasing the quality and richness of data.  
In general, the response of official discourse to receiver discourse was that of defending 
the status quo and the efforts put in place to assist local people through implemented policies. 
For example, the TLB in an answer to land allocation for agricultural purposes in Seronga in an 
ODMP meeting held on 02/03/2005  
The Land Board does not stop people from ploughing along the river or in the 
flood plains. However, TLB will not make allocations or issue certificates for 
molapo fields. Doing so would have adverse legal implications. TLB does not 
compensate farmers who plough in this high risk area if fields are flooded… P 24 
The answer is from practitioner discourse perspective where the speaker is an implementer of 
policy and follows the rules in place hence the answer might be seen to be inadequate as it 
merely states the position of government. It should also be noted that the issue here represent the 
feeling skeptical category discussed above. In Ikoga, CM, in an answer concerning the 
elephants/livestock conflicts stated that in many communities people have complained about the 
destruction caused by elephants. He mentioned that this issue would be addressed by the 
management plan (ODMP 2003). The same issue when raised in the second round of the ODMP 
meetings was answered in the same fashion making local people to feel that the government is not 
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taking their concerns seriously. Another complaint about the TLB with regards to unfair land 
allocations was that the TLB allocates land after consulting with communities (ODMP consultative 
meeting, 2005, p 87). Many communities as shown in the preceding section on skepticism of 
government policy have pointed out that the TLB was a problem with its land allocation policy 
which the communities were not clear as to how it works.  
Responses concerning low compensation have also been made as well. As one member of 
the ODMP team put it, the word compensation is not understood by local people and needs to be 
changed because according to the official explanation, compensation does not meet paying the 
value of the damage as the local people would like it to be. It means defraying cost for the 
farmers but not paying the total cost of the damage. This issue was raised in the different types of 
the communities studied: those depending on livestock only; those involved in agriculture and 
CBNRM and those that do not keep livestock and are involved in CBNRM. 
There were no official or practitioner discourses relating to indigenous knowledge other 
than to acknowledge the concerns of the communities. The same types of responses were made 
concerning policy conflicts where the issues of livestock predation and crop damage were 
appreciated by the official discourse and local people promised that action would be taken. This 
is indicative of the power of official discourse to manipulate issues in order to keep the conflict 
to low levels by using symbolic placation or non-decision. 
In conclusion, this chapter has discussed the attitudes of local people towards the animal 
disease control policy with specific reference to the veterinary cordon fences and the CBNRM. 
Three types of communities were discussed in this chapter. The communities that participate in 
CBNRM and are not involved in agriculture, secondly, communities that are involved in both 
agriculture and CBNRM. The third category of communities was those which are involved in 
agricultural production but are not part of CBNRM program. Four categories describing the local 
142 
 
people’s perception of the policies were looked at. These are: feeling excluded from decision 
making, skeptical of government policy, disregard for indigenous knowledge and policy 
conflicts. These categories are comprised of several focused codes that were derived from initial 
codes.  
The chapter showed that there were differences in intensity of attitude towards the 
policies depending on which community type was expressing the attitude. The results on attitude 
showed that the communities who participate in CBNRM only and not in agriculture are more 
concerned about being excluded from decision-making concerning CBNRM and hardly 
mentioned livestock policies. The communities that are involved in both agriculture and 
CBNRM showed concern about lack of consultations on both CBNRM and agriculture with 
more intense attitudes expressed decisions that affect livestock and wildlife conflict. Local 
people in these communities were more concerned about protecting their livestock and being 
involved in the decision making that concerned compensation for crop damage and livestock 
predation. Local people in communities that do not participate in CBNRM but participate in 
agricultural production were also concerned with feeling excluded although they were more 
concerned with decisions pertaining to agriculture and protection of their crops and livestock.  
Local people in all communities expressed skepticism about government policy. This was 
mainly due to unmet promises made by government agencies to the local people. Such promises 
as the solution to the livestock and wildlife conflict was a thorny issue in communities that are 
involved in livestock and crop production. For communities that are not involved in agriculture, 
the conflict involved the threat to human life by wildlife and the government inaction on the 
issue. Other examples that made local people lose confidence in the promises by government 
were the persistent soliciting of concerns or issues that the local people felt should be addressed 
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by the government but with no results. The discussion above shows that in a situation of unequal 
power relation, those who wield less power can bring forth ideas and concerns but the power 
holder may still not address them.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusions 
This chapter presents the discussion of the results and the conclusions drawn from those 
results. The chapter is divided into three sections as follows: first the discussion of the results is 
presented, followed by the limitations of the study and thirdly the recommendations are 
presented.  
The purpose of this study was to understand the conflicts in the management of the 
ODRS by evaluating attitudes of individuals who live in communities of the ODRS towards 
natural and environmental conservation. The study focused on the CBNRM policy and the 
veterinary disease control policy. The veterinary disease control policy is aimed at controlling 
animal disease through the erection of veterinary cordon fences which separates livestock from 
wild animals in the ODRS. The major livestock diseases that pose serious threats to livestock in 
the ODRS are foot and mouth disease and the cattle lung disease. 
5.1 Discussion 
This study found that most members of communities in the ODRS have a favorable 
attitude towards CBNRM due to the tangible benefits that accrue to them as a result of the 
policy. Communities most favorable to CBNRM are those who are involved with the program 
and thus are able to balance the loss of agricultural produce such as crops and livestock due to 
wild animals with the gains through CBNRM. Cash income is the major incentive that minimizes 
negativity to CBNRM even when there is predation and crop damage by wild animals. The 
communities, who do not participate in CBNRM, showed negative attitudes towards CBNRM 
which they equated to a policy that protects wild animals at the expense of their agricultural 
products: crops and livestock. Although CBNRM is viewed positively in most of the 
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communities, there is disgruntlement and frustration with regard to the way decisions pertaining 
to CBNRM and conservation are made.  
The main discontent with CBNRM is that the community participation in CBNRM 
decision making is symbolic rather than authentic. Participation is influenced by recognition of 
different actors by the power holders based on their power status. The power status might be 
based on the expertise of an actor or resources they have. For communities to effectively 
participate in decision making pertaining to CBNRM and Ministry of Agriculture policies there 
must be genuine recognition of the need for their participation by the power holders which are 
the government and the bureaucracy. In Botswana the legislature and the bureaucracy have a 
dialectical relationship at policy formation level where the bureaucracy is both an initiator of 
policy as well as the implementer also playing the role of advisor to the legislature. 
In political systems that heavily rely on top-down decision-making or what Howlett and 
Ramesh (2003) call unitary systems like China and France, different approaches must be used. In 
these systems, the government or the executive retains the power of decision-making and/or 
policy formulation. Its decisions are often unchallengeable (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: p 62). 
Over and above the power of the executive to make policies, it also has the responsibility to 
implement them. One of the legislature’s functions is to safeguard the interests of the society by 
holding the executive accountable. Botswana’s political system resembles this system with its 
three branches of government being the executive, the judiciary and the legislature. The power of 
the executive lies in their access to and control of resources like finance and the bureaucracy that 
serves as experts in policy issues. The role of the legislature is to make policies which are 
supervised by the executive for implementation. 
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In Federalist systems like the USA, at least two autonomous levels of government exist, 
e.g. states, provinces, regions that participate in public policy process as independent entities. 
The federalist system means that a decision must be reached involving all parties. This process 
often leads to protracted bargaining and lobbying between the groups and the policy process 
become a long process. In these systems participation is widespread among different actors 
unlike in unitary systems. This ensures the checks and balances that prevent dictatorial 
tendencies in policy making. Botswana follows a non-federalist system of democracy where the 
government is comprised of the legislature, the judiciary and the executive. The elected 
representatives in the legislature make policies with the bureaucracy playing an advisory role and 
at times as initiators of policy. The general population is informed about policy ideas which 
emanate from the legislature and/or from the bureaucracy. The weak civil society and 
fragmented NGO in the country creates a weak base for policy coalitions to be assembled which 
could increase the debate on policy issues. This results in the dominance of the legislature and 
the bureaucracy in policy formation with most of the citizenry participating at the end of the 
process when the policy idea has been solidified. The different ministries represented by their 
senior bureaucrats act as policy experts who bring policy ideas to the attention of elected 
officials intended to achieve individual ministries goals or provide solutions to their ministry 
problems which at times conflict with ideas from other ministries.  
The delayed solution to the problem of policy conflicts (especially animal disease control 
policy and CBNRM) in the ODRS between the MoA and the MEWT is due to several 
possibilities. One of the reasons for this delay pertaining to fences in the country is attributed to 
the political leadership in Botswana formulating policies that are in their best interests especially 
in the case of livestock (Fidzani, 1998; Cullis and Watson, 2004). Since cattle ownership is 
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concentrated in the hands of the few politicians and the senior bureaucrats (Fidzani, 1998), 
problems related to livestock are acted upon quickly and are well resourced. Polices related to 
livestock are also given priority when compared to environmental and natural resources policies 
(Wilson, 2000; Albertson, 1998).  
An examination of the CBNRM implementation in the Okavango region reveals that 
different social classes from the communities participate in the running of their trusts. For 
example, Sorensen (2003) examined the social groups who participate in the Okavango Polers 
Trust (OPT), another CBO in the Okavango region involved with wildlife based tourism. She 
discovered that before joining the trust, fifteen members were categorized as very poor, twenty-
nine as poor, thirty as middle income and only one member as rich. The ranking was based on 
five categories of very poor, poor, middle income, rich and very rich (Sorenson 2003). This 
indicates that the participation in the trust was inclusive of the different social groups in the 
community with the majority coming from the lower social classes. This participatory 
development more likely ensures that the lower social classes are uplifted from poverty and are 
able to reduce their dependence on government support. It also ensures the success of the project 
by increasing the revenues generated as demonstrated in the section on economic benefits. 
While it is established that different social groups in the communities are involved in 
CBNRM, it is also important to understand how influential they are in the decision making 
process of their trusts. CBNRM in Botswana has three main stakeholders: 1) communities, 2) the 
private sector (safari companies), and 3) the government. The devolution of power to the 
communities through CBNRM is intended to instill in the community members a sense of 
ownership of the resources to be conserved. As a result, they are given an opportunity to use 
their collective decision making to rationalize the use of the natural resources in their jurisdiction 
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to their own advantage and maximum benefit. This ability to make decisions independently has 
been observed in some CBOs in the ODRS. For example, the Khwai Development Trust never 
entered into a joint venture agreement with any safari company even though the general belief is 
that this form of arrangement is the most profitable. Instead, the Trust opted to auction a part of 
its quota to private hunters (CBNRM, 2003; Potts, 2003). Although the decision taken by the 
community was not popular with both the private sector and the government, the community 
went ahead with its decision.  
The benefit of participatory development, of which CBNRM is a strategy, ensures that 
the stated development objectives set by the community are met. For example, the CBOs studied 
have shown economic growth both in terms of revenues accruing to them and employment 
creation. This increase in revenues is the result of collective efforts by the communities to 
manage the resources in their areas to maximize benefits. One of the ways that CBOs have been 
able to maximize their earnings has been through decisions by trusts to sell part of their quotas to 
safari companies or enter into joint ventures. In this case, CBNRM has created conducive 
conditions for the communities to bond together for the common good. This is not only 
beneficial to economic development, but also to the enhancement of social cohesion in the 
community. It can be argued that the new social relations that are formed during CBO operations 
will engender a new sense of community in other areas of community development. Despite the 
seemingly high level of participation in CBNRM by communities as presented by official 
discourse, there are dissenting voices that are indicative of the hidden meanings and information 
gatekeeping that ensures the harmony intended by official and practioner discourses. 
Symbolic participation of communities in CBNRM and livestock policy making results 
from lack of recognition by both the bureaucracy and government of the communities as having 
149 
 
voice in policy development. According to Tatentove, Endelmbos, and Klok (2010), “…citizen 
participation…refers specifically to participation of citizens in policy formulation, decision-
making and implementation” (p. 609). When citizens are consulted on an already formulated 
policy for its finalization, their participation is not authentic but is used to justify the relevance of 
the policy as a solution to some well-articulated problem within the government circle or by the 
power holders. 
The voice of communities in the ODRS fails to get the attention of policy makers because 
they do not wield enough power to influence decision. They do not have the resources to 
mobilize and have their issues brought into the policy agenda (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, 
Gaventa, 1982). The state uses the mobilization of bias to keep the issues that community 
members care about to the margins. During the interviews the issue of livestock and wildlife 
conflict and the action the state has taken as inadequate was raised by all the communities and 
they (communities) indicated that it has been a thorny issue for years since the state took control 
of wildlife but no action has been taken to address it. The lack of participation of communities in 
the solution to wildlife and livestock conflict has left the communities as perpetual complainants 
about the issue. The solution the government put forward was inadequate compensation which 
was confirmed during the interviews with the focus groups discussion I conducted as well as by 
the ODMP consultative meetings.  In fact, Jackson et al (2007), show that the compensation 
given to farmers for crop damage by elephants is only 11 % of what they would get if there was 
no damage. Not only is compensation insufficient, the process for compensation is often long 
and stressful (Tawana Land board, 2005). The low compensation has been discussed in different 
forums but no agreement has been reached to increase the compensation.  
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The CBNRM policy and other conservation polices in the ODRS indicate the domination 
of the government and the bureaucracy over the communities in policy making. The participation 
of the communities takes place within parameters and limits set by the government. The policies 
are intended to regulate the resources euphemistically owned by communities and yet controlled 
by the government and the bureaucracy. DWNP for example has custody and control over 
wildlife which is ‘owned’ by the government and yet in discussions with communities the 
impression given is that the communities control these resources (Twyman, 1998). 
Communities’ control of resources is used as a powerful policy image by the government to 
appeal to the communities and their leadership to support the policy. Once the policy is 
supported by the communities, the DWNP which has policy monopoly over wildlife and other 
ecosystem resources sets rules in place which will govern policy implementation. As 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) note, policy monopolies have “…a definable institutional 
structure…responsible for policy making and that structure limits access to the policy process” 
(p.7). The DWNP in this case limits the communities’ access to policy process by excluding 
them from the nuts and bolts of the policy formulation. They do this by allowing communities to 
participate only at the very end when the policy has been formulated. 
The same strategy of limiting communities’ access to the policy process is applied by the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) which designs policies based on their perceived national and 
other political interests. The animal disease control policy was designed with only the prevention 
of livestock disease in mind. In the process the communities in the ODRS were barely consulted 
on the proposed policy. It is no wonder that the interviews I conducted and the ODMP 
consultative meetings revealed the displeasure by the communities about the veterinary cordon 
fences which they said restrict wildlife movements and limits their access to grazing and veldt 
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products. Wilson (2000) found these fences were erected without proper Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) despite the need for such EIAs to be conducted when such projects with 
potential impact on the environment are implemented. The bureaucracy in the MoA being the 
policy monopoly is able to thwart any suggestion that seems to threaten the policy they propose. 
The mobilization of bias was used in this case by justifying that the EIA would delay the need to 
promptly deal with the impending crisis of cattle lung disease which threatened the lucrative 
European beef market (Wilson, 2000). The paradox of this policy is that the beef from ODRS is 
banned from entering the European market! The interviews also revealed that even within the 
ODRS the movement of cattle is restricted from one area to another within the ODRS. 
The interviews revealed that local people in some of the ODRS communities have been 
forcibly moved from their locations in the past and such attempts or insinuations have been made 
in the recent past. The Mababe and Khwai communities have been moved when the MGR was 
established in the 1960s against their will (Mbaiwa, 2006). One of the respondents during the 
interviews revealed that suggestions to move them have been made in the recent past (5 years) 
when the Okavango Delta was flooding. The local people were informed that they should move 
because the floods would destroy their property but paradoxically some business people from 
outside the area were not asked to move. This has made local people in some of the ODRS 
communities uneasy and suspicious when they see government officials because they fear that 
they might be moved. In other words the appearance of outsiders; be they researchers or 
government officials is associated with threats of actions that would affect the communities 
negatively.  
Although there might be legitimacy in the local people’s suspicion of outsiders, it is not 
all the time that outsiders represent a potential threat to peace and tranquility that reign in these 
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communities in the absence of outsiders. Perpetual fear makes the local people to avoid effective 
participation in activities or deliberations that affect their lives. It can thus be argued that local 
people socially construct oppression based on past experiences and become targets for 
manipulations by the power holders. Gaventa (1982) found this type of outside control of the 
local people to be effectively used by the power holders in the Appalachian valley even when 
these absentee power holders were taking no action. The categories developed in this research 
point to the perspective of a powerless people, whose past and repeated exclusion from decision 
making couple with threats to be moved, feel oppressed due to latent actions on the part of the 
power holders. Charmaz (2006) define constructivism as “a social scientific perspective that 
addresses how realities are made” (p. 187). Social construction of oppression means a situation 
where people create an image of stifled freedom or imposed lack of freedom due to past 
experiences which then limits their ability to freely participate in the running of their lives. The 
ODRS communities who I argue socially construct oppression have limited freedom to articulate 
and mobilize process for the presentation and achievement of their desired goals. Lack of 
resources and the knowledge of the extent to which the power holders have and can utilize the 
resources at their disposal make local people to relegate themselves to the margins as well as 
have suppressed ambitions.  
The relegation of indigenous knowledge to the margins and its substitution with exotic 
knowledge system leads to the depreciation of social capital that hitherto has ensured proper 
governance in the use of natural resources and management of common pool resources (WRI, 
2005). As the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework explains, local rules and 
institutions in communities ensure an effective governance of common pool resources. This is 
made possible by the shared understanding and trust that has been developed over the years in a 
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community. The shared understanding and trust (social capital) make interaction of actors within 
the action arena more cordial and effective leading to meaningful decisions such as how much to 
appropriate, who should appropriate and when (Ostrom, 2011). In the case of the Botswana 
polity, the Kgotla is the major decision making forum making it the main action arena for 
community decision making within the IAD framework. It is in the action arena where rules and 
institutions are articulated and agreed upon for governance in the use and management of 
common pool resource. The current rules and institutions in place for governance in the use of 
CPR in the ODRS are characterized by a multi layered influence (Clement, 2009). As Clements 
again notes, it is important to understand the multi layered nature of IAD framework as 
comprising the national, the regional and the local (ibid). In the ODRS, this analysis is in order 
because the influence on the decision making at local level (community) is influenced by both 
the international policies (Ramsar) and a plethora of national policies such as tourism policy, 
CBNRM, animal disease control policy etc. 
The impact of these layers at local level is the depreciation of local culture and the rules 
and institutions that held the community together and its relationship to natural resource and their 
management thereof. In the ODRS, Ramsar requirements dictate certain policy positions such as 
the need for a management plan that aims to conserve the Delta and impose some limits on its 
use. At national level, policies related to the ODRS are aligned to the conservation of the ODRS 
according to the expectations of RAMSAR. This top down approach explains why in the face of 
decentralized planning through CBNRM there is still a lot of centralization (Poteete, 2011), 
hence the continued grievances from the communities. At local level, self-governance is 
undermined because the local rules and institutions of the communities are replaced with new 
and exotic rules and institutions from outside the community. Through the mobilization of bias 
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and non-decision, the government and its agencies are able to implement new rules and 
regulations even when the communities express their dissatisfaction. One way the government 
and its agencies use the mobilization of bias is to invoke the administrative procedures that 
prevent the questioning of government actions. For example, during the ODMP consultations 
such statements as “it is government policy we cannot change this now” and “we need to address 
relevant issues” coming from the ODMP project facilitator were common. By so doing the 
facilitator was able to restrict the discussions to “safe havens” (Rogers and Cobbs). Another way 
that issues from the communities were restricted was to re-direct them to other agencies that 
were not present during the consultative process. It is notable from the composition of the 
ODMP team that conducted the consultative meetings in 2003 that DWA, TLB, and MoA were 
not represented.  
The results section has shown that veterinary cordon fences are a thorny issue in the 
ODRS and have been for years before the signing of the Ramsar convention in 1997 (Albertson, 
1998; Mbaiwa, 2005; and Wilson, 2000). It is possible that the absence of the MoA from the 
consultative meeting was a deliberate action by the organizers to limit the discussions to non-
controversial issues. For example, when the issue of fences and the hardships these cause to 
communities the ODMP project facilitators answered “the community should report the low 
effectiveness of the buffalo fence and the unsatisfactory compensation for livestock that has been 
shot when found in the Delta to the DAHP”. There were so many grievances that were expressed 
about the TLB, but there were no precise answers or comments that the ODMP team made other 
than that the TLB was not present to answer. It is possible that leaving government agencies who 
seem to be at conflict with the community was a strategy to limit all the emergence of potentially 
controversial issues (Gaventa, 1982). Confronted with new and exotic rules and institutions in 
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their own action arena, communities face a choice of rejecting there new rules and institutions or 
going along with them amid torrid protests and grievances. In almost all cases communities 
follow and hope to one day understand (Poteete, 2011). The choice to reject the new rules is 
limited by the lack of resources on the part of the communities. They do not have the necessary 
skills, money and media on their side to effect the mobilization of process (Gaventa, 1982) on 
their issues. Similar to the experience of Appalachian valley, the media hardly reports on the 
inequalities and dissatisfaction of communities in rural areas. The ODRS communities are more 
disadvantaged because the issues that affect them do not take national character and are only 
relevant to them. That livestock is killed by predators is an issue relevant mostly to the ODRS; 
crop damage by elephants and other wild animals as well as the problem of veterinary cordon 
fences are spatially localized problems to the ODRS. Other parts of the country cannot relate to 
them, making expedited acceleration of these issues onto the formal policy agenda remote. 
The multi layered influence on the local resources of the ODRS by powerful international 
(e.g. United Nations Environmental Program) and national actors paralyzes the function of the 
local rules and institutions (Clement, 2011). Where local people could work within their actions 
arenas to design rules and regulations for governing CPRs given normal the external variables, it 
is difficult for ODRS communities to realize this goal because of the powerful actors stated 
above with their new rules and institutions. Clement (2011) argues that the disintegration of 
traditional rules and institutions was in fact a deliberate effort by government to extend control 
over communities. Agrawal (2011) argues that the CBNRM in east and southern Africa has been 
high jacked by the state, which despite advocates of decentralization of natural resources 
management, has in fact retained much of the control due to lack of trust on local communities’ 
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ability to effectively manage the natural resources. The state’s control on the natural resources, 
albeit advocating decentralization, has undermined traditional institutions. 
Community self-governance through CBNRM could be possible if the external actors 
loosened their grip on natural resources control (WRI, 2008). Experience with self-governance 
shows that communities can achieve good governance if they are able to use their institutions 
based on social capital (Agrawal, 2011; Poteete, 2011; Goldman, 2011; Ostrom, 2011). As 
Mbaiwa (2005) points out, before the advent of modern institutions and regulation by 
government, communities had their own rules that governed appropriation of resources. For 
example, Mbaiwa notes that hunting of animals was targeted at older males during specific 
seasons. They would avoid female animals and violators were punished by the leadership. 
DWNP (2010) also notes that animal species that were observed to be in decline would be spared 
from hunting. Taylor (2007) also observed that land use monitoring was enforced based on 
agreed rules and institutions by the communities. Selected land overseers would ensure for 
example that cattle only used an agreed side of the grazing area. The idea was to ensure that 
other sides of the grazing areas recover. Self-governance and management of CPR therefore 
depends on the communities’ social capital and the relationship between the community and 
external actors. Where there is more centralized power in a central agency such as government 
also being a stakeholder in specific CPR, self-governance will be undermined. The power 
differential would subdue the community to the dictates of the center. In a more relaxed power 
authority, the community would have the opportunity to employ and implement their rules, and 
self-governance. 
Government agencies involved in the development of the ODRS have direct impact on 
the livelihoods of communities in the area through the policies or programs they implement. The 
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major government agencies in the ODRS are the Department of Veterinary Services and 
Department of Crop Production in the MoA; Department of Tourism and Department of Wildlife 
and National Parks in the Ministry of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism, Department of Water 
Affairs in the Ministry of Minerals and Water Resources; Ngamiland District Council, Tawana 
Land Board under the Ministry of Lands. These agencies pursue their different plans all 
contributing to the national vision 2016. They play a major role and at times a leading role in 
policy agenda setting and policy formation. Where the policy issue emanates from the legislature 
a relevant department is identified where their expertise would be utilized to finalize the policy 
and implement it. In some instances sectorial policies emerge from the government agencies 
though identification of problems that the bureaucracy or experts deem important enough to be in 
the policy agenda. 
The different government departments stated above pursue their departmental goals 
which are sometime incongruent (Meyers, Riccucci, and Lurie, 2001). Part of the policy conflicts 
in the ODRS is due to incongruent goals pursued by the departments and by extension the 
different ministries. The Ministry of Agriculture pursues food security as a policy and recently 
with some shifts to food self-sufficiency. These are people centered policies which need more 
land in order to increase food production as well as more grazing for livestock. On the other hand 
the DWNP pursues conservation of wildlife and natural resources as a policy (for example 
wildlife policy of 1986) which is fauna and flora centered. To achieve conservation policies 
transformation of tribal land into WMA was effected to ensure free movement of wild animals 
and at the same time allow some livestock production in these areas (Taylor, 2006; Poteete, 
2011). The lack of congruence of the stated policies has resulted in the ODRS being both a 
livestock production zone with intensive investments by the Ministry of Agriculture, while from 
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the Ministry of Environment Wildlife and Tourism (MEWT), the ODRS is viewed as a 
conservation of natural resources zone with investments geared towards that goal. Food security 
as a policy outcome has not been jointly articulated as a congruent outcome that intersects both 
ministries. The result is pursuant of different policies by the two ministries that could 
complement each other but end up sending mixed messages to communities while aiming to 
improve the livelihoods for the same communities. For example the approval of the allocation of 
goats for Mababe by the MoA was intended to help alleviate poverty but the DWNP stopped the 
goats from reaching the beneficiaries in Mababe because the village is situated in a livestock free 
zone where livestock is officially not allowed. The presence of livestock (goats and donkeys) in 
Sankuyo, which is in a livestock free zone, contradicts the official policy which prohibits 
livestock production or arable agriculture in the area. In one instance a plowing field was 
allocated for Mababe residents and fenced and this also was against the spirit of conservation 
policies implementation by DWNP. These contradictions are exacerbated by the minimal 
participation of the target group (communities) as well as the bureaucracies’ motivation to 
achieve their goals. The results of this study show that the minimal participation of local people 
influences their views on the implemented policies while the contradictory and conflicting 
messages from the different government agencies creates a negative view of local people on the 
agencies. 
This study set out to investigate the attitudes of local communities towards the CBNRM 
and livestock policies especially the animal disease control policy. The study also set out to 
assess the impact of these policies on local development in the ODRS. From the results as well 
as the analysis of the results, this study concludes that the attitudes of local communities towards 
CBMR are a positive/favorable. This conclusion has also been reached by Mbaiwa et al (2011) 
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who compared the attitudes of people in Mababe, Sankuyo and Khwai between 2001 and 2011. 
He found that attitudes have increasingly been favorable between the two periods having been 
somehow negative in 2001 to being positive in 2011. The change in attitudes is attributed to the 
increase in tourism revenues that have trickled down the local people. 
This study and the one conducted by Mbaiwa finds that economic development and 
benefits from wildlife have been the major variable influencing whether communities support 
CBNRM or not. Where CBNRM is not implemented, the attitudes of local people towards 
wildlife are negative especially if there’s predation on livestock and crop damage by wild 
animals. The level of appreciation of CBNRM also differs depending on whether the community 
is dependent on the policy for their livelihood or not. For those communities who derive their 
livelihoods from CBNRM only,(Mababe, Sankuyo and Khwai) the policy has had a major 
transformative effect on their lives. The communities cannot imagine the hardships they would 
endure without the policy. This study concludes that the value of CBNRM to these communities 
is also related to other available opportunities which can create employment, generate revenue 
and hence community development. Such opportunities have never existed in the CBNRM 
dependent communities that were part of this study and there are still no alternative opportunities 
at present. Their evaluation of CBNRM is only in relative terms: a prior situation where there 
were no revenue sources and the advent of CBNRM which brought the benefits stated earlier: 
revenue and cash employment to individuals. Community members who own livestock and are 
engaged in CBNRM also expressed favorable attitude towards wildlife and CBNRM but were 
much concerned about predation on livestock and crop damage by wild animals. The inadequate 
compensation for livestock killed by predators and crop damage stared resentment towards the 
DWNP which is seen as being more concerned about wildlife and care less about the human 
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plight. Communities which do not participate in CBNRM expressed negative attitudes towards 
CBNRM and wildlife because they have a net loss due to predation and crop damage by wild 
animals. 
The attitudes of communities towards livestock policies were favorable except that they 
expressed concern about the buffalo fence which limits access to grazing areas and veldt 
products. The favorable attitude were evaluated by the statements that they respondents used 
during the interviews, focused group discussions and the data obtained from secondary sources 
such as the ODMP consultative meetings. The favorable attitude of ODRS communities towards 
livestock policies is influenced by the benefits (both social and economic) that accrue to them. 
Heavy subsides towards the subsector help maximize the benefits by minimizing the production 
costs of livestock making it a lucrative enterprise to venture into. Even those communities that 
do not own livestock such as those in the livestock free zone (Mababe, Sankuyo, and Khwai) 
expressed interest in owning livestock if they could be allowed to. 
The agencies that implement the policies in the ODRS also shape the attitude of local 
people. The DWNP is still viewed by some in a negative light. The major reasons for this are: 
DWNP is perceived by some as protecting animals at the expense of people; the DWNP limits 
the communities’ access to resources and exercises too much power over communities and 
decision-making process. The TLB was also perceived in a negative light with most respondents 
complaining about the TLB refusal to allocate land to applicants from communities but while 
allocation of land for foreigners or non-locals was perceived to be expedited by the TLB. It is 
singled out as delaying development because of its inefficiency in land allocation and rigidity in 
land use change. The respondents had favorable attitudes towards the DVS from the MoA 
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because its major function is to ensure the good health of livestock for farmers and is always 
available to meet the demands from communities. 
This study concludes that self-governance in the ODRS communities is hampered by the 
unequal power relations where external factors such as the government agencies are more 
powerful and bring prescriptive institutions that communities have to follow. The erosion of 
local institutions and rules weakens the communities’ capacity to self-govern and manage their 
CPR. Vestiges of centralization based on the patronage philosophy of the Harding’s model in 
resource conservation are still retained. It is possible that limiting the communities’ ability to 
apply and utilize their institutions might limit the efficiency of CBNRM as a policy as well as 
hampering the minimization of policy conflicts in the ODRS. The rights of communities to the 
ODRS resource system are limited to those of authorized user where their rights include access, 
withdrawal and management. This position makes self-governance difficult because one of the 
conditions for self-governance is exclusion meaning the ability to determine who will have right 
to access and withdrawal of resource units.  
5.2. Limitations of the Study 
Most research presents challenges that a researcher has to content with in order to get all 
the necessary data to perform an analysis of the problem under investigation (Browne-Nunez and 
Jonker, 2008). 
1. Time was the most limiting factor in this study as the research site is in a different country in 
an area not easily accessible by any type of transport except all-weather like four by four 
types of vehicles. The time to move from one area to the other was slow resulting in less 
being achieved than anticipated. This affected coverage because I could not reach a wide 
variety of respondents as I would have wanted to. For example, gender is an important 
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variable in natural resource management but due to time constraints I could not have focus 
groups with women only so that I could discern the gender dimension in the data. 
2. Qualitative research especially grounded theory requires repeated visits with respondents so 
that one can capture the changing views if any and also to use the observation technique 
which provides better results when done several times. 
3. Some respondents were reluctant to provide information and be recorded. Although most of 
the data they provided was captured by writing, some data could escape with possible effect 
on the quality of data collected. This was observed more with senior government officials 
who preferred to refer the researcher to written documents rather than answer questions and 
articulate policy position by government.  
4. Availability of data on employment, revenues generated by the different CBOs as well as 
distribution was scarce making it difficult to measure the real economic impact of the 
CBNRM policy on community development. It was also not possible to obtain current 
information on livestock sales to make comparisons of the value generated by livestock 
versus wildlife. Although this information would be useful, it was not critical because it was 
beyond the scope of this study both in terms of the research questions and the resources to 
obtain such information.  
Despite these limitations, this study was able to gather enough information to answer the 
research question by conducting extensive search for secondary data of which the ODMP 
consultative meetings minutes provided a valuable source bridging the gap in primary 
information gathering. The study also had an added strength of integrating the IAD framework 
with the power theory and providing insights into the interaction of the power theory and the 
framework which has not been adequately studied in the ODRS. The second strength of study is 
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the use grounded theory which emphasized narratives of the respondents as the basis for the data 
and understanding of the policy conflicts in the ODRS. This helped provide a clear view of the 
situation on the ground by providing stories from respondents first hand. 
5.3. Recommendations 
On the basis of the results of this study, the following recommendations are proposed: 
1. The respondents from the ODRS have a favorable attitude towards CBNRM but are not 
happy with the decision-making process. Adequate consultation is lacking and communities 
have to follow what the government and its agencies propose. It is recommended that the 
government and its agencies work with the communities to identify issues that the 
communities are concerned about and work with the communities to identify possible 
solutions to the problem. Communities' views on the issue or problem should be center-
stage so that they can have a sense of ownership of the proposed solution. 
2. In most or all the communities in the ODRS, the traditional institutions have been 
weakened. For example chieftainship has been undermined as the decision-making 
institution with the tribe but has been reduced to an extension of one of the government 
departments. Their role is to buttress what is being proposed by the government and its 
agencies. Despite this, the local people still respect the institution of chieftainship and would 
prefer to use it as the first point of contact for any concern that they have. This study 
recommends that the role of the chief and traditional leadership be strengthened by giving 
them more freedom to represent the interest of their communities and articulate local issues 
without inhibition by government regulations. Chiefs are currently regulated by the Public 
Service Act designed to regulate the public service. This obligates the chiefs to act 
spokespersons for the government with their different communities hence restricting their 
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ability to articulate the interests of their subjects more effectively such as the conflicts in the 
ODRS as well as the growing dissatisfaction of the local people with regard to their 
symbolic participation in policy decision making. By exempting them from the Act, they 
will be free to represent the interests of their tribes as well as working with elected officials 
in their communities for effective representation of the local people’s interests.  
3. Government agencies should work together towards identifying topical issues that affect the 
communities and consult on the roles of the different agencies in addressing an identified 
issue. The improved collaboration among the government agencies would minimize the 
confusing messages that conflict and contradict each other. This will bring more congruence 
in policy formation and will address the issues that the communities care about. 
4. NGOs and civil society should be strengthened and more involved with policy making as 
well as implementation so that there could be a voice that could counter symbolic placation. 
This should be done by empowering the local institutions such as the Village Development 
Communities, Health Committee, and other village institutions responsible for different 
aspects of village activities. The committees mandates should be clarified and the elected 
officers to these committees be trained in their mandate of their committees and how they 
should interact with elected officials and the government agencies. 
5. The communities in the ODRS are characterized by low development and lack of human 
capacity. This has resulted in many non-locals benefiting from the tourism industry than the 
locals. It has also led to many CBOs employing non-locals to fill management positions to 
help run their Trusts. Many conflicts and suspicions have arisen with communities 
suspecting fowl play when benefits are not flowing as expected. It is recommended that 
government creates a special fund to assist in accelerating the human capital of local people 
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so that they can manage their Trusts and reduce dependency on non-locals. This will go a 
long way in creating the much needed skilled labor in the communities. The current 
arrangement where some of these communities are treated at par with the rest of the country 
without due regard for the special circumstances that they face does not help the 
communities. By virtue of their location, some of these communities are far away from built 
capital which enhances learning and human growth, thus disadvantaging them when it 
comes to educational attainment.  
6. A monitoring and evaluation system with a management information system (MIS) should 
be established in order to track the progress of policy implementation. The information 
should be collected and kept at both local and national levels so that the information can be 
used to correct the immediate deviations at local levels while providing strategic 
information at the national level for alignment with Vision 2016. If the MIS is managed at 
the national level by the government agencies due to their resource access and human 
capital, it can be accessible to research which contributes valuable information to other 
stakeholders including government.  
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Appendix 1: Open ended questionnaire 
 
1. What are the benefits that you derive from CBNRM policy? 
2. Who came up with the idea of CBNRM? 
3. Before CBNRM, how did local people manage wildlife existence in their area? 
4. How have you been involved in conservation in the past? 
5. There has been a lot of concern about poaching, what are you views about causes of 
poaching?  
6. How do local people try to address the problem of poaching? 
7. What are the benefits that you derive from livestock policy? 
8. What is your role in making decisions pertaining to CBNRM?  
9. What is the role of the community in decisions concerning CBNRM/livestock policies 
10. How does the community leadership participate in CBNRM/livestock polices 
11. What are your feelings about the wildlife presence in your area? 
12. Role of community organizations in the management of wildlife resources 
13. What is your relationship with the DWNP?  
14. What is your relationship with the MoA? 
15. Are you aware of the ODMP? 
16. How have you participated in the design of the plan? 
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Appendix 2: Code book 
Code Type Description Example from 
Transcript 
Diverse ways of 
empowering community 
 
Inductive/d
eductive 
Actions designed to uplift 
the community 
economically and socially 
If government was to help 
people to utilize these 
natural resources 
including food to show 
case them to white people 
it would help them get out 
of poverty (p 1) 
Identifying viable projects:  deductive A set of activities 
designed to advance the 
wellbeing of the 
community 
yah basically what 
happens is that we look 
for diverse ways that the 
community can be 
empowered. (p 1) 
Explaining how decision s 
are communicated 
inductive Explanation of how issues 
are communicated 
With that in mind we 
present that to the board, 
and if they are happy 
about it then the 
community is informed 
about those decisions 
before they can be 
implemented (p 1) 
Tool for managing 
CBNRM   
inductive The use of constitution to 
show how the affairs of an 
organization are run 
the constitution explains 
that the board presents to 
the community (p 1) 
Dealing with technical staff 
 
inductive Issues handled by 
management that are 
considered requiring 
specialized skills to 
perform 
However there might be 
other technical staff that 
may come from the office 
that may require our 
presentation especially in 
the areas of accounting 
and stuff. (p 1) 
 
Management as technical 
experts 
inductive Individuals endowed with 
the skills to perform 
technical issues 
However there might be 
other technical staff that 
may come from the office 
that may require our 
presentation especially in 
the areas of accounting 
and stuff. (p 1) 
 
Differing levels of 
conceptualization 
inductive Understanding issues at 
different levels 
…ends up with the board 
not understanding exactly 
where we are coming 
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from, where we are 
driving them to or the 
vision that we have, the 
vision that we would like 
them to have ownership 
of, so we are all in one 
boat, and all able to move 
and deliver to the 
community (p 2) 
Improving information 
flow for community 
involvement 
inductive Disseminating 
information and 
empowering community 
and board members so 
that they and management 
understand each other 
board needs to be 
empowered in areas of 
education, areas of 
projects implementation 
so we all at the same wave 
length (p 3) 
Management superiority inductive A situation where 
management feels they are 
above the community 
So what we do is put them 
at the same level of 
understanding with us (p 
4) 
Having freedom to make 
decisions 
inductive The community’s choice 
to express their views 
without inhibition 
They ask questions when 
they don’t understand, 
they can sometimes refuse 
even if it’s a fair decision 
(p 4) 
Differing levels of 
understanding  
inductive A situation where it takes 
people different times to 
understand an issue with 
some grasping it quickly 
others taking a while to 
understand 
because the speed of their 
understanding is different, 
others grasp issues quickly 
others it takes them two or 
three days to understand 
what others understood in 
a short time especially old 
men (p 4) 
Agreeing without 
understanding  
 
inductive A situation where people 
agree to make another 
happy or to bring the 
conversation to an end 
at times agree but may not 
explain later why they 
agreed to the ideas or 
reason that we agreed for 
1,2,3 reasons (p 4) 
 
Resisting to new ideas inductive Reluctance or refusal to 
embrace unfamiliar ideas 
or projects 
it happens often when it is 
a new thing completely 
that needs to be 
implemented (p 5) 
Preferring certain Issues inductive Community members 
prefer issue that seem to 
address their core 
concerns and issues that 
If it’s something new like 
designing the logo, it took 
them time but if it’s 
something related to 
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they are familiar with projects like building, it 
takes them a short while 
because it’s in them 
already. (p 5) 
Explaining village power 
relations 
inductive Distribution of power that 
influence decisions in the 
community 
I was saying because of 
the two prominent 
families in the community 
we also encounter a 
challenge as management 
to work with the board 
and the community (p 6) 
Encountering challenges in 
decision making 
inductive Uncertainty about 
adopting a position that 
would be acceptable to all 
concerned 
I was saying because of 
the two prominent 
families in the community 
we also encounter a 
challenge as management 
to work with the board 
and the community (p 6) 
Not trusting management inductive People feeling that 
management favors 
another faction or groups 
let’s say on that decision 
Kebuelemang’s family is a 
beneficiary in that 
particular decision, the 
Tebalo’s family will feel 
we are doing that because 
we are on the 
Kebuelemangs side (6) 
Focusing on the objective 
to be achieved 
inductive Decision making by 
management designed to 
benefit all 
but we will be 
implementing the decision 
without looking at who is 
who in the community, 
only focusing on what is it 
that we want to 
accomplish (p 6) 
Participation in community 
power structure 
inductive A situation where people 
align themselves with 
major factions in a 
community 
yeah they are though, 
somewhere somehow they 
also have got their own 
side (p 6) 
Fearing victimization inductive fear to freely express 
one’s opinion to avoid  
being made a victim 
some decided to be silent 
for the reason of being 
hated; they don’t want to 
be singled out (p 7) 
    Management of CBNRM: 
Kgosi Montle 
Kebualemang 
Level of participation 
Tool for managing inductive The Trust used as a tool to you know we have a 
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CBNRM   
 
manage CBNRM community trust for 
Mababe, it really is a tool 
we use to manage 
CBNRM (p 1) 
Fluctuating level of 
involvement 
inductive Level of involvement 
varying depending on 
circumstances 
Some other times you find 
that my involvement is not 
that much, some other 
times my involvement is 
heavy depending on how 
much the board invites me 
to their meetings. 
 
Expressing wishes through 
constitution 
Inductive Using agreed upon 
constitution to guide the 
operations of the 
organization 
So it is the community 
that expresses their wishes 
concerning how the trust 
should operate by 
instituting that particular 
clause (p 2) 
Assigning importance to 
self 
inductive Speaking about self in a 
manner that shows how 
important one is 
But I think they at times 
invite me when they want 
my advice possibly when 
there is something that is 
technical but really all is 
up to them (p 2) 
Lacking skills inductive Where skills are scarce 
affecting decision making 
they may need me for help 
since there is shortage of 
skills on certain issues (p 
2) 
predatory animals 
conflicting with domestic 
animals 
inductive Wild life predation on 
domestic animals resulting 
in conflict between 
communities and the 
custodians of wildlife 
The reason is that there 
are a lot of predatory 
animals, hyenas, lions and 
leopard.(p 2) 
Inattention to Agriculture 
 
inductive When there is no support 
or notable promotion of 
agriculture 
the thing is it is not 
encouraged but it is not 
that they are prohibited to 
have animals.(p 2) 
Compensating for killed 
animals  
inductive The payment by 
government to the farmers 
whose livestock or crops 
have been killed or 
destroyed by wild animals 
Yes, there was even 
though I cannot remember 
how much the 
compensation was (p 3) 
Agriculture programs    
  Disclosing CBNRM as an 
alternative source of 
livelihood 
inductive CBNRM program being 
stated as an alternative 
source of livelihood to 
the advent of CBNRM 
provided an alternative 
source of livelihood. 
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agriculture (p 3) 
doubting government 
assistance 
 
inductive Unsure of what the 
government is doing to 
assist the people 
Actually they used to 
distribute seeds, but I 
don’t remember if they 
still do or not (p 3) 
Forms of agriculture     
Wildlife and agriculture 
conflict 
Inductive/d
eductive 
The problem that occurs 
when wild animals 
predate on domestic 
animals and destroy crops 
The problem is elephants 
have no barrier so they get 
in and stamp on the water 
melons, break the crops, 
baboons also destroy 
crops, the ntloles also eat 
the crops (p 3) 
Distributing resources inductive Sharing of resources 
among the community 
members 
Those in the village share 
from the rations of those 
in camps and others bring 
in some money. 
Bridging harvest gap inductive The strategies that people 
use to add to their food 
bank the shortages from 
harvests 
uuhh really what we get 
from our fields even 
though it is small we 
increase it by buying from 
places like Sankuyo, they 
sometimes have better 
harvests,  when people 
want to eat food from the 
fields.(p 4) 
Seasonality of hunger inductive Hunger described as being 
a problem in particular 
seasons and not a problem 
in other seasons 
hunger during the months 
when there is hunting is 
not an issue as such, even 
in the village (p 5) 
Disclosing income sources inductive Discussing where the 
community gets its 
revenues to sustain 
households 
you know there are those 
who work in the village in 
the Trust, from there, there 
are those in the camps. (p 
5) 
Negotiating quota inductive The participation of 
stakeholders in discussing 
how many animals are 
allocated to each 
community 
it is the company that the 
Trust has entered into an 
agreement with, you know 
the government gives us a 
quota for a certain number 
of animals for that season 
(p5) 
Having  brother mentality Inductive 
deductive 
A situation where one 
group exert their power 
over another to have their 
agenda succeed 
they sometimes prevent 
the trust to make certain 
decisions at other times 
they disturb the trust in 
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different ways (p 6) 
G.M    
Disregarding indigenous 
knowledge 
inductive When authorities impose 
their way of doing things 
and do not factor in loal 
skills and cultural 
practices 
That is he does not 
consider indigenous 
knowledge (p 1) 
Discussing poverty 
eradication 
inductive Explaining how poverty 
can be eradicated  
 
Abolishing dependency inductive Finding ways to ensure 
that communities do not 
depend on an outside 
entity for their livelihood 
When I am here I can 
think of things which as I 
move around here in the 
dry land that can be done 
to eradicate poverty, 
instead of struggling the 
whole day as someone’s 
laborer, or looking up to 
government. (p 1) 
Emphasizing resource 
availability 
 
Inductive Explaining the variety of 
resources in the area 
But while in the Ramsar 
Site, you are the boss 
because you can acquire 
so many things that one 
can acquire in the Ramsar 
Site (p 1) 
Showing resources wealth inductive Showing that there are 
richness and various 
resources in the ODRS 
I can use such plants as 
Maupo for soap, animals 
skins for clothes cause 
these days the animals are 
given (p 2) 
Being viewed as backward 
 
Inductive A view from outside 
entity of one being 
uncivilized 
So one can survive even 
though you will be like 
you’ve gone back to the 
Stone Age but still in the 
modern era. (p 2) 
 
Critical of government 
policy  
Inductive/ 
deductive 
When the government 
policy is being pointed at 
as being responsible for 
the existing problem 
If government was to help 
people to utilize these 
natural resources 
including food to show 
case them to white people 
it would help them get out 
of poverty (p 2) 
Feeling discrimination by 
government 
Inductive Government seeming to 
favor certain people over 
the local people 
Instead of government 
asking the people to leave 
the Delta and go to the dry 
land, while allowing white 
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people to remain in the 
Delta. And yet coming to 
the land you don’t know 
and understand, you see (p 
2) 
Uncertainty about 
government policy  
inductive When government adopts 
different positions that are 
contradictory 
This leads to people to 
take chances and claim 
that government is doing 
this because of certain 
reason 
Advocating transparency inductive Avoiding unscrupulous 
ways of using resources 
by ensuring that resource 
use is being accounted for 
So what is needed is for us 
to utilize them in a proper 
manner without corruption 
because they are not for us 
alone (p 2) 
Marginalizing communities inductive When communities are 
deliberately left out of 
decision making 
An example I can give 
you is when they made the 
final plan for the OD 
Ramsar Site, we were 
holding a meeting at (p 2) 
Symbolic placation inductive When authorities promise 
to take action on an issue 
to stifle opposition only 
but in essence do not keep 
the promise 
Then they say “nah, we 
will always bring a car”. 
They never did, it only 
happened that we found 
later that the ODMP was 
finalized. 
 Government insensitivity inductive Government unwilling to 
address issues or concerns 
of local people 
When they ridicule them, 
they call them river 
Bushmen, those people 
have their way of life so 
when you make them 
abandon their of way of 
life just because you want 
to conserve and yet you 
can’t accommodate them 
in your house, you can’t 
go with them to the toilet 
you cannot... you can’t 
work with them, what 
reaction do you expect 
from them? 
